92 F. 663 | 2d Cir. | 1898
Since tbe argument of this appeal, tbe case of The Carib Prince has been determined by tbe supreme court (170 U. S. 655, 18 Sup. Ct. 753), and that adjudication narrows tbe consideration of the cause to tbe question whether tbe steamship was seaworthy at tbe inception of tbe voyage. If she was, as it is not open to dispute that the injuries which caused tbe libelant’s loss were caused by tbe perils of tbe sea, and could not be repaired during tbe voyage, the exception in tbe bill of lading against liability for losses caused by such perils protects tbe vessel from responsibility. According to tbe doctrine of The Carib Prince, a stipulation in tbe contract of affreightment exempting tbe vessel from liability for loss and damage occasioned by any “latent defects in tbe bull of tbe vessel'’ does not extend to such as were in existence at tbe time of tbe commencement of tbe voyage; and tbe provisions of tbe statute known as tbe “Harter Act” (section 3), by which, if tbe owner “has exercised due diligence to make tbe said vessel in all respects seaworthy —neither the vessel, her owners, agent or charterer — shall be held liable for losses arising from dangers of the sea” (27 Stat. 445), does not relieve tbe vessel, notwithstanding it is satisfactorily proved that due diligence was thus exercised by tbe owner. The case illustrates the inadequacy of language, whether used in a contract or statute, to modify tbe rigorous common-law obligation of tbe carrier by water, importing an absolute warranty that tbe vessel is seaworthy at tbe outset of her voyage. That decision is, of course, controlling upon this court.
Tbe libelant’s sugar, shipped upon tbe Sandfield at Alexandria, Egypt, for transportation to New York, was damaged by sea water which entered tbe bold of tbe vessel by leakage around a rivet in one of tbe steel plates below the water line in the port bilge aft, and which became loosened on tbe voyage by tbe. vibration of the vessel while straining and pounding in weather of extraordinary severity.
In constructing such a vessel, the plates are riveted to the frames by driving a hoi rivet from the inside, and battering down the head so as to fill op the countersink in the outer surface of the plate. Apparently, in the case of this particular rivet, the hole in the plate was not perfectly fair with the hole in the frame when the rivet was driven, there being a deviation in the inside surfaces of one-eighth of an inch in- diameters of seven-eighths of an inch; and, in consequence of the rivet following the irregular passage-way, it was not long enough when battered down to completely fill the countersink. When the ship was docked in New York after the voyage, the countersunk part of the rivet was found broken off and gone, but the rivet, (bough loosened, had to be driven out with a hammer and punch.
The witnesses say that on the voyage in question the weather was the worst ever encountered in their experience. The steamship received much sea damage. Two lifeboats were damaged, — one washed away; the winches were damaged; pipes and ventilators on deck were carried away; bridge rails and stanchions were bent and broken; the after deck was started.in two places on the port and starboard sides; the wheel chains were parted several times, and after shackles were put on the shackles parted; and the propeller shaft was fractured from racing. At times she fell into the trough of the sea, and quantities of water came through the skylight into the engine-room.
The theory upon which it is insisted that the steamship was un-’seaworthy is that the rivet in question was defective. Undoubtedly the rivet was not as perfect as the workman might have made it, and was less capable of resisting the effects of strain and vibration
In the case of The Warren Adams, 38 U. S. App. 356, 20 C. C. A. 486, and 74 Fed. 413, this court had occasion to consider the presumptions to be indulged upon the question of the seaworthiness of a vessel at the outset of the voyage. The court said:
“Where a vessel soon after leaving a port becomes leaky, without stress of weather, or other adequate cause of injury, the presumption is that she was unsound before setting sail. The law will intend the want of seaworthiness, because no visible or rational cause other than a latent or inherent defect in the vessel can be assigned for the result. But, where it satisfactorily appears that the vessel incurred marine perils which might well disable a*667 ■staunch and well-manned ship, no such presumption can he invoked. And where for a considerable time she has incurred such perils, and shown herself staunch and strong, any such presumption is not only overthrown, hut the fact of her previous seaworthiness is persuasively indicated.”
We conclude in the present case that the vessel was seaworthy, and that the rivet was fractured and loosened b,y the extraordinary strain inflicted upon it by stress of weather.
We have not overlooked the contention for the appellant that the steamship should be held liable for negligence because of the omission to open the sluices during the 20 days of the storm. If this was a negligent omission, it occurred as a part of the “management of the vessel”; and the owners having exercised due diligence to make her in all respects seaworthy, and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, she is not liable for faults in her management, and the terms of the Harter act (section 3) apply. In the recent case of The Silvia (decided at the present term) supra, the supreme court defined the meaning of the words “management of said vessel,” as used in the “Harter Act,” as follows:
“They might not .include stowage of cargo, not affecting the fitness of the ship to carry her cargo. But they do include, at the least, the control, during the voyage, of everything with which the vessel is equipped for the purpose ■of protecting her and her cargo against the inroad of tho seas.”
The decree is affirmed, with costs.