16 N.E.2d 752 | Ill. | 1938
The People brought an action of debt in the circuit court of Cook county for the 1932, 1933, and 1934 personal property taxes against the Wilson Car Lines, Inc., a Maine corporation with its principal place of business in Cook county, Illinois. Propositions of law were submitted by defendant and judgment was rendered by the court in its favor. The case is here on direct appeal.
The principal facts were stipulated by the parties. On April 1, 1932, defendant company owned 1742 railroad cars valued at a fair cash value of $968,853; on the same date in 1933, it owned 1697 cars valued at $1,021,238; in 1934, it owned 1,627 cars valued at $1,055,689. These cars were rented to railroad companies for the interstate and intrastate transportation of merchandise to and from certain meat-packing plants located in Cook county. Defendant also owned office furniture and fixtures located in the same county. In 1932, defendant filed a personal property tax *296 schedule listing its office furniture at $500. The local assessor increased this valuation to $755 and inserted an additional assessment on line 16 of the printed schedule labeled "Manufacturers' Tools and Machinery," with a valuation of $168,983. The two items were totaled and equalized at thirty-seven per cent, making an equalized assessment of $62,803. Defendant filed a complaint before the board of appeals which revised the assessment and reduced the equalized value to $53,145. A tax was thereupon assessed against defendant in the amount of $4,107.51, only $14.30 of which was paid — that part of the tax attributable to the office furniture.
In 1933, defendant again scheduled only its office furniture. An additional assessment of $145,440 was entered by the assessor on line 10 of the schedule labeled "Machinery and Equipment," and another item of $25,000 was entered on line 16, labeled "all other personal property." These items were equalized at thirty-seven per cent to give a total assessed value of $63,137. Defendant again complained to the board of appeals which struck off all the items except the office furniture. Subsequently, after notice to defendant, the assessor made an additional assessment for omitted property for the year 1933 in column 10 labeled "Machinery and Equipment," with an equalized value of $48,138. Substantially the same events occurred in 1934. On line 10, labeled "Machinery and Equipment," an additional assessment of $117,094 was entered by the assessor; the board of appeals, upon the recommendation of the assessor, reduced that valuation to $70,456 which was equalized to $26,069, and defendant paid only $4 — the tax on its office furniture — out of a total tax of $1,856.12.
It was successfully contended by defendant in the circuit court that the assessment entered on line 16 of the 1932 schedule labeled "Manufacturers' Tools and Machinery," and those entered on line 10 of the 1933 and 1934 schedules labeled "Machinery and Equipment," could not *297
be sustained by proof that defendant owned railroad cars — assuming that these cars were subject to taxation. A motion was filed by the People to correct the record to show that the assessment made in each case was upon cars owned by defendant but this motion was denied. Section 191 of the Revenue act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 179) provides: "In all judicial proceedings of any kind, for the collection of taxes, * * * no error or informality in the proceedings of any of the officers connected with the assessment, levying or collection of the taxes, not affecting the substantial justice of the tax itself, shall vitiate or in any manner affect the tax or the assessment thereof; and any irregularity or informality in * * * any of the proceedings connected with the assessment or levy of such taxes, or any omission or defective act of any other officer * * * connected with the assessment or levying of such taxes, may be in the discretion of the court, corrected, supplied and made to conform to law by the court," etc. While the right to order the record amended under this section is in the discretion of the trial court, such discretion must be reasonably exercised and is subject to review upon appeal. People v. Payne,
The schedules upon which the challenged assessments were entered were issued by the State Tax Commission in conformity with the provisions of section 25 of the Revenue act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 25.) The one used in 1932 contains forty-one separate classifications of personal property; those used in 1933 and 1934 contain sixteen classifications. An assessment of railroad cars cannot accurately be placed under any of the specific groups and hence should have been inserted under the last item on each of the schedules which covers all taxable personal property not otherwise specified. The existence of this error, alone, however, does not vitiate the assessment if it can be said that it does not affect "the substantial justice of the tax." This court described the purpose served by requiring the *298
itemization of assessed property in People v. Commonwealth EdisonCo.
The circuit court further found that the cars in question here were assessable by the State Tax Commission as rolling stock belonging to the railroad companies upon whose lines they were operated. In support of this ruling, defendant *299
cites the early decision of Kennedy v. St. Louis, Vandalia andTerre Haute Railroad Co.
The circuit court also held that the cars assessed here were instruments of interstate commerce and hence could not be assessed locally in Cook county. Two questions are presented by this holding: (1) Whether these cars, or any number of them, can be subjected to taxation in Illinois under the constitution of the United States and, if so, (2) whether the legislature of this State has authorized their taxation by statute. In JohnsonRefining Co. v. Oklahoma,
A reference to the Illinois statutes shows that the legislature has exercised the power that it possesses. Section 7 of the Revenue act of 1898 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 286) provides that "All property in this State shall be subject to assessment and taxation as provided by the general laws for the assessment of property and for the levy and collection of taxes except such property as may be exempt therefrom by such general laws." This broad provision indicates an intent to tax all personal property in this State which may constitutionally be subjected to assessment. (Wheelock, Lovejoy Co. v. Gill,
Defendant argues that section 1 of the Revenue act, supra, by its express terms applies only to property in transitu belonging to "persons residing in this State;" that defendant is a foreign corporation and hence not within the statutory terms; that theKeith case, supra, involved a domestic corporation, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals, *303 in the McKnight case, improperly interpreted our statutes to apply to foreign corporations. Section 11 of the Revenue act of 1872 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 11) provides, however, that "Personal property, in transitu, shall be listed and assessed in the county, town, city or district where the owner resides: Provided, if it is intended for a business, it shall be listed and assessed at the place where the property of such business is required to be listed." Section 7 of the Revenue act of 1872 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 7) provides that the property of a corporation shall be listed at its principal office or place of business, which, in defendant's case, is in the town of Lake, Cook county, Illinois. Further, it is significant that defendant's cars are loaded and unloaded at points within this State. In fact, almost all of defendant's business is conducted at its principal office. Thus, defendant can be said to have acquired a business situs here and to be a resident of this State within the meaning of these sections of the tax law. Our decision in Wheelock, Lovejoy Co. v. Gill,supra, is distinguishable from the present case. Intangible personal property was there involved and we held that, because of the doctrine of mobilia sequunt personam, intangibles of foreign corporations were not subject to taxation under our statutes, notwithstanding their broad provisions. Here the tangible personal property which has acquired a situs for the purpose of taxation within this State is involved, and no reason appears why it should be exempted from its just share of the costs of government.
Defendant's claim that the judgment of the circuit court can be sustained because the People failed to prove the average number of cars acquiring a situs in this State in the respective years involved is without merit. In Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.Lynch, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "The complaint in this case contained no averment as to the average number of cars of plaintiff in error used in the State of Utah, but it *304
did show that the company was doing business in Utah in the year for which the tax in question was levied, and that it was running its cars into and through the State. * * * The presumption is that the action of the taxing officers was correct and regular, and that the number of cars assessed * * * was the average number used and employed by plaintiff in error in the State of Utah during 1897." The presumption here referred to is codified in section 230 of our Revenue act of 1872 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 215) which provides that "the fact that real estate or personal property is assessed to a person, firm or corporation, shall be prima facie evidence that such person, firm or corporation was the owner thereof, and liable for the taxes for the year or years for which the assessment was made," etc.(Carney v. People,
Defendant further contends that despite the assumption that its property is taxable in Illinois, a personal judgment cannot be rendered against it because it was incorporated in Maine and hence domiciled there. In support of this contention, defendant relies principally upon Dewey v. Des Moines,
Defendant finally urges that it is not liable for a tax upon the average number of cars acquiring a situs in this State in 1933 because those cars were assessed as omitted property by the assessor, who was without power to do so in the absence of direction by the board of appeals. This point is well taken. While it is true, as the People contend, that section 276 of the Revenue act of 1872 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 261) authorizes the assessment of omitted property by the local assessor, we have held that in view of section 35a of the Revenue act of 1898 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 120, par. 314a) which provided that the board of appeals should direct the assessor to assess omitted property, no such assessment could be made by the assessor in the absence of such direction. (People v. Board ofAppeals,
The judgment of the circuit court of Cook county, holding void the taxes assessed against defendant for the year 1933, is affirmed; in all other respects the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court, with directions to enter judgment for the People in the amount of $4093.21, taxes for the year 1932, and $1852.12, taxes for the year 1934, the amounts stipulated by the parties.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded, withdirections. *306