The People v. Ryan P. BrahneyThe People v. Ryan P. Brahney
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Jon E. Budelmann, District Attorney, Auburn (Christopher T. Valdina of counsel), for respondent.
STEIN, J.
On this appeal, we are asked to determine whether consecutive sentences were authorized under
I.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with numerous crimes, including two counts of murder in the second degree and two counts of burglary in the first degree, after he killed his former girlfriend in her home by stabbing her with a butcher knife. At the ensuing nonjury trial, defendant stipulated in writing that he “caused the death of” the victim “by stabbing her with a knife,” but proffered an affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Defendant‘s uncle testified that defendant appeared at the uncle‘s homе at approximately 1:00 a.m. on the night of the murder. Defendant was covered in blood, asked that his mother be called to pick up his son, and stated that he had stabbed and killed the victim. The uncle called the police. At the station, defendant made statements to police that he had killed the victim; he was subsequently recorded on a telephone call with his mother, admitting that he went to the victim‘s apartment, “dragged her dоwn the stairs and murdered her.”
Police responding to the victim‘s apartment determined that defendant had gained entrance by smashing a window and
The Chief Medical Examiner testified that he found 38 slash or stab wounds on the victim‘s body, all of which were consistent with the murder weаpon. He explained that several of the wounds, individually, could have been fatal—specifically, those that penetrated the chest cavity, caused lung collapse, injured the heart, sliced a majоr vein in the neck and penetrated the liver—but did not identify a particular wound that clearly caused death immediately.
As relevant here, defendant was found guilty of intentional murder, as well as two counts of burglary in the first degrеe, based on (1) causing physical injury and (2) using or threatening to use a dangerous instrument. At sentencing, the People argued that consecutive sentences were appropriate because the evidenсe showed that defendant pulled the victim out of bed and inflicted minor injuries on her while she was upstairs, before dragging her down the stairs and inflicting mortal wounds in the living room. Defendant argued that consecutive sentences wеre not permissible because the crimes were part of a continuing course of criminal conduct that was formulated, according to the People, before he entered the victim‘s apartment. Thе court, upon resentencing, sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment of 54 years to life, with the concurrent sentences on the two burglary convictions imposed consecutively to his sentence оn the intentional murder conviction.
Upon defendant‘s appeals from the judgment of conviction and resentence, the Appellate Division affirmed, with two Justices dissenting (126 AD3d 1286 [4th Dept 2015]). While stating that “the actus reus elements of thе burglary counts and the murder count overlap under the facts presented here,” the Court “nevertheless conclude[d] that the People ‘establish[ed] the legality of consecutive sentencing by showing that the “acts or omissions” committed by defendant were separate and
II.
“[w]hen more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the sentences . . . must run concurrently” (
Penal Law § 70.25 [2] ).
In other words, under
In determining whether consecutive sentences are authorized, “a court must first look to the statutory definitions of the crimes at issue to discern whether the actus reus elements оverlap” (People v Rodriguez, 25 NY3d 238, 244 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Couser, 28 NY3d 368, 375 [2016]). “Reference to the fact-specific circumstances and proof of a crime to determine whether, under the second statutory prong, one offense is a material element of a second is not the test for consecutive sentencing purposes” (People v Day, 73 NY2d 208, 211 [1989]). Rather, “the commission of one offense is a material element of a second for restrictive sentencing purposes if, by compаrative examination, the statutory definition of the second crime provides that the first crime is also a necessary component in the legislative classification and definitional sense” (id.).
Moreover, even “[i]f the statutory elements do overlap under either prong of the statute, the People may yet establish the
This Court has repeatedly explained that “[t]he People have the burden оf establishing the legality of consecutive sentences” (People v Rosas, 8 NY3d 493, 496 [2007]). In Laureano, the Court stated that the People may meet their burden of demonstrating that the facts underlying the crimes are separate and distinct “by identifying the facts which supрort their view . . . from the . . . record” (Laureano, 87 NY2d at 644; accord Rodriguez, 25 NY3d at 244). In contrast, where “the People are unable to point to any testimony or evidence which would support the view that the offenses of which defendant stands convicted involvеd disparate or separate acts, the sentences must run concurrently” (People v Underwood, 52 NY2d 882, 883 [1981]).
III.
As relevant to the particular crimes at issue here, “[a] person is guilty of murder in the second degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause the deаth of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person” (
“when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein,
and when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: . . . “[c]auses physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or . . .
“[u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument” (
Penal Law § 140.30 [2], [3] ).
The actus reus element of the burglary charge predicated upon the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument does not, by definition, overlap with the actus reus of murder in the second degree. In contrast, defendant correctly argues that there is an overlap in the actus reus elements оf murder in the second degree and the burglary count in which the aggravating factor was causing physical injury. “By definition, the act of causing death is subsumed within the element of causing . . . physical injury” (Laureano, 87 NY2d at 644; see
Specifically, the evidence of a small amount of blood upstairs, as comparеd with the large amount downstairs, supports the determination of the courts below that defendant used a dangerous instrument to cause physical injury to the victim upstairs, and then—as he admitted—“dragged her down the stairs and murderеd her” in a separate and distinct act (see People v Brown, 80 NY2d 361, 365 [1992]). The scenario posited by defendant would have required that the victim barely bled in the location where she sustained a stab wound that sliced or punctured one of her internal organs, but that she bled profusely in a different location. Under these circumstances, we cannot say as a matter of law that the conduct resulting in defendant‘s conviction of intentional murder and the сonduct underlying the elements of the burglary convictions was a single act for consecutive sentencing purposes (see People v Salcedo, 92 NY2d 1019, 1022 [1998]).
Defendant‘s argument that he received the ineffective assistance of counsеl has been considered and found to be lacking in
Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Fahey, Garcia and Wilson concur.
Orders affirmed.