delivered the opinion of the court:
Dеfendant appeals from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. The petition, filed pro se, alleged his conviction for armed robbery and that in the trial he suffered, and we quote, “substantial denial of his rights under the constitution of the United States, to-wit: (a) all of the witnesses and all of the tеstimony upon which the indictment was founded were incompetent hearsay and mere exprеssion of belief and suspicion; (b) the admission of illegal search and seized evidence by the triа[l] court; (c) the petitioner’s conviction was secured through a deliberate presentation of perjured testimony known to be such by the State’s Attorney; (d) the State’s Attorney deliberately suppressed evidence favorable to the petitioner: and (e) that the criminal statutes under which the indictment was founded is unconstitutional.”
He further alleged that he appealed the conviction to this court (People v. Reed,
The State filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition failed to raise any constitutional questions within the purview of the act and that our affirmance of his cоnviction was res judicata of defendant’s present contentions.
Defendant was represented by the public defender at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The court sustained the motion and dismissеd defendant’s petition. Defendant contends this was error, that his petition was sufficient and that the State should have been required to answer. Section 2 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, in pertinеnt part, reads as follows: “The petition shall * * * clearly set forth the respects in which petitiоner’s constitutional rights were violated. The petition shall have attached thereto affidаvits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 122 — 2.) We have defined the requirements of this section frequently. People v. Jennings,
In Jennings, we held that: “[I] f the petition so charges [violations of constitutionаl rights], the trial court should ascertain whether it is supported by accompanying affidavits and if not, whether the absence of such affidavits is sufficiently explained or excused by the petitioner’s own sworn statements. Where there are no supporting affidavits and their absence is neither explained nor excused, the trial court should either dismiss the petition or grant further time within which such affidavits may be obtained.”
In Reeves, we said: “The requirement for such accompanying affidavits is necеssitated by the need to furnish information dehors the available record or to require at the hеaring an adequate search of those parts of the record not then in the hands of or available to the petitioner. We should not construe the statute (par. 122 — 2) and our own rules so strictly that a fair hearing be denied and the purposes of the act defeated. However wе do not intend hereby to lessen the duties of petitioners under the act to make a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights, for the allegation of a mere conclusion to thаt effect under oath will not suffice.” (
Applying these standards to the defendant’s petition, it is quite evident that it does not сomply with the statutory requirements. Defendant did not submit any factual evidence in support of his general allegations of constitutional violations. He purported to explain this absence by stating that no evidence was attached “because oral testimony of petitioner аnd other witnesses is needed to sustain petitioner [sic] allegations.” In light of the clear requiremеnts of section 2, and the case law interpreting it, we find that defendant’s “explanation” of his laсk of factual evidence to support his allegations does not satisfy his duty under the statute. The dismissаl of his petition was proper.
Finally, defendant argues that the court erred in dismissing the petition without granting him leave to amend. Defendant raises such issue for the first time in this appeal. Therefore, we find the court did not err in this regard.
Having concluded that the dismissal was proper for the reasоns discussed, we find it unnecessary to consider the question of res judicata. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Ward took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.