delivered the opinion of the court:
Fоllowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Du Page County, the 17-year-old defendant, Charles Pardo, was found guilty on four counts of burglаry and three counts of theft, and sentenced to five years probation, the first year to be served in the Illinois State Prison Fаrm at Vandalia. Defendant appeals directly to this court raising constitutional questions. Supreme Court Rule 603, 43 Ill.2d R 603.
On September 23, 1968, Pardo was apprehended in Rock County, Wisconsin, after a high-speed automobile chase by Wisconsin State police, and arrested for violation of Wisconsin traffic laws. A registration check of the vehicle driven by him revealed that it had been reported stolen earlier that day in Hinsdale, Illinois. The Hinsdale Police Department was notified, and two оfficers from that department drove to the Rock County jail on September 24 to interview the defendant. Pardo agreеd to waive extradition and was taken to the home of a local judge who signed the extradition order after determining thаt the waiver was voluntary. The defendant was then driven to the Hinsdale police station by the officers. On the afternoon of September 25, he was transferred to the Du Page County jail in Wheaton, Illinois. While in custody there, and after having been sufficiently advised of his constitutional rights, Pardo confessed to four burglaries and two additional automobile thefts committed in Du Page County bеtween August 3, 1968, and September 23, 1968. The grand jury of Du Page County returned five separate indictments charging Pardo with these offenses as well as the theft of the automobile which he had driven to Wisconsin. A motion to dismiss the indictments and for institution of proceedings under article 2 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 37, par. 702 — 1 et seq.) was denied and defendant appealed to this court. We granted the State’s motion to strike the notices of appeal.
The cases were consolidated for trial аnd for hearing on a motion to suppress the confessions and other evidence which was subsequently denied. The record fully supports the trial court’s ruling on this motion, and apparently defendant does not dispute the point further on appeal.
Defendant’s first contention is that the extradition hearing in Wisconsin was, in effect, an adjudication of his standing as a juvenile аnd he was thus entitled to the assistance of counsel. (Kent v. United States,
Defendant further contends that his waiver of extradition was ineffеctive because he was a minor and it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. “We have held that alleged irregularities in the manner in which a defendant is returned to this State on extradition for trial on a criminal charge will not be inquired into, since these mattеrs affect neither the guilt nor innocence of the accused nor the jurisdiction of the court to try him.” (People v. Partelow,
Defendant next argues that the classification under article 2 of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 37, par. 702—1 et seq.) of minors by age, according to sex, is constitutionally prohibited in that it discriminates agаinst 17-year-old males in favor of 17-year-old females, since females may be considered juveniles until 18 years of age whereas males are not subject to juvenile proceedings after becoming 17. “The classification of objects, subjеcts, groups or persons for legislative purposes is, primarily a question for the legislature and courts will not interfere unlеss such classification is clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary.” (Jacobson v. Lenhart,
Defendant lacks standing to object to the vesting of discretion in the State’s Attorney under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 37, par. 702—7(3)) to prоceed against a juvenile either under the juvenile law or the criminal law, because Pardo is not a juvenile, and the рrosecutor had no discretion with regard to this case.
The final argument made by defendant is that the effect of his conviсtion of burglary, which is an infamous crime in Illinois (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 124 — 2), is cruel and unusual punishment, as applied to him, and not propоrtioned to the offense. This provision denying certain substantial civil rights to one convicted of specified crimes is applied uniformly to all persons convicted under the Criminal Code of an infamous crime, and the legislature must be presumed tо have foreseen its application to a 17-year-old defendant. Pardo was convicted on four counts of burglary as well as three counts of theft, and the sentence imposed with resultant loss of civil rights was, in our judgment, neither cruel and unusual nor disproportionate to the nature of the offense.
The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.