The People v. LinkThe People v. Link
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Wilson
delivered the opinion of the court:
Frank J. Link, John T. Miller, Timothy J. Crowe, August W. Miller; Timothy L. Connolly, James M. Whalen, John J. Touhy, John K. Lawler and Martin Edelstein were jointly indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for conspiracy. Of these, Crowe was president of the board of trustees of the Sanitary District of Chicago in 1927 and 1928, Link, August W. Miller, Whalen, Touhy and Lawler were trustees, John T. Miller was superintendent of the department of permanent plants and structures, Edelstein was head of the real estate department and Connolly was the
Prior to the commencement of the trial all counts of the indictment except the first, third and seventh were quashed. The first charges the nine persons previously named with conspiracy to wrongfully obtain, by false pretenses, $5,000,000 in money from the Sanitary District of Chicago. The third count charges the defendants with conspiracy to unlawfully divert $3,000,000 in money and property from the Sanitary District of Chicago to certain persons by inducing the sanitary district to pay to such persons large sums of money under the false pretenses that they were performing, and had performed, work, services and labor for the district and that it was indebted to them, when, in fact, they were not performing and had not performed any services, work and labor • for the district and it was not indebted to them. By the seventh count the charge is made that the defendants conspired together and with George L. Chamberlain, and with
The record is voluminous, consisting of approximately 7000 pages and the abstract of more than 1300 pages. More than 700 witnesses testified for the prosecution. None of the defendants testified in their own behalf and only one witness was called by them. The actions of the defendants upon which the charge of conspiracy rests fall into three major classifications: (1) Pay-roll padding; (2) the unauthorized construction of a cinder or ■ bridle path at an exorbitant cost to the Sanitary District of Chicago; and (3) not only excessive but also duplicate, and in some instances multiple, payments for services and materials furnished the district by various companies. The evidence with respect to these matters will be summarized.
During the period in controversy Crowe was president of the Sanitary District of Chicago and Link was one of the trustees. On December 2, 1926, the board of trustees adopted a rule which provided that “the committee on employment shall appoint all employees of the district, and the chairman of said committee shall certify in writing to the head of the proper department and to the clerk the names of all such employees, stating the positions to be filled and the compensation to be paid to such employees. Thereupon it shall be the duty of such head of department and the clerk of the district to include the name of such employee upon the pay-roll of the district. * * * The head of any department, in case of emergency, may temporarily employ such agents and employees as may be required by the work of
One hundred sixty-two other persons testified that they were on the water survey pay-roll and performed services wholly incommensurate with their remuneration. Large salaries were paid to these witnesses for services such as copying names off poll and registration lists, addressing envelopes, and interviewing certain householders to ascertain whether
The Illinois valley department had charge of actions brought against the district to recover for alleged damage to lands and crops caused by the overflowing of the Illinois river, which was claimed to have been caused by the negligence of the district in regulating the flow of water. Twenty-five persons, denominated “investigators,” testified that they were on. the Illinois valley pay-roll, with expense accounts, and did either no work or rendered negligible services for the district. They received large salaries for little or no work, and, in addition, submitted false expense accounts. One Schaeffer testified that he received $5000 in salary, at the rate of $250 per month, and $1448 for expenses. He admitted that he never performed any services whatever for the district. William Lass, sponsored by Link, typifies those who rendered perfunctory services. He was in the employ of the district from November 15, 1927, to December, 1930, at a salary of $300 per month. He received $1961.70 for unincurred expenses in 1928. Vouchers therefor purported to be expenses in connection with trips to Beardstown. The witness stated, however, that he never made a single trip to that city. The record also shows that a substantial number of persons occupying official positions were placed on the law pay-roll of the district. Although they testified that they received pay in large amounts, few performed any- service whatever.
Additional facts and circumstances connect the defendants with the pay-roll padding. Twelve persons who did no work for the sanitary district were directed by Link to report to their ward committeemen and do political work. A. J, Link, a brother of one of the defendants, testified that he was on the law pay-roll from June 1, 1927, to November 15,
A bridle path was constructed by the sanitary district, beginning at Winnemac Park in Chicago and extending to West Railroad avenue in Evanston, following the course of the North Shore channel. Miller discussed the building of the path with various trustees. The Sanitary District of Chicago was organized under the act entitled “An act to create sanitary districts and to remove obstructions in the DesPlaines and Illinois rivérs.” Section 11 as amended (State Bar Stat. 1935, p. 1383; Smith-Hurd Stat. 1935, p. 1367;) provides: “All contracts for work to be done by such municipality, the expense of which will exceed five hundred dollars, shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder therefor upon not less than ten days’ public notice of the terms and conditions upon which the contract is to be let having been given by publication in a newspaper of general circulation published in said district.” All but three vouchers for the project were in amounts less than $500. The trial court held that while the method of payment for the work and materials by such vouchers constituted no offense, the
Evidence concerning over-charges and duplicate payments is itself voluminous. Employees of the district working under Miller, and others, organized the City Machine and Engineering Company. Desk space was rented in an insurance and real estate office at 3953 Roosevelt road. George Pezman, a machinist, entered the employ of the company in 1926. His duties consisted of repairing pumps and engines and doing general machinist work for the sanitary district. He testified that he was a foreman and hired union men to
An experienced engineer, who himself had done business with the district from its inception and was thoroughly familiar with the character of the work done by the company for the district, testified that the reasonable price for the repairs made at the Lawrence avenue pumping station was $4310. The amount invoiced and paid was $9056 — an overcharge of nearly $4800. The witness testified further that the invoice price for the repairs at the Clifton avenue pumping station was $976.62 and the reasonable price was $600, or an overcharge of $376.62; that the reasonable price for the work at the Ninety-fifth street pumping station was $1580 against an invoice of $3249.11, or an overcharge of $1669.11‘; that the invoice for the Thirty-ninth street pumping station was $1808.91 and the reasonable price $1000, or an
The Evers-Sauvage Engineering Company furnished labor and material on machinery of the sanitary district under the supervision of the defendant John T. Miller. It received therefor $54,240.35 from the district in 1927 and 1928. Walter Doud, an engineer formerly employed by the district, testified with respect to the repair of four motors for the pumps at the Wilmette station, and $10,099.25 was paid by the district to the Evers-Sauvage Company for this work in the form of twenty-two vouchers dated October 13, 1928. The motors in question were, however, actually repaired by the General Electric Company at a cost of $5560.73, which was charged by it to the Evers-Sauvage Company^ Other evidence with respect to this company discloses that work at various plants and stations of the district was invoiced at and paid for by sums far in excess of the reasonable price therefor.
The record discloses further that in many instances duplicate, triplicate and even quadruplicate payments were made for materials purchased and services rendered through Miller’s department and under his control and supervision. The orders for the payment of the same were authorized by Miller. It was stipulated upon the trial that the trustees of the sanitary district approved the vouchers for the payment of the salaries of all those on the pay-rolls and for all work done or alleged to have been done. Thomas J. Whalen, the committee reporter and secretary for the sanitary district during 1927 and 1928, testified that the voucher lists were considered by the finance committee and then by the board of trustees; that the chairman (Crowe) would present the lists to the entire board and inquire if there was any objection; that the witness could not recall a single instance of. an objection being interposed by any of the nine members of the finance committee or discussion relating to the payment of these vouchers, and that upon the roll-calls all trustees present from time to time voted for their payment.
The salaries of trustees of the sanitary district are fixed by statute at not more than $7500 per annum. (State Bar Stat. 1935, sec. 4, p. 1371; Smith-Hurd Stat. 1935, sec. 4, p. 1355.) Miller’s salary as superintendent of the department of public plants and structures was $12,000 per year. Subject to the objections of the defendants, a report of investigation as to credits in the form of deposits at certain banks during 1927 and 1928 was admitted in evidence. From this exhibit it appears that $99,100 in currency was credited to the bank accounts of Link and his wife, beginning with February
To obtain a reversal, Link and John T. Miller make the contention, among others, that the first, third and seventh counts of the indictment are fatally duplicitous. They argue that each of these counts charges that it is for the same act and offense charged in a previous indictment. Each count charges that the alleged conspiracy was entered into on December 6, 1928. From the record it appears that the defendants had on May 29, 1930, been indicted for the same offenses as those charged in the present indictment, returned June 5, 1931. All counts in the earlier indictment were either quashed or nolle prossed. The indictment now attacked recites in each count that the defendants are indicted on the -same charge as is made in the indictment returned May 29, 1930. Section 6 of division 4 of the Criminal Code provides that when an indictment is quashed or the proceedings on the same are set aside or reversed on writ of error the time during the pendency of such indictment shall not be reckoned so as to bar any new indictment for the same offense. (State Bar Stat. 1935, p. 1246; Smith-Hurd Stat. 1935, p. 1217.) The manifest purpose of the allegations assailed was to toll the Statute of Limitations. (Swalley v. People, 116 Ill. 247.) Duplicity in an indictment has been defined as the joinder of two or more distinct offenses in the same count of an indictment. (Joyce on Indictments, sec. 392.) The word “same,” employed in the indictment
The seventh count, which charges that the defendants conspired with George L. Chamberlain, and with divers other persons whose names are unknown, it is urged, should have been quashed because the named conspirators are not the same as in the other counts. This contention rests upon the theory that Chamberlain was designated a co-conspirator. He was not, however, made a defendant. Persons engaged in a conspiracy are not a part of the offense to the extent that they are descriptive of it. (United States v. Heitler, 274 Fed. 401; People v. Smith, 239 Ill. 91.) Nor does failure to prosecute all the known conspirators prevent the prosecution of a part of them. (Cohen v. United States, 157 Fed. 651.) Furthermore, the specification in their written motion to quash the indictment of specific grounds, operated as a waiver of any and all other grounds which might have been, but were not, assigned as reasons for quashing it. (People v. Bain, 359 Ill. 455; People v. Fox, 346 id. 374.) If the defendants deemed themselves prejudiced because Chamberlain was not named as a defendant their proper remedy was by motion to quash. Although they filed a motion to quash and assigned in it numerous grounds, they did not allege that the failure to name Chamberlain as a co-defendant in any manner prejudiced them. By failing to move to quash the indictment on the ground now urged the defendants are in no position to complain. People v. Bain, supra.
Counts 1 and 3, it is insisted, are barred by the Statute of Limitations. In prosecutions for conspiracy the Statute
The contention is earnestly argued that the prosecution sought to prove the existence of a number of disconnected, separate, small conspiracies wherefrom to infer the existence of a large general conspiracy. Conspiracy has been defined as a confederacy of two or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by some unlawful means. (2 Bishop on Crim. Law, (9th ed.) sec. 175; People v. Bain, supra.) Section 46 of division 1 of the Criminal Code (State Bar Stat. 1935, p. 1164; Smith-Hurd Stat. 1935, p. 1129;) provides that if two or more persons conspire or agree together to obtain money or other property by false pretenses they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy. To constitute a conspiracy under the statute there must be a concert of will arid endeavor on the part of two or more persons to commit an unlawful act. The existence of a conspiracy may be proved, however, not only by
An analogous situation obtained in Ochs v. People, supra. The defendants, certain members of the board of county commissioners of Cook county, and other persons, were indicted for conspiracy to obtain money from Cook county by false pretenses. The proof related to occurrences over a period of five years. From the evidence it appeared that a combination was formed among a number of commissioners sufficient to control the awarding of contracts for county expenditures, and auditing and paying the bills for such expenses, and various officials in charge of certain county institutions. The commissioners in question awarded contracts for supplies and work to such persons as would pay commissions and bonuses therefor. The contractors, in turn, rendered false and fraudulent invoices containing over-charges, and the commissioners audited them and approved their payment. The contention was made, as here, that though the evidence might tend to show that there were minor conspiracies among certain ones or groups of the accused, it did not show a general conspiracy in which all the defendants were engaged, and that, whatever the conspiracy may have
Other contentions relate to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the convictions on the respective counts and the admissibility of certain testimony. The defendants assert that the evidence fails to show a pay-roll conspiracy, as charged in the first and third counts. No useful purpose can be served by setting forth the purported extenuating circumstances now pleaded. It suffices to observe that the evidence previously set forth, amply, if not abundantly, proved that both defendants, one an elected officer of municipal government and the other an appointee, participated in the perpetration of a shocking and unconscionable conspiracy to defraud the sanitary district of its money and property by false pretenses, among others, through the medium of’ pay-roll padding. Hundreds of persons who performed negligible or no services for the sanitary district were placed on the pay-rolls, to the detriment of the tax-payers. Crowe, as chairman of the committee on employment, handled all appointments, and the entire board approved the employment of
Evidence to sustain the seventh count, it is contended, is wanting. The seventh count charges a conspiracy to defraud by excessive and exorbitant prices and costs in connection with certain contracts. If two items attacked by the defendants are eliminated from the cost of the bridle path, the cost therefor, according to the testimony of reliable witnesses, would be $1,051,729.24 against a reasonable cost of $292,375.08. Conceding, as the defendants strenuously insist, that evidence to sustain the seventh count is lacking, the concession does not support their contention, as the testimony relating to this count was admissible under the first’ count. The finding of the court was a general finding of guilty, which, of course, included a finding of guilty under the first count. Where there is a general finding of guilty, one good count sustained by the evidence will support the finding. People v. Darr, 262 Ill. 202; Ochs v. People, supra.
The contention is also made that the evidence failed to show the actual cost of the bridle path, and that, therefore, count 7, in charging excessive cost of “divers contracts,” is meaningless. The seventh count, in charging a conspiracy to defraud, elaborates upon the first count by setting forth the means to effectuate the conspiracy. It is unnecessary to set out the means by which a conspiracy to do an unlawful act is to be accomplished. (People v. Smith, supra; Chicago, Wilmington and Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421; Thomas v. People, 113 id. 531.) The bill of exceptions does not contain the bill of particulars filed by the prosecution setting forth the contracts upon which proof was adduced. If the defendants believed the allegation
Our attention is directed to portions of the evidence. The defendants argue that the theory of the prosecution was that John T. Miller was a co-conspirator merely because he knew of the existence of a conspiracy and acquiesced therein. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, approval or attempt, it is true, on the part of one to perpetrate the illegal act, does not constitute conspiracy. (2 Bishop on Crim. Law, (9th ed.) sec. 190; People v. Bain, supra, and 358 Ill. 177; Evans v. People, 90 id. 384.) The testimony previously narrated shows, however, actual participation in the conspiracy charged and proved.
It is also said that the evidence fails to show that Link was a member of the conspiracy. The testimony shows that numerous so-called pay-roll witnesses were sponsored by Link and that persons placed on the pay-roll by him were specifically ordered to report to that defendant’s ward headquarters for strictly political assignments. His brother was placed on the pay-roll of the district and received several thousand dollars for which he rendered no services whatever. Furthermore, McDonnell’s testimony tends to indicate that Link obtained the money of the district by diverting funds to himself. Link voted in favor of every pay-roll presented for approval. In addition to approving padded pay-rolls he consented to the payment of the bills heretofore mentioned. Proof that Link was a member of the conspiracy charged is overwhelming.
Complaint is made concerning the admission of testimony with respect to the bank accounts of Miller and Link. They assert that this testimony necessarily resulted in an inference being drawn from an inference, or a presumption from another presumption. The prosecution answers that the deposits were admissible as circumstances tending to prove the principal issue, and that, with other evidence, conclusively proved
The final contention of the defendants is, that the judgment, sentences and fine against them are void because they were, it is asserted, entered by a branch of the criminal court composed of three judges sitting en banc. The placita in the record shows that the cause was tried before Hon. Harry »M. Fisher, a judge of the circuit court of Cook county and ex-officio judge of the criminal court of Cook county. The common law record recites: “By agreement between State and defendants case submitted to the court for trial without a jury. Present: Hon. Harry M. Fisher, Hon. John Prystalski and Hon. James J. Kelly.” And later: “February 5, 1932. Before Hon. Harry M. Fisher, Hon. John Prystalski and Hon. James J. Kelly, sitting en banc. Judgment. And the court being fully advised in the premises doth find the said defendants,” etc. The bill of exceptions was signed and sealed by Judge Fisher alone. The bill commences: “Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 25th day of November, A. D. 1931, being one of the days of said term of said court, before the Hon. Harry M. Fisher, judge of the circuit court of Cook county, ex-officio judge of the criminal court of Cook county, and Judges John Prystalski and James J. Kelly, both judges of the superior court of Cook county and ex-officio judges of the criminal court of Cook county, the latter two named judges acting in an advisory capacity.”
Prior to the trial a colloquy ensued between Judge Fisher and an assistant State’s attorney and the counsel for
“Mr. Northup: That is all. I offer this check in evidence and ask to have it marked State’s exhibit Wood [a handwriting expert] No. i of this date, the check in question. I offer it in evidence.
“Mr. Fink: I object to it as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
“Judge Prystalski: Let Judge Fisher rule on it.
“Mr. Northup: Sir.
“Judge Prystalski: Let Judge Fisher rule on it. Renew your offer.
“Mr. Fink: Let the record show the objection is overruled and exception.
“Judge Prystalski: I prefer that he make the ruling, because he is sitting.”
Hall v. Hamilton, 74 Ill. 437, is relied upon by both the defendants and the prosecution. In that case the placita to the record recited that three judges of the superior court and two of the circuit court of Cook county were present. The action originated in a confession of judgment. The warrant of attorney, among other things, provided that a cognovit for the amount due might be filed, with an agreement that no writ of error should be prosecuted or appeal taken and that all errors be released. The cognovit as agreed to expressly released all errors. Referring to the composition of the personnel of the trial court this court said: “If that number sat and decided questions, they may have been decided by three of the five, and the decision
This cause was tried before the court without a jury. The trial court had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, of observing their demeanor while testifying, and was far better equipped to pass upon their credibility than is a court of review. The record discloses that the defendants received a fair trial, and we observe that the record is unusually free from error. Upon review the Appellate Court made a careful survey of the evidence and a painstaking analysis of the defendants’ contentions and affirmed the judgment of the criminal court.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is right, and it will accordingly be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.