160 N.E. 836 | Ill. | 1927
Plaintiff in error, Willie Landers, prosecutes this writ of error to review the judgment of the circuit court of Fayette county finding him guilty of a violation of section 5 of an act entitled "An act in relation to the Illinois State farm" and sentencing him to imprisonment in the penitentiary. The section provides: "Whoever being a prisoner at the Illinois State farm escaped therefrom is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than ten years." By his assignment of errors he challenges the validity of this section of the act.
The first objection is that the subject matter of section 5 is not expressed in the title of the act, as required by section 13 of article 4 of the constitution. This provision of the constitution has been uniformly construed liberally in favor of the validity of enactments. (People v. Lloyd,
It is further contended that the words "Illinois State farm" do not have a meaning which is generally understood, and that neither the members of the legislature nor the public would recognize from the title that the act deals with a penal institution. This contention is without merit. In 1917 the legislature provided by public act for the establishment of an institution to be known as the Illinois State farm, which was to be used for the correction of male offenders above the age of sixteen years whose offense was punishable by confinement in the county jail. In 1919 an appropriation of $252,000 was made to the Illinois State farm for land and permanent improvements, and each subsequent biennial appropriation bill has carried an appropriation to this State institution. The act of June 14, 1917, entitled "An act to create a State farm," was repealed by the act of June 27, 1923, which is the act now in force, and each biennial appropriation act has expired at the end of its biennium, but in the interpretation of the act of 1923, which continues the Illinois State farm as one of the penal institutions of the State, we are permitted to refer to the earlier acts which relate to the same subject. Ex parteKan-gi-shun-ca,
It is finally contended that the section is void for the reason that the penalty is not proportioned to the nature of the offense, as required by section 11 of the bill of rights. Many eminent jurists have argued that the unresisted escape of prisoners from custody should not be a punishable offense. The basis of their argument is, that since the law of freedom is natural and the instinct for *457
freedom irrepressible, if the law determines to restrain this freedom it must do so by adequate means. Under the English common law the offense of prison breach was a felony if the commitment were for a felony, or a misdemeanor if the commitment were for a misdemeanor. There was, however, a distinction made between prison breach and escape. Where no force was used and there was no breaking of the prison walls the offense was an escape and was under no circumstances more than a misdemeanor. The act in question makes no distinction and makes any escape from the Illinois State farm a felony, whether it be a mere uninterrupted walking away from one of the fields or a forcible breaking from one of the places of confinement on the farm, and the punishment is imprisonment in the penitentiary. Whether a sixteen-year-old boy ought to be branded a felon because he walks away from an uninclosed farm to which he has been committed for some trifling misdemeanor is a question which demands serious thought, but it is legislative in character. However absurd or unwise the court may regard this legislation, it cannot declare it void unless it can say that it is so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the conscience of reasonable men. The nature, character and extent of penalties are matters almost wholly legislative, and the courts have jurisdiction to interfere with legislation upon the subject only where the penalty is manifestly in excess of the very broad and general constitutional limitation invoked. (People v. Lloyd, supra.) We have held that this act does not contravene section 11 of the bill of rights, (People v.Callicott,
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. *458