delivered the opinion of the court:
Luther Jones, the defendant, on October 6, 1965, pleaded guilty in the circuit court of St. Clair County to a charge of theft from the person and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 9 to 10 years. On October 27, 1967, acting pro se he filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 122— 1 et seq.) in which he requested that counsel be appointed to represent him. On December 8, 1967, continuing to act pro se, he filed an amended petition, and on December 19, 1967, counsel was appointed to represent him.
Thereafter, on January 24, 1968, the trial court noted
The defendant complains that the legal representation he received in the post-conviction proceeding, as shown by the record, was so deficient as to deny him the representation by counsel contemplated by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
Our statement in People v. Slaughter,
The attorney designated by the court to represent the defendant did not consult with him concerning his grievances prior to the hearing and thereby failed to discharge an elementary responsibility of representation. The defendant was not provided the benefit of counsel required under our view of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See: People v. Barnes,
The State’s argument that in any event the trial court did properly dismiss the petition, as its. allegations were insufficient to raise a constitutional issue and it could not be made sufficient by amendment, does not persuade. We have held it to be error to dismiss a post-conviction petition on the pleadings, as occurred here, where there has been inadequate representation by counsel, though the pro se petition itself fails to present a substantial constitutional claim. People v. Tyner,
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.
