The People v. Jamell R. McCulloughThe People v. Jamell R. McCullough
Case Information
*1 This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports. ----------------------------------------------------------------- No. 105 The People &c., Appellant, v. Jamell R. McCullough, Respondent.
Scott Myles, for appellant. Brian Shiffrin, for respondent. The Innocence Project, Inc., amicus curiae.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to that court for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that court.
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree
(
On December 27, 2008, an eyewitness, J.J., was in front of the barbershop owned by the victim, Vincent Dotson, when a white Malibu with a missing hubcap pulled up. One of the occupants of the vehicle followed J.J. into the barbershop, sat in a chair and asked for a haircut. J.J. sat in another chair. The man took two phone calls in succession. Shortly thereafter, three other men entered the barbershop. One of them asked, "where's the bud at," while another man (later identified as defendant), shut the door and attempted to lock it. The men ordered J.J. and Dotson to the floor, demanding money and drugs. One of the men took $200 from Dotson and then fatally shot him. The four men fled and J.J. called 911.
Later that evening, the police, in response to a
dispatch concerning the robbery, pursued a white Malibu with three men inside. All three men fled; two of them escaped, but the driver, one Willie Harvey, was apprehended. Harvey was transported to the crime scene, where a witness -- another employee of the barbershop who had been waiting for a bus nearby when the incident occurred -- identified him as the driver. Approximately three months later, J.J. identified defendant in a lineup as the last man to enter the barbershop. Harvey later implicated defendant in the crimes.
Defendant was thereafter indicted on the murder and robbery counts, pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
The defense moved for an order permitting, among other things, testimony from an identification expert about certain factors that could have influenced J.J.'s ability to make a positive identification of defendant. [1] Supreme Court, noting that it had previously heard J.J.'s testimony in a criminal proceeding brought against Harvey's brother (one of the accomplices in the crime), held that J.J.'s identification of defendant as a participant, coupled with Harvey's testimony connecting defendant to the incident, would constitute sufficient corroboration. It therefore denied the motion, but granted the defense permission to revisit the issue once the People had rested their case.
At trial, in addition to J.J.'s testimony concerning the events he observed in the barbershop, the People produced testimony from Harvey, the getaway driver, who, by then, had pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree for his role as an accomplice in the crime. Harvey testified that he observed defendant at Harvey's cousin's house both immediately before and after the crime. He also stated that Harvey's brother, cousin, defendant and another man drove in two separate cars to the corner of Dewey Avenue and Flower City Park. At that point, Harvey remained in the car while the four men walked down Dewey Avenue, with the men returning approximately 15 minutes later. According to Harvey, all of the participants reconvened at his cousin's home where he observed the other four men, including defendant, place marijuana and two or three guns on the hood of the Malibu.
Harvey admitted at trial that he initially failed to pick defendant out of a photo array a month after the incident. He testified that he did not identify defendant because, at that point, he was unsure what role his brother had played in the incident. He admitted that he had lied when he told police that he did not recognize anyone in the array.
At the conclusion of the People's case, defense counsel renewed his motion to call the expert witness. The court denied the motion, stating that J.J.'s testimony had been corroborated by Harvey's, rendering the proposed expert testimony unnecessary. The jury convicted defendant of all counts. Defendant appealed.
A divided Appellate Division reversed, holding, as
relevant here, that the trial court abused its discretion in
precluding the defense from presenting expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identification (
The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony
concerning factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness
identifications rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court (see People v Lee,
People v McCullough
No. 105
RIVERA, J.(dissenting):
Our Court has made plain that it is an abuse of
discretion for a trial court to preclude expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identifications where the case "turns
on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little
or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the
crime," and the proposed expert "'testimony is (1) relevant to
the witness's identification of defendant, (2) based on
principles that are generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4)
on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror'" (People v
Santiago,
In defendant's case, the proposed corroborating
evidence came from a coparticipant in the crimes and was highly suspect, with more than a speculative possibility that the jury would question the credibility of its source. I would not ignore, as the majority apparently does, the "several factors [that] call the corroborating identification[] into question" (id.). Instead, based on facts indicative of the untrustworthiness of this testimony, rendering doubtful its reliability, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's request to present expert testimony on matters potentially affecting the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Therefore, I dissent and would affirm the Appellate Division order reversing defendant's conviction and granting him a new trial.
I.
A jury convicted defendant of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree, arising from the fatal shooting of Vincent Dotson, during a robbery in his barbershop. There was no forensic, DNA, or physical evidence connecting defendant to the crime, and the sole eyewitness was the surviving victim, "J.J.," who observed defendant under conditions that defendant argued could potentially impact the reliability of the eyewitness identification.
Defense counsel filed a motion in limine to admit expert testimony concerning the influence of various factors on eyewitness recollection, including the level of violence during the interaction, the length of time of the incident, and the presence of a weapon. Defendant alternatively requested a hearing pursuant to Frye v United States (293 F 1013 [DC Cir 1923]), to determine whether his proposed expert testimony was generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. During argument on the motion, the People contended that under our case law no expert was necessary because J.J.'s testimony was corroborated by a separately charged co-defendant, Willie Harvey, who would place defendant in the vicinity of the crime. The People stated that although Harvey did not go inside the barbershop and was not a witness to the robbery or shooting, he would testify that he drove defendant and three other men around the corner from where the barbershop was located, drove away with them, and later saw them with guns and the robbery proceeds.
The People also sought to "make the record very clear" about various credibility issues related to Harvey. The People described Harvey's initial failure to identify defendant from a photo array, even after Harvey implicated his own brother and another person in the crimes. The People also explained that Harvey was initially charged with murder, robbery, and attempted robbery in the first degree, and entered a deal by which he was allowed to plead guilty to the robbery count in satisfaction of all charges, in exchange for testifying against defendant and the other participants in the crimes. The People alternatively requested a Frye hearing if the court was considering permitting the expert testimony.
In response, defense counsel argued Harvey could not provide the necessary corroboration for J.J.'s testimony because Harvey's statements were self-serving, and his description of events was partially contradicted by other testimony. Moreover, Harvey admitted he had never seen defendant until the night of the crime.
The judge denied the motion, explaining that he
previously observed J.J. testify against another codefendant and considered him to be "a credible witness," and that Harvey's testimony appeared sufficient to corroborate J.J.'s identification of defendant. At the close of the People's case, the judge denied counsel's renewed motion, without a Frye hearing, upon a finding that Harvey corroborated J.J.'s testimony.
II.
At trial, J.J. testified that he observed a man exit a white Chevy Malibu and enter Dotson's barbershop to get a hair cut. Soon after, three other men entered, one of whom tried to lock the door behind them. J.J. described the first two men who walked into the barbershop as dark-skinned, and stated that the first man wore a dark coat and black winter hat. The third man was lighter-skinned and taller, and wore an orange coat and matching baseball cap.
The men ordered Dotson and J.J. to the ground, demanded money and drugs, and pistol whipped them. After they had taken $200 from Dotson, the first of the three men to enter the barbershop fatally shot Dotson in the chest. The men ran out of the shop, but the shooter returned. J.J. closed his eyes and heard a clicking sound over his head. After he heard the shooter leave, J.J. called 911.
Several weeks after the shooting, J.J. saw defendant in a photo array and told the police that he looked like the shooter. Two months later, J.J. picked out defendant in a lineup, only this time he said defendant was the last man to enter the barbershop, notwithstanding the different descriptions he had previously provided of these two men. Defendant was the only person displayed in both the photo array and the lineup. J.J. made an in-court identification of defendant, again describing him as the last man of the three who entered the shop.
Harvey testified and also identified defendant as one of the men involved in the robbery. Harvey described how he first met defendant on the day of the crime, when Harvey, Harvey's brother and cousin, defendant, and another stranger drove in separate cars to where the shooting occurred. Everyone but Harvey exited the cars and went around the corner. About 15 minutes later they returned, and again drove in separate cars to another location where Harvey saw the men put marijuana and guns on the hood of the car he had been riding in, a white Chevy Malibu. He then left in the Malibu with his brother and cousin, and rode with them until he was apprehended by the police later that evening.
As the prosecutor foretold, Harvey's credibility was questionable. Defense counsel sought to establish Harvey's penchant for fabrication. He cross-examined Harvey about his false statements to the police, including his initial denials of any knowledge about the crimes, and his attempts to minimize his role after he was identified as the driver. Although Harvey told the court at his plea that he was the driver, he contradicted this statement at defendant's trial and downplayed his involvement, saying he was a passenger and that his brother drove to the crime scene. [1]
The circumstances surrounding Harvey's identification of defendant were particularly troubling. Harvey admitted that he initially failed to pick out defendant from a photo array a month after the shooting, only to identify him from a second photo array another month later, while Harvey was incarcerated and awaiting trial on charges of murder and robbery for the Dotson shooting. After Harvey identified defendant, Harvey entered a plea agreement whereby he would receive a 10-year sentence, in exchange for pleading guilty to robbery in the first degree and testifying against defendant and the other participants in the crimes.
The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court wrongly excluded the expert testimony on witness identification because there was little or no corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the crime, and Harvey's testimony established that he was a person of dubious credibility, whose identification of defendant was itself unreliable. In my opinion, there is no merit to the People's appeal.
III.
The People argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request to admit expert evidence on the reliability of eyewitness identification because Harvey's observations of defendant were sufficient to corroborate J.J.'s identification, rendering the expert's testimony unnecessary. In the alternative, the People request a Frye hearing to determine if the expert testimony is admissible, thus providing a basis for a new trial.
In the wake of the growing body of research on factors
impacting the reliability of eyewitness identifications, and the
data establishing a connection between misidentifications and
wrongful convictions, we have encouraged courts to admit expert
testimony on eyewitness identifications in appropriate cases, as
a means to educate the jury about these factors (Santiago, 17
NY3d at 669, quoting People v Drake,
The admission of expert testimony on the accuracy of
eyewitness identification rests within the discretion of a trial
court, after "weighing a request to introduce such expert
testimony 'against other relevant factors, such as the centrality
of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating
evidence'" (Santiago,
[2013]). In such cases it is an abuse of discretion to exclude
expert testimony (LeGrand,
In LeGrand, the Court "established a two-stage inquiry"
governing this exercise of a trial court's discretion (Santiago,
For example, in Santiago, no physical evidence linked
the defendant to an assault in a subway station, but the victim
and two other eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the
assailant. Several factors impacted the accuracy of the victim's
identification. The defendant was a stranger to the victim, and
the assailant's face was partially concealed during the attack by
his clothing and hat, such that the victim could not see the
assailant's hair and his face was not visible "[f]rom the middle
of his top lip, down, and from the top of his eyebrows up"
(Santiago,
like the victim, only partially viewed the assailant's face, and picked out defendant from a lineup with "only 80% confidence." The Court also recognized that this his memory may have been tainted by having seen a newspaper photograph of the defendant linking him to the crime the day after he initially viewed the lineup. Similarly, the other eyewitness's identification of the defendant "may have been influenced by his memory of the police artist's sketch of the assailant, calling into question the independence of this evidence" (id.).
However, where the corroborative evidence has a "strong
indicia of accuracy" (id. at 671), the trial court may exercise
its discretion to exclude expert testimony which might confuse
and distract the jury from principal matters in the case (Oddone,
the victim's identification of the defendant as the person who
stole his car was sufficiently corroborated by evidence that the
defendant was arrested driving the stolen vehicle (
In People v Allen, eyewitnesses independently
identified the defendant as the knife-wielding member of a two-
man team of masked intruders in a barbershop robbery. The first
eyewitness "quickly recognized" the defendant because he
regularly encountered him in the neighborhood, was familiar with
his voice, and also knew his nickname -- the same nickname
defendant provided to the police upon his arrest. When the
police arrived at the barbershop, this eyewitness provided a
description and information about the defendant and subsequently
picked out the defendant from photos in mug books and a photo
array. This identical photo array was shown the same day of the
robbery to the second eyewitness who immediately identified the
defendant's photo, and who also knew defendant from the
neighborhood (Allen
In contrast to Lee, Young, and Allen, and similar to
Santiago, there are factors suggesting that Harvey's
identification of defendant is unreliable, based on undisputed
facts placing his credibility in question. Harvey initially
failed to identify defendant from a photo array a month after the
crimes, and only implicated defendant after Harvey had been
charged, arrested and held in jail awaiting trial for the murder
and robbery, which carried a possible life sentence. He then
identified defendant after he was offered a ten-year sentence in
exchange for his plea, thus avoiding life in prison. Although he
testified that the only condition of the plea was that he had to
testify and tell "his side of the story" at defendant's trial,
nevertheless he identified defendant right before his plea,
raising the specter of fabrication to secure a generous plea
deal. He also admitted that while he was incarcerated, and
before he implicated defendant in the crimes, he saw news reports
that defendant had been charged with the same crimes as Harvey.
Most damaging to Harvey's credibility is the fact that he
implicated his brother and cousin in the crime, but not
defendant, even though he had seen defendant's picture in a
police photo array soon after the crimes. Harvey's reason for
not identifying defendant at the time was that he did not know
everything about what happened. This was simply unbelievable
given his role as the getaway driver. Even if it was a tenable
excuse, it would not outweigh the other circumstances pointing to
his unreliability, just as the explanation provided by one
eyewitness in Santiago for failing to identify the defendant when
the opportunity first presented itself was not enough to offset
the insufficiency of the corroboration in that case. There, the
eyewitness claimed that he did not tell the police he saw the
defendant in the lineup because he wanted to remain unknown due
to his immigration status (Santiago,
The fact that Harvey's reliability is suspect based on
his credibility, rather than the potential inaccuracy of his
identification, does not affect the analysis.
[4]
Where
circumstances suggest the corroborating testimony is inaccurate--
as was the case in Santiago--those circumstances weigh in favor
of admitting the expert testimony, and failure to do so
constitutes an abuse of discretion (Santiago,
This does not mean that codefendant or coparticipant
testimony can never provide corroboration, or that a beneficial
plea deal renders such testimony "incredible." "Whether a
victim's or other eyewitnesses's identification of a defendant is
sufficiently corroborated by other eyewitness identifications, so
that the trial court need not proceed to the second stage of the
LeGrand analysis, is dependent on the circumstances of the case"
(Santiago,
Furthermore, J.J.'s identification was subject to the
types of factors that have an impact on eyewitness memory and
accuracy. His observations of the four men involved in the crime
were made under highly stressful conditions, which can affect
memory (see People v Abney,
Since the People's case depended on J.J.'s
identification testimony, which was uncorroborated, the trial
court should have proceeded to the second stage of the LeGrand
inquiry (Santiago,
Lastly, the error was not harmless, as the proof of
defendant's guilt was not overwhelming (People v Crimmins,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that court, in a memorandum. Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Pigott, Stein and Garcia concur. Judge Rivera dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion in which Judges Abdus-Salaam and Fahey concur. Decided June 28, 2016
Notes
[1] The expert was expected to testify as to how the level of violence, the length of the incident and the presence of a weapon could influence an eyewitness's ability to make an identification.
[1] Harvey claimed that his attorney at the plea told him to say he was the driver.
[2] Contrary to the majority's contention, LeGrand did not
simply list factors to be considered or ignored by courts without
guiding standards and structure (majority op at 5-6). Rather,
LeGrand established a legal framework with specific areas of
inquiry, to be applied by courts when determining the
admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification
(see Santiago,
[3] The defendant sought to admit expert testimony concerning the impact on eyewitness recognition of "exposure time (the amount of time available for viewing a perpetrator affects the witness's ability to identify the perpetrator); cross-racial and cross-ethnic inaccuracy (non-Hispanic Caucasian eyewitnesses are generally less accurate in identifying Hispanic people than in identifying other non-Hispanic Caucasians); weapon focus (a victim's focus on the weapon used in an assault can affect ability to observe and remember the attacker); lineup fairness (similarity of fillers to the suspect increases identification accuracy); lineup instructions (police instructions indicating that the police believe the perpetrator to be in the lineup increase the likelihood of false identification); forgetting
[4] I do not agree with the Appellate Division's conclusion that Harvey's memory was unreliable based on factors impacting Harvey's ability to view defendant and that defendant was a stranger. The record establishes that Harvey observed defendant for a period of time the evening of the robbery.