9 N.E.2d 310 | Ill. | 1937
The Illinois Central Railroad Company filed objections in the county court of Jasper county to the application of the county collector for judgment and an order of sale of the company's property for delinquent 1934 taxes. Its objections were overruled, judgment and order for sale were rendered, and the company has appealed.
The board of supervisors of Jasper county levied $16,200 for general county purposes for the year 1934. Appellant objected to the following items in that levy: "Fuel, water and lights for courthouse, $1000; fuel, water and lights for jail, $300, and for bridges, $400." The company contends that the items, "fuel, water and lights" for the court-house and for the jail, were improper in that several purposes are covered by one amount, or, in other words, the levies for these purposes should have been made specific by further itemization, and that the item for "bridges" is uncertain and does not sufficiently designate the purpose for which the levy made is to be used. In People v. Jackson,
The appellee confesses error was committed by the overruling of the appellant's objection to the item of, "$100 for fire department" contained in the levy ordinance of the city of Newton.
Objections were made to, "street and alley fund, $200," "for streets and alleys, $200," and "for street and alleys, $2000," contained in the respective 1934 levy ordinances of the villages of Rose Hill and Willow Hill, and the city of Newton. In view of our holdings that levies for streets and alleys are for a single purpose, these objections were properly overruled. People v.Eastern Illinois and Missouri Railroad Co.
Three other items were objected to in the village of Rose Hill tax levy ordinance, viz., "election fund $40," "light fund, $630," and "sidewalk and bridge fund, $100." The first two items are such as would ordinarily be found in an annual village tax levy ordinance. The expense items connected with holding an election in a village are few in number and small in amount. No statutory provision is violated by a failure to further itemize the election item of $40. The same is true of the item of $630 for light for the village. The fact that the word "fund" was included *411
does not necessarily make the items vague and indefinite. While we have held that it is possible for a fund or an account to be for different purposes and subject to the objection that it is indefinite, (People v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois RailwayCo.
The objection to the levy of $100 for, "sidewalks and bridges," should have been sustained, because these were two separate purposes. We held in People v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
Appellant objected to the 1934 levies in fifteen school districts in Jasper county on the ground that, in each district, the levies were so unreasonable and unnecessary as to show an abuse of discretion by the taxing authorities; that the directors, in making the 1934 levy, did not take into consideration the cash on hand, the uncollected 1933 taxes still in process of collection, and the amounts which would be received from the motor fuel tax, and the occupational tax through the State distributive school fund; that they made no attempt to estimate the funds which would be needed to operate the schools during the tax year; and that the result of permitting the levy for the year 1934 to stand, would be an unnecessary accumulation of funds in the school treasuries. The financial status of each district on the day of the levy was stipulated, but the appellee objected to the materiality of the facts and figures contained in the various exhibits. District 35 illustrates the *412 data furnished with reference to each of the districts. In it the net funds available for a two-year period included cash on hand $684.49 and a balance of $262.35 of the 1933 taxes, which the testimony shows was collected in the fall of 1934. It was stipulated that this district received $136.72 during the eight months' period in which the motor fuel tax was diverted, in part, to school purposes. From the occupational tax, based on eleven months' actual receipts, it was estimated that the district would receive $971.46 over a two-year period, or $485.73 for one year. There were no outstanding orders or debts at the time the 1934 tax levy was made. The average cost of operating the school district for one year was $684.25, based on the cost for the three preceding years, and the tax levied for 1934, at the rate of one dollar, would produce the sum of $564.17. It is contended that the district would have $2055.02 net funds available for a two-year period, and that no levy should have been made for the year 1934. Substantially the same objections are made to the tax in the other school districts. The only difference is in the amounts of the tax levy, cost of operation and net funds available. Only school districts 40 and 41 had any outstanding school orders, and it is stipulated that these were deducted from the total funds available in those two districts.
It was stipulated that appellee had made a prima facie case, and no question is made as to the legality of the levy in any district by reason of the same exceeding the statutory rate. The exhibits introduced by appellant, and objected to as immaterial by appellee, purport to cover a two-year period. All the levies were made on August 7, 1934, and the fiscal year of the school districts ended on June 30, 1935. The appellant objects to the relevancy and materiality of the county collector's testimony showing that only a part of the 1934 levy was received by each district in May, 1935, and that the balance collected thereof would be paid in December, 1935. We have taken from the exhibits, *413 which are admitted to be correct as to amounts, the figures for the year 1934-5, in the fifteen districts, which are shown in the following table:
============================================================= | Average | Levy | Cash on | Uncollected Dist. | Annual cost | for | hand June | taxes for No. | of operation. | 1934. | 30, 1934. | 1933. -------|---------------|------------|-----------|------------ 35 | $ 684.25 | $ 564.17 | $ 684.49 | $ 262.35 39 | 552.22 | 625.58 | 901.48 | 299.52 40 | 757.46 | 531.17 | 495.45 | 243.07 41 | 12,306.88 | 10,755.75 | 9,541.86 | 5,117.79 42 | 469.12 | 520.35 | 505.67 | 203.85 58 | 1,314.40 | 758.26 | 1,401.51 | 507.37 59 | 572.89 | 518.17 | 1,109.82 | 257.27 69 | 789.31 | 807.77 | 1,207.42 | 370.89 70 | 940.67 | 620.29 | 732.93 | 350.79 72 | 719.64 | 621.25 | 707.04 | 326.25 75 | 742.90 | 524.15 | 987.90 | 463.05 76 | 997.40 | 522.04 | 1,862.72 | 523.98 78 | 637.40 | 517.75 | 443.42 | 514.35 88 | 2,661.79 | 1,616.93 | 730.34 | 368.84 115 | 723.70 | 696.55 | 1,072.28 | 550.18 -------------------------------------------------------------The appellant made no showing as to what amount, if any, had been received in prior years from the State distributive school fund. The act providing for a transfer of a portion of the motor fuel tax to school purposes was not approved until May 4, 1934. It provided that after March 1, 1935, the motor fuel tax money should be otherwise distributed. (Laws of 1933-4, first, second and third sp. sess. p. 227.) The statute directing payment of a part of the occupational tax into the common school fund, became effective July 1, 1933, (Laws of 1933, p. 1090,) so that there was available to the directors of the fifteen districts, eleven months' experience to assist them in estimating what amount could be expected from this source during the year 1934-5, but, at best, the amounts to be expected from both these sources, were highly conjectural. The appellant's evidence *414 consisted of exhibits showing the cash on hand, the amounts of uncollected 1933 taxes, and the cost of operation in each district for the last three years preceding 1934-5. All the money from the motor fuel tax was received by the districts subsequent to August 7, 1934, the date of the levies. There is nothing to show what expenses were anticipated by the directors in any district for the fiscal year 1934-5. The 1934 levies were, for the most part, less in amount than the average annual cost of operation.
It was the duty of the various school directors to make their levy on or before the first Tuesday in August. They also had the right to maintain sufficient money in the treasury to pay indebtedness as it became due, and it was not necessary for them to wait until money was actually needed to defray outstanding obligations, before levying a tax. (Mathews v. City of Chicago,
In People v. Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Co.
In People v. Wabash Railroad Co.
In Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v.People,
The appellant relies on People v. Millard, supra, and People v.New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Co.
The objector does not make such a showing here and under the facts we cannot hold that there was a clear abuse of the discretion lodged in any of the fifteen school districts. The county court properly overruled these objections.
The judgment of the county court of Jasper county is affirmed as to all items objected to except the item of $100 *418 for the fire department of the city of Newton, and the item of $100 for sidewalk and bridge fund, in the ordinance adopted by the village of Rose Hill, and as to these two items the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to sustain the objections thereto.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, withdirections.