75 N.E.2d 889 | Ill. | 1947
Jack Harwell, Edward Mulligan and Raymond Kelly were indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for the larceny, on April 25, 1946, of a camera having a value of sixty-five dollars. The defendants entered pleas of not guilty. Thereafter, on September 11, 1946, Harwell and Mulligan withdrew their pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of guilty. Kelly was not present. The court admonished Harwell and Mulligan as to the effect of their pleas *371 of guilty but they persisted in the pleas. Evidence was adduced, arguments of counsel were heard, and Harwell and Mulligan were sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year nor more than one year and one day, and each fined one dollar. On October 7, 1946, twenty-six days after judgment was entered, Harwell made a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence. The next day, the portion of the sentence assessing a fine against him was ordered expunged from the record, and the motion to vacate the judgment and sentence overruled. An order was also entered expunging the fine against Mulligan. Harwell prosecutes this writ of error.
Seeking a reversal, the defendant Harwell insists the judgment entered on September 11, 1946, was void for the reasons that (1) it imposed a fine contrary to the statute fixing the punishment for grand larceny at not less than one year nor more than ten years' imprisonment in the penitentiary, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 38, par. 389,) and (2) did not conform to the explanation given by the trial judge, or which ought to have been given, as to the effect of pleading guilty to the charge. The recital in the record disclosing that defendant was informed, warned and cautioned as to the effect of his plea of guilty shows a sufficient compliance with the statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 38, par. 732; People v. Childers,
It is true that, in rare cases, we have held the presumption that the court discharged its duty in admonishing a defendant of the consequences of a plea of guilty and his persistence in the plea was overcome by a totally erroneous sentence. (People v.Meyers,
The Criminal Code does not define either grand larceny or petit larceny. Larceny is defined as the felonious stealing, taking and carrying, leading, riding or driving away the personal goods of another. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 38, par. 387.) Larceny is a generic term and includes, among others, the offenses of grand larceny and petit larceny. The fundamental distinction between these two kinds of larceny is largely a matter of the punishment to be inflicted. (People v. Crane,
Defendant complains that a conviction on a plea of guilty in a criminal cause should show the reception of a single plea of guilty and the court's separate warning as to its effect. The Criminal Code makes no such requirement, and defendant does not assume to explain how he could have been prejudiced by pleading jointly with one of his two codefendants.
Defendant's third contention is that the judgment against Mulligan and himself is a joint judgment and, consequently, void. Where two or more persons jointly tried are convicted, the sentence or judgment must, as a rule, be rendered against them severally and not jointly, each being subject to the full penalty and punishment for the criminal offense in the same manner as if he had been the sole offender. The law does not require, however, that entirely separate judgments be written up, it being sufficient if the sentences are separately assessed on each, although appearing in the same judgment. (24 C.J.S., Criminal *374
Law, sec. 1565, p. 35; 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, sec. 452, p. 112; People v. Dron,
The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.