The People v. Hakim B. ScottThe People v. Hakim B. Scott
Case Information
*1 This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports. ----------------------------------------------------------------- No. 87 The People &c., Respondent, v. Hakim B. Scott, Appellant.
Steven R. Bernhard, for appellant. Seth M. Lieberman, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. In the early morning hours of December 7, 2008, following a night of heavy drinking, José Sucuzhaney and his brother Romel Sucuzhaney were walking home in their Brooklyn neighborhood while supportively holding one another. The *2 brothers crossed in front of an SUV which was stopped at a red light. In the SUV were Keith Phoenix in the driver's seat, Demetrius Nathaniel in the passenger seat, and defendant Hakim Scott in the back seat. As the brothers passed in front of the SUV, Phoenix yelled homophobic slurs from the car window. In response, one of the brothers either lifted his foot to kick the SUV or actually kicked it. Defendant exited the vehicle, raised a glass beer bottle and smashed it over José's head, causing José to fall to the ground. Defendant thereafter chased Romel down the block, carrying the remains of the broken bottle. Phoenix, at some point, exited the SUV, removed an aluminum baseball bat from the car and proceeded to beat José with the bat. Defendant, upon returning to the scene, fled in the SUV along with Phoenix and Nathaniel. José was left unconscious and died from his injuries the next day.
At trial, the People asserted two alternative theories
of liability (1) that defendant was acting in concert with
Phoenix and (2) that defendant alone caused José's death.
Following trial, defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the
first degree, for the death of José, and attempted assault in the
first degree, for his actions toward Romel. Defendant was
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 25 years on the
manslaughter conviction and 12 years for attempted assault. The
Appellate Division reduced the term of imprisonment for the
attempted assault charge from 12 years to four years, and
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otherwise affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was
legally sufficient to sustain the convictions (see People v
Scott,
Penal Law § 20.00 provides that when a principal
commits a crime, the principal's accomplice may be held liable
where the accomplice "acting with the mental culpability required
for the commission [of the crime] . . . solicits, requests,
commands, importunes, or intentionally aids [the principal] to
engage [in the commission of the crime]." In People v LaBelle
(
This was a close case. The evidence presented at trial
resulted in conflicting testimony about when exactly Phoenix
exited the SUV. Nathaniel testified that defendant got out of
the car first, then, once defendant ran away chasing Romel,
Phoenix exited the vehicle. Romel, however, testified that
Phoenix exited at the same time as defendant and, that after
defendant hit José with the bottle, Romel could see Phoenix
coming toward José with the bat. Thus, under Romel's version of
events, defendant and Phoenix were out of the car at the same
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time, both acting in a manner intending to cause harm to José.
Additionally, another eyewitness testified that he observed
Phoenix swing the bat at one of the brothers while defendant was
present. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most
favorable to the People (see People v Delamota,
Finally, we reject defendant's argument that the trial court committed a mode of proceedings error when it gave the jury a supplemental instruction in defendant's absence, regarding the dates alleged in the indictment.
During jury instructions, as the court was giving the jury the relevant dates for the charges against defendant as stated in the indictment, December 7th and December 8th, the prosecutor interrupted the judge, attempting to correct her by stating that the relevant dates were December 6th and December 7th. The judge then charged the jury using the dates given by the prosecutor. The following day, the court -- in the absence of the jury, defendant, and all counsel -- stated, on the record to the court reporter, that she had charged the jury on the wrong dates of the alleged crimes, and that the correct dates were December 7th and 8th. The judge stated that she had spoken with *5 the parties who agreed that the jury could be informed of this mistake outside of their presence. Thereafter, in the absence of the attorneys and defendant, the judge informed the jury that she had given them the wrong dates and told them the correct dates of the alleged crimes, noting that both parties agreed that she could make the correction in their absence. Later in the day, when defendant and his counsel were present, the court referenced its earlier supplemental instruction and asked defense counsel if the supplemental instruction was satisfactory, to which defense counsel responded that he had no objection.
Although defendant has a fundamental right to be
present during "all material stages of a trial" (People v
Mehmedi,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Order affirmed, in a memorandum. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey concur. Decided June 11, 2015