delivered the opinion of the court:
Sеptember 19, 1939, the defendant, Charles Evans, was indicted in the circuit court of St. Clair county for the crime of rape. Defendant pleaded guilty and, on Decеmber 22, 1939, judgment was entered sentencing him to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. Aрpearing pro se, Evans prosecutes this writ of error. No bill of exceрtions has been filed.
Defendant first contends that a judgment of conviction resulting from a plea of guilty obtained through coercion, trickery, or false promises, violates the due-process-of-law clause of the fourteenth аmendment to the Federal constitution. In the absence of a bill of excеptions, this contention is not open to consideration. Defendant’s brief сontains a long “History of the Case.” His reply brief contains an extended discussiоn of the matters described in the principal brief. The common-law record affords no basis for any of the charges in defendant’s briefs with respect to promises alleged to have been made by an assistant State’s attorney. As frеquently observed, the record imports verity and cannot be contradicted by statements in the briefs. People v. Conn,
The second contention urged is that the trial court erred •in sentencing defendant without hearing witnesses in aggravation оr mitigation of the offense. Where the court has discretion as to the extеnt of the punishment, if neither the defendant nor the People request an examination of witnesses as to the aggravation or mitigation of the offense, the examination and hearing are deemed to have been waived. (People v. McElhaney,
Defendant’s third contention is that the judgment of conviction was obtained, through denial of counsel to him in contravention of the Federal constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The assertion is made that the trial court at no time informed defendant of his constitutional right to counsel; that he was ignorant of his right to the assistance and benefit of coúnsel and thаt, accordingly, at no time competently and intelligently waived his right in this regard either by word or action. There is no mandatory constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed to represent an accused. Nor does the due-process-of-law clause in the fourteenth amendment to the Fedеral constitution require that counsel be assigned to an accused, even where requested. (Betts v. Brady,
The judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair county is affirmed.
T , , Judgment affirmed.
