delivered the opinion of the court:
Thе defendant, Charles Cox, was indicted on a charge of larceny from the person, fоund guilty and sentenced. The case is before us on writ of error.
The defendant’s contentiоns are that the indictment was defective; that the evidence does not sustain a conviction beyond all reasonable doubt, and that prejudicial testimony was admitted warranting a reversal.
The facts are that one David H. Fochtman, an investigator for the Courts Services Division of the Cook County Department of Welfare, encountered the defendant in an area on the near north side of Chicago known as Bughouse Square. Cox was destitute and asked Fochtman for money. Cox testified that he received $4 and a little later $15 from Fochtman, whereas Fochtman testified that he gave Cox only $1 for carfare. The two men went to a nearby tavern and drank a bottle of beer. After quitting the tavern, Fochtmаn testified that Cox asked to see his wallet containing a star and when Fochtman produced the wallet, Cox seized it, removed $19 and the star, then ran away. Cox testified that Fochtman gave him the $15 to buy his silence after suggesting an unnatural sex act.
Defendant’s argument that the indiсtment is defective, in that it fails to describe properly the property which was the subjеct of the larceny, cannot be sustained. There was no motion to quash filed in the trial court, and as technical objections to an indictment must be made before trial, under sеction 9 of division XI of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 38, par. 719), they are waived by failure tо move to quash or otherwise assail the sufficiency of the indictment before trial and verdict. People v. Pond,
The defendant next contends that the evidence of the People is improbable. We cannot agree from a careful reading of the entire transcript. The trial judge had the opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses аnd the weight to be accorded their testimony. (People v. West,
The counsel for defendant urges that reversible error was committed in the introduction of prejudicial testimony that defendant had previously committed offenses and was confinеd in the county jail. Upon objection, where rulings were secured, much of this testimony was strickеn. There was no jury and there was no motion that mistrial be declared because of alleged prejudice. We feel that the conduct of the trial court assured the defendant a fair trial. It is not our function as a court to reverse for any error in the record, but rather to insure a fair trial and to determine that the conviction is based on evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Keagle,
No effort was made by the People to show that the defendant had previously been in jail; rather the assistant State’s Attorney cautioned the complaining witness not to make any references to such fact. Nevertheless, defendant’s counsel asked many questions of Fochtman about the defendant’s having been in jail.
The defendant also alleges error in that the complaining witness was permitted to testify that he had made cоmplaint to police officers immediately after the larceny. There was no оbjection to this testimony, and on cross-examination of the complaining witness the defеndant’s counsel himself asked several questions along the same line. From the record as a whole, we find no prejudicial error in the admission of evidence.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed,