147 N.E. 428 | Ill. | 1925
Plaintiff in error, Abe Berman, was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced in the circuit court of Boone county for an alleged second offense under the Illinois Prohibition law, and the case is now before this court upon writ of error.
Upon the examination of prospective jurors, counsel for plaintiff in error inquired of one of the jurors if he belonged to an organization known as the Ku Klux Klan. An objection to this question made by the State's attorney was sustained. The same juror was then asked if he had taken an oath as a member of that organization. A similar objection was made and sustained, and these rulings of the court are assigned as error. This question was fully discussed in People v. Kroll,
Upon his examination the twelfth juryman sworn to try the case, after plaintiff in error had exhausted his peremptory challenges, stated that he had an opinion in the case which it would require evidence to remove. He was then challenged for cause. Upon further examination he stated that he did not have a fixed opinion on the guilt or innocence of the accused; that it was a passing opinion; that it could be removed and he would enter upon the case with *549 a feeling of presumption of innocence notwithstanding what he had learned; that he would certainly do so; that he could lay aside everything which he had learned or heard and decide the case purely upon what he heard upon the witness stand; that he would do that; that what he had read would not bias him at the start of the case; that he thought it was quite natural for anyone reading a case of any kind to form an opinion; that it was so with him; that the defendant would not have to come in and prove his innocence; that he (the juror) would have to dispel from his mind the opinion he gained from reading an account of the case; that it was simply a press report; that he would not carry that opinion into the jury box when the case began; that he felt perfectly capable of putting aside at the beginning of the case any opinion that he had formed from reading; that he would not care to serve as a juror if he could not do that; that he realized that it would not be right; that he would absolutely put the opinion aside and start in the trial with the presumption of innocence.
It is the right of every man accused of crime to have a fair and impartial trial before a fair and impartial jury, but that does not mean that he is entitled to be tried by jurors who had never heard or read of his case or formed a passing opinion as to his guilt or innocence. If that were the rule in these times, when every occurrence of more than passing moment is exploited in the newspapers, no man of ordinary intelligence would be qualified to sit as a juror. The most common criticism of our jury system is with reference to the intelligence of the jurors. This may be accounted for by the fact that so many intelligent citizens seek to evade their duty as citizens by presenting excuses when called upon to serve as jurors, and many others, when examined upon their voir dire, through a lack of comprehension of their duties as jurors or from pride of opinion refuse to express a willingness to lay aside from their minds an opinion based solely upon street rumor or newspaper reports *550 and decide the case solely under the law and upon the evidence produced upon the trial. The examination of the juror in question showed not only that he was competent but that he possessed more than an ordinary understanding of his duties as a juror.
The indictment in this case consisted of eight counts, and plaintiff in error was found guilty upon all the counts of the indictment but judgment and sentence were had only upon the seventh count. It is contended by plaintiff in error that this count does not properly set out a crime under the law of Illinois. The seventh count of the indictment alleged a prior sale on May 21, 1923, and averred that on June 30, 1924, "the said Abe Berman, at and within the county of Boone, and State of Illinois, not being authorized to possess intoxicating liquor in the manner provided by the Illinois Prohibition act, did then and there possess intoxicating liquor with the intent to use the same in violation of the said Illinois Prohibition act, contrary to the form of the statute," etc. InPeople v. Barnes,
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
Judgment reversed.