7 N.Y. 378 | NY | 1852
Lead Opinion
There is but a single question made in this case for determination; and that is, whether the decision of the court below, excluding the evidence offered by the defendant of the general good character of the witness Wood for truth and veracity was correct. This witness had been called by the defendant and examined and had given material evidence in the cause. He was then cross-examined in behalf of the people and testified that he had been prosecuted before a magistrate upon a charge of perjury and committed for trial upon the complaint of L. and G. Raymond; that the perjury alleged to have been committed was in a suit tried in September previously, in favor of the defendant against the two Raymonds. The general rule is that a party can only give evidence of the good character of his witness where his general character for truth has been first attacked, by witnesses who have spoken in regard to it, called on the other side. It is not pretended that there had been an attack in any form upon the general character of the witness Wood, by the evidence of any witness, or that any witness had spoken in any respect to it. But it is urged on the part of the defendant that the evidence given by Wood himself on his cross-examination, to which I have referred, impeached or tended to impeach his general character for truth and therefore laid the foundation for giving evidence to sustain it. The People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569; Carter v. The People, 2 Hill, 317, and The People v. Hulse, 3Hill, 309, have been cited as sustaining the proposition. The case of Carter v. The People was this: Carter was indicted and tried and found guilty of perjury: at the trial a material witness for the defendant testified on his cross-examination by the prosecution that he had been complained of and bound over on a charge of passing counterfeit money; upon which the counsel for the defendant offered to give evidence of the good character of the witness for truth, which the court on objection rejected. Oncertiorari brought, the supreme court said that upon the principle established in The People v. Rector, the prisoner was entitled to the benefit of the proof offered, and ordered a new trial upon that ground. *380
It can not be denied, but that if the judgment in that case can be upheld, it fully sustains the defendant's proposition in this case, for the question then made is identical with the question made here.
It is proper to remark that the rule of evidence applicable in such cases was not at all discussed by the court in that case. It was decided on the argument, the court assuming, that the decision in The People v. Rector, established the principle contended for in behalf of the defendant in that case. But it seems to me that there is a wide difference in principle applicable to the two cases. In The People v. Rector it had been shown by the cross-examination that the witness was a man of grossly immoral habits and conduct, and the decision was that this evidence impeached his general moral character and laid the foundation for the party calling the witness to sustain him, by evidence in reply of general good character for truth.
It is not necessary on this occasion to express an opinion whether I should be able to agree with the court in that decision; that is, that the evidence could not on the cross-examination of the witness tend to impeach his general character, within the rule allowing replying evidence of general good character for truth. In the case of Carter v. ThePeople, the witness on his cross-examination did not admit or give evidence to any immoral conduct. All that he testified to in that respect was that he had been complained of and bound over on a charge of passing counterfeit money. The law presumed this witness innocent, and no guilt was proved by the evidence. The single fact that he had been complained of and held for trial for the commission of a crime did not affect his moral character.
I think that it was correctly said by Mr. Justice Parker in delivering the judgment of the court below in this case, that both of these decisions have in effect been overruled by the decision in The People v. Hulse (3 Hill, 309). That was a trial of an indictment against Hulse for a rape. The defendant attempted to discredit the testimony of the complainant; first, by showing on her cross-examination that her evidence was *381 improbable in itself: second, by disproving some of the facts to which she testified: third, by evidence that her conduct was inconsistent with the idea of the offence having been committed; and fourth, by calling witnesses to show that the account which she had given of the matter out of court did not correspond with her statement under oath as a witness. It was held that this was not an attack on the general character of the witness, and consequently evidence of her general good character was not admissible in reply.
In my judgment the rule was correctly stated and sustained inThe People v. Hulse, and in the judgment of the court below in the case under consideration: that in general a party will not be permitted to give evidence of his witness's good character until it has been attacked on the other side, either by the evidence of witnesses called for such purpose or by the evidence of the witness on cross-examination going to impeach his general character. There are several other well considered cases which sustain the principle stated; among them are Russell v.Coffin (8 Pick. 143), Rogers v. Moore (10 Conn. 13). It is unnecessary to review them at this time; that was ably done by the late Mr. Justice Bronson in the cases of The People v.Rector and The People v. Hulse, and by Mr. Justice Parker in delivering the judgment of the court below in this case. Judgment should be affirmed.
GARDINER, JOHNSON, EDMONDS and WATSON, JJ., concurred in the opinion of Judge JEWETT.
Dissenting Opinion
The question in what cases evidence of the general good character of a witness may be received or the principle upon which such evidence rests, notwithstanding the numerous decided cases and the various speculations of elementary writers on the subject, does not seem to be yet entirely settled or at least not generally understood.
In the case of The People v. Rector (19 Wend. R. 569), it was held that where the general moral character of a witness is impeached, whether by witnesses called for that purpose or on *382 his own cross-examination, it is competent for the party calling him to adduce testimony in support of his character for truth and veracity, so that the jury may pass upon his credit. In that case Gillespie, the witness in question, had testified upon his cross-examination to facts not material to the issue, and which were confessedly collateral to it, but which nevertheless had a tendency to affect his moral character and to discredit him with the jury. If they had been material and pertinent to the issue, the court would have held, as I infer from the opinion of Justice Cowen, that general evidence of good character would not have been received.
The case of Carter v. The People (2 Hill, 317) was decided upon the same point, according to the principle of Rector's case.
The People v. Hulse (3 Hill, 309) has been supposed to shake the authority of the case of Rector. But it seems to me this is a mistake. In the case of Hulse the cross-examination of the witness did not extend beyond matters pertinent to the issue, and in such a case, as the court say, the public prosecutor was not at liberty to call witnesses to sustain the good character of the witness. Bronson, Justice, says: "In the People v.Rector, it was shown by the cross-examination that the witness was a man of grossly immoral habits and conduct, and it was held that evidence was admissible in reply, to show that the general character of the witness for truth was good." He proceeds to say that "The rule with us then seems to be this: where a party attacks the general character of a witness on the other side, either by calling impeaching witnesses or by drawing out extrinsic facts going to prove general character on the cross-examination, sustaining evidence may be given in reply." A party may upon the cross-examination of a witness introduced by his adversary, ask him collateral questions upon matters entirely disconnected with the issue, the answers to which may tend to degrade and discredit him, and the witness may in general do as he pleases about answering them. If he does answer them and his answers are of a character to degrade him or to produce an unfavorable impression *383 upon the minds of the jury in regard to his character for truthfulness, he stands to some extent impeached and discredited. The facts so drawn out on cross-examination are entirely immaterial to the question at issue, and are only admissible upon the ground that as their usual if not necessary concomitant is a depraved moral standard, the evidence given by the witness, which is pertinent to the issue, is less reliable, and when weighed against other evidence in the case, the jury might be justified in disregarding it altogether: and this I understand to be the principle upon which evidence of reputation is received of the character of a witness. If a witness's conduct has been such as to fix upon him the judgment of the community in which he resides and where he is known a particular character in any respect, that judgment is presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved. If it be that he is immoral or habitually guilty of conduct inconsistent with honesty or morality, and the judgment be true, it needs no argument to show that evidence derived from such a witness is not to be relied upon. The source is polluted. The only security for its truth is the chance, in the mind of the witness, of escape from detection, in case he swears falsely. It is bereft of the highest sanction and greatest safeguard — a good conscience and an honest purpose.
In both cases, where the witness impeaches himself by admitting his own delinquencies on the stand and where impeaching evidence is produced against him by evidence of general reputation, the result is that his character is affected unfavorably; in neither case is the evidence conclusive; and I am not able to perceive why his credit may not be repaired by the same kind of proof in the one case as in the other. It is claimed that the evidence of Wood on his cross-examination related to isolated facts and circumstances, and did not affect his general moral character, and therefore was not to be met by evidence of general good character.
It seems to me such a distinction is not warranted by the reason and good sense of the case. A reference to the cross-examination will show that Wood was not only a suspected *384 person, but that proceedings had been in several instances instituted with a view to punish him for perjury. It is said he was at liberty to explain the transactions and deny his guilt. But would that restore him to confidence? And would it not with propriety be said that his denial of guilt was to be expected as a matter of course? His character would still labor under the odium occasioned by the prosecution, and all the explanations he could give would not wipe out the reproach.
The true distinction, I apprehend, is the one drawn by Justice Bronson in the case of The People v. Hulse, between a case where the cross-examination is confined to topics pertinent to the issue upon trial, and where it is entirely collateral to the issue and only tends to impair the credit of the witness. In the latter case evidence of general reputation that his character for truth is good, or which goes to repair his character thus presumptively damaged is admissible, while in the former, although the cross-examination may have incidentally impaired his credit, yet it is not to be restored by evidence of general reputation.
In the case now under consideration the cross-examination had not the remotest relation to the issue, and its only possible object or effect was to impeach the credit of the witness. It is in no wise distinguishable in principle from the cases ofRector and Carter before referred to; and I have shown that neither the decision nor the reasoning of the court in the case of Hulse conflict with the decisions in the two former cases.
If the foregoing views are correct, it follows that the judgment of the supreme court and that of the oyer and terminer should be reversed.
RUGGLES, Ch. J., concurred with Judge WELLES.
GRIDLEY, J., was absent.
Judgment affirmed. *385
