217 F. 973 | W.D. Wash. | 1914
The’liability in this case depends wholly upon the fact as to whether or not the speed at which the Oceania Vance was going was immoderate. -It is strongly contended on the part of the claimant that she was going not to exceed a speed of 5 knots an hour, and that that was not an immoderate speed. I think a fair consideration of the testimony is conclusive that the schooner was going not less than 6% or 7 knots an hour. The fact that she was sailing before the wind, with practically all of her sails set, with a “strong breeze” blowing, as stated by one of the witnesses, and by practically all of the witnesses that there was a good breeze, and the further fact of the" testimony of the captain, immediately after the collision, that the boat was going at a speed of 6% to 7 miles an hour, and he had concluded this after an examination of the log, and only modified his testimony upon the hearing, some two years after the collision, and all of the facts as disclosed by the witnesses in the record, would indicate that the vessel was moving at the speed suggested.
It is also strongly contended upon the part of the claimant that, even though the speed of the schooner was 7 miles an hour, that was not an immoderate ’speed, and that the conduct and action of the tug Sea Lion in reversing its engines and fhen going forward, instead of stopping the engines and moving at a moderate speed, was the cause of the injury, and it was the negligence of the -tug Sea Lion that caused the collision. From -a -fair- consideration of the -evidence, I think it
“Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions. A steam vessel hearing, apparently forward of her beam, the fog signal of a vessel, the position of which is not ascertained shall, so far as the circumstances of the case shall permit, stop her engines, and then navigate with caution until danger of collision is over.”
While this statute does not include sailing crafts, yet the principle enunciated is held to comprehend and be applicable to sailing vessels. The further fact that a sailing vessel cannot be maneuvered in the manner required is a strong reason, as stated by the courts, for so moderating her speed as to furnish effective aid to an approaching steamer, charged with the duty of avoiding her. She can do practically nothing beyond putting her helm up or down to “ease the blow,” after the danger of collision has become imminent.
I think this case is on “all fours” with the Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, 19 Sup. Ct. 491, 43 L. Ed. 801, where the duty of a sailing vessel in a fog is defined, and in which the court reviews all of the authorities. A consideration of that case, with the facts in this case, precludes any conclusion other than that a decree should be entered for libelant as prayed for; and it is so ordered.