16 Barb. 651 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1853
The warrant under which the defendant claims a justification for seizing and selling the plaintiffs’ cars in the town of Bedford, required him, as collector of that town, to collect from the several persons named in the assessment roll annexed to it the several - sums mentioned in the last column on each page, opposite to their respective names : and
It is apparent from the first section of title 1 of the chapter of the revised statutes relative to the assessment and collection of taxes, that it was designed to make provision for the assessment and taxation of all lands and all personal estate within this state, subject to certain exemptions which are inap- . plicable to this case. By the 2d title of the same chapter, the
The remaining question is whether the assessors are authorized to name in their rolls the actual or supposed owners of what the statute denominates non-resident lands. They are expressly required to set down in a particular column the names of all the taxable inhabitants of their town or ward. There is no provision requiring or authorizing them to set down the names of non-residents. On the contrary, they are required to insert in a column, similar to that containing the names of the residents, and apparently as a substitute therefor, descriptions of the lands of such non-residents. The only reference to the names of the owners is in the provision for the description of a subdivision of a tract, where they are required to put down in a first column the number of the lot without the name of the owner. By the 26th section of title 2, the assessors are required to certify, and by the 8th section of the act of April 15, 1851, they are required to swear, that their assessment roll contains a true statement of the aggregate amount of the taxable personal estate of each and every person named in the said roll, over and above the amount of his debts and taxable stocks. Now, as they cannot insert in their roll the amount of the taxable personal estate of non-residents, this provision, construed literally, implies that their names should not be inserted at all. If it had been designed that such names should be inserted, the application of this part of the certificate and oath should, and no doubt would, have been expressly restricted to residents.
There is nothing in the affidavit as to unpaid taxes, which the collector is required to make, at variance with this construction of the statute. He is required to swear that he has not, upon diligent inquiry, been able to discover any goods or chattels belonging to, or in the possession of, the person charged with, or liable to pay, such sums, whereon he could levy the same. If the assessors are not authorized to name non-resident owners, no person is charged with, nor rendered liable to pay, the taxes imposed upon their lands. Nor can the collector levy the tax upon any personal property of non-residents, as his warrant only authorizes him “in case any person named in the assessment roll shall refuse or neglect to pay his tax, to levy the same by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of such person.” (1 R. S. 396, § 37, sub. 5.) I have mentioned one class where the assessors are expressly prohibited from setting down the names of non-resident owners. Clearly, the collectors are not authorized to levy upon the personal property of such owners; nor, as I conceive, can they do so upon the property of any nonresidents. If, therefore, the affidavit has any reference to the taxes on the lands of non-residents, the collector can safely make it, as to them, in all cases where the taxes have not been voluntarily paid.
In the case under consideration the land was assessed as the property of non-residents. The want of the requisite power to seize and sell their personal property was apparent upon the face of the instrument, to which the warrant referred as explanatory of the directions which it contained. The presumption that every one must be acquainted with the law applicable to his own conduct, is necessary to the due administration of justice, although in many instances, and probably in that now under consideration, it is a strange one, and may operate very hard.
Upon the whole, I am satisfied that the defendant had no authority to levy upon the personal property of the plaintiffs,
S. B. Strong, Justice.]