81 U.S. 204 | SCOTUS | 1872
THE MABEY AND COOPER.
Supreme Court of United States.
*208 Messrs. Beebe, Donohue, and Cooke, for the appellants.
Messrs. Benedict and Benedict, contra.
*211 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Controversies growing out of collisions between ships arise where the colliding vessel was in charge of a tug in which both the tug and the tow are liable for the consequences, as when the officers and crews of both vessels jointly participated in their control and management and where those in charge of both vessels are deficient in skill, *212 omit to take due care, or are guilty of negligence in their navigation. Cases also arise where the tow alone is responsible, as where the tug is employed as the mere motive power to propel the tow from one point to another, and both vessels are under the exclusive control and management of the officers and crew of the tow. Other cases also arise where the tug is solely responsible, as where the tug, under the charge of her own master and crew, undertakes to transport another vessel from one point to another, which, for the time being, has neither her master nor crew on board, as in that case her officers and crew direct and control the navigation of both vessels.[*]
Compensation is claimed in this case by the owners of the ship Isaac Chapman for injuries which the ship received in a collision between the ship of the libellants and the ship Helen Cooper and the steamtug R.L. Mabey, which had the latter ship in tow. As alleged in the libel, the collision occurred on the seventeenth of February, 1866, in the harbor of New York, while the ship of the libellants was moored on the upper side of pier forty-five in East River, and the proofs show that she lay with her head towards the shore, her stern being twenty feet inside of the outer end of the pier. She had a cargo of merchandise on board and was ready for sea, but those in charge of her did not deem it prudent to leave the wharf at that time as the tide was ebb with a strong current and there were large masses of floating ice in the stream.
Different views, however, were entertained by those in charge of the ship Helen Cooper, which was also loaded and ready to sail for a Southern port. By the answer as originally filed it appears that she was lying at the wharf of the gas-works, on the Brooklyn side of the river, with her head towards the shore and her stern towards the stream; that while in that situation those in charge of the steamtug R.L. Mabey made fast to her bows on the port side by a hawser *213 which was passed aft and there fastened by stops, and by that means she was towed into the stream stern foremost, the tide having just commenced to ebb, and the statement of the answer is that as the ship passed out into the stream the stop at the stern was cut so as to allow the ship to turn and head down the river, and that both the ship and the steamtug, while the ship was in the act of turning, were unexpectedly caught in an immense field of floating ice, which, in spite of the power of the steamtug, set both vessels towards the opposite shore and carried them down and across the river so that the bows of the ship passed inside of pier forty-five and struck the side of the ship of the libellants and caused whatever damage the libellants' ship received by the collision. Proof of the collision, therefore, is unnecessary, as the allegation is admitted, but the respondents allege that the ship is not liable, as the collision was the result of inevitable accident.
Prompt appearance was also entered by the claimant of the steamtug, and he filed a separate answer, in which he alleges that the master of the steamtug when applied to on that day to tow the ship of the respondents to sea informed the owners that it was not safe to proceed to sea in the then condition of the weather and tide. Had he himself been governed by that opinion the case of the steamtug would be quite different, but the proofs show that he yielded to the importunity of the owners or agent of the ship and took her in tow, the owners of the ship agreeing to assume the risk of all accidents and dangers. Apart from that he also charges that the collision was occasioned by disobedience of the orders of the pilot and faulty navigation of the ship; that the order of the pilot was not to cast off the hawser by which the ship was moored but only to slacken it until the head of the ship was swung round; that the order was disobeyed, and that the hawser was cast off before the ship came round, which had the effect to set the ship over to the opposite shore towards the ship of the libellants; and he also charges that those in command of the respondents' ship, when she had reached the middle of the stream "and *214 was headed down stream," put her helm hard aport so that the ship took a sudden sheer to starboard, which caused her to run into the ship of the libellants.
Leave was granted to the owners of the respondent ship to file an amended answer, in which they still insist that the collision was the result of inevitable accident, but of a widely different character from that described in the original answer filed more than five months earlier. They now allege that the river was clear of ice for a considerable distance on the opposite side of the river; that owing to the ice on the side where the ship lay it was more difficult than it otherwise would have been to turn the ship so that she would head down the river, and that while the steamtug was endeavoring to accomplish that object a ferry-boat suddenly and improperly crossed the bows of the steamtug, and in order to prevent striking the ferry-boat it became necessary that the steamtug should be suddenly slowed, which had the effect to turn the ship towards the opposite shore and caused the collision, in the manner more fully described in the amended answer.
Both parties took testimony and were fully heard in the District Court, and the District Court being of the opinion that both the tug and the tow were in fault, entered a decree for the libellants against both the respondent vessels, and the owners of the ship appealed from the whole decree to the Circuit Court, where the parties were again heard upon the same pleadings and proofs, and the Circuit Court affirmed the decree of the District Court, holding that both the respondent vessels were in fault. Whereupon the owners of the respective vessels took separate appeals to this court.
Objection is made that the owners of the steamtug could not properly appeal to this court, as they did not formally appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court, but it is not necessary to decide that question, as it is quite clear that the decree must be affirmed against the tug as well as the tow. Nor is the court prepared to admit the validity of the objection, as the record shows that the owners of the tow *215 signed a written stipulation before the decretal order was entered in the District Court, that they, as the owners of the ship, would assume the entire conduct of the defence and that they would answer and pay whatever sum the libellants should recover in the case against both vessels. Undoubtedly the general rule is that a party who does not appeal cannot be heard in opposition to the decree. Still it appears in this case that an appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court was taken from the entire decree, and by a party who represented the entire interest of the losing party in the suit. Well-founded doubt may, perhaps, arise as to the regularity of the proceeding, but it is not necessary to solve that doubt in the present case.
Suppose the appeal is correctly here, we are all of the opinion that the decree of the court below was correct.
Where the collision occurs exclusively from natural causes, and without any negligence or fault on the part of either party, the rule is that the loss must rest where it fell, as no one is responsible for an accident which was produced by causes over which human agency could exercise no control. Such a doctrine, however, can have no application to a case where negligence or fault is shown to have been committed on either side. Inevitable accident, as applied to a case of this description, must be understood to mean a collision which occurs when both parties have endeavored, by every means in their power, with due care and caution, and a proper display of nautical skill, to prevent the occurrence of the accident, and where the proofs show that it occurred in spite of everything that nautical skill, care, and precaution could do to keep the vessels from coming together.[*]
Want of due care is shown in the fact that the ship went to sea at a moment when the master of the tug which had her in tow knew that it was not safe in view of the condition of the weather and tide; nor can the tug be held blameless any more than the ship, because as the master ultimately *216 yielded to the importunities of the owners of the ship and assumed the risk, subject to his claim on the owner of the ship for indemnity. Faulty navigation is also shown, which of itself is a sufficient answer to the defence of inevitable accident.
Palpable error is shown to have been set up in the original answer filed by the owners of the ship, and the court is not satisfied that the defence set up in the amended answer is entitled to any more credit. Such a defence as that set up, that a ferry-boat suddenly and improperly crossed the bows of the steamtug, if founded in fact, could easily be proved by those who were on board the ferry-boat and know what occurred. Instead of that, not even the name of the ferry-boat is given, either in the answer or in the proofs, and not a witness is called except the pilot and the master of the ship, and their statements in that behalf are not satisfactory. No such defence is set up in behalf of the steam-tug, and nothing of the kind was alleged in the original answer filed by the owners of the ship shortly after the suit was commenced. Neither of the courts below appear to have given that defence much credence, and this court concurs with the subordinate courts that the defence is not established.
DECREES AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] Sturgis v. Boyer et al., 24 Howard, 122.
[*] The Pennsylvania, 24 Howard, 313; The Morning Light, 2 Wallace, 556.