THE HONORABLE KAREN WELDIN STEWART, CIR-ML, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE RECEIVER OF SECURITY PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. IN LIQUIDATION, SPI-202, INC. IN LIQUIDATION, SPI-203, INC. IN LIQUIDATION, and SPI-204, INC. IN LIQUIDATION v. WILMINGTON TRUST SP SERVICES, INC.; JOHNSON LAMBERT & CO., LLP; JOHNSON LAMBERT, LLP; MCSOLEY MCCOY & CO.; and STEPHEN D. KANTNER
No. 204, 2015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
November 2, 2015
Submitted: October 28, 2015
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND and VAUGHN, Justices; SMALLS, Chief Judge; and WELCH, Judge,* constituting the Court en Banc.
This 2nd day of November 2015, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On this appeal, a receiver of an insolvent insurer seeks to appeal the Court of Chancery’s decision to dismiss its claims for breach of contract and professional
(2) The Court of Chancery dismissed the professional negligence and contract claims, holding that they were barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto.1 By contrast, the Court of Chancery did not dismiss the aiding and abetting claims against Wilmington Trust and Johnson Lambert, reasoning that under Delaware law, the doctrine of in pari delicto should, consistent with the recognized fiduciary exception to that doctrine, not bar claims against professional advisors for aiding and abetting.2 By so holding, the Court of
(3) On appeal, the receiver’s main argument is that the Court of Chancery erred in its application of the in pari delicto doctrine and should have: i) allowed the receiver to raise all claims the insurer possessed and disregard the doctrine because the underlying company was an insurer; and ii) allowed for an exception to the in pari delicto doctrine to allow a company to bring claims of professional negligence or breach of contract regardless of whether the economic damages at issue flow from unlawful behavior of the company’s own managers. We do not embrace either argument. Rather, we agree with the Court of Chancery’s careful analysis of this difficult area of the law.4
(4) The balance the Court of Chancery struck between the need for accountability of professional advisors and the costs of exposing professional advisors to potentially excessive risks is a sensible one, and reflects the one chosen by sister states, such as New York, whose laws are often involved in situations involving Delaware corporations.5 This harmony is beneficial and if it is to be disturbed, that decision is best made by the General Assembly.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
* Chief Judge Smalls and Judge Welch sit by designation under
