The Gold Hunter
The point, raised,, in this case, as to the jurisdiction of the court, is to be determined by the consideration, whether, the subject matter of the suit is of a maritime character. Subjects of a maritime nature, which pertain to the cognizance of courts- of admiralty, are those touching things done upon, or in relation to the sea; in other words, all transactions and proceedings- relative to commerce and navigation, and to damages and injuries done upon the sea. Charter-parties and contracts of affreightment are appropriately considered as within the scope of those powers, and jurisdiction is exercised by admiralty courts
It is not denied that subjects of the character of the one involved in this action were, at an early period, within the ordinary jurisdiction of the English admiralty. It is supposed, however, that the jurisdiction has, to that extent, been abrogated or restrained by the adjudications of courts of common law, from a period anterior to our Revolution. Johnson, J., in Ramsay v. Allegre, 12 Wheat. [25 U. S.] 621. Although the common law decisions in England, and the prohibitions which followed them, may have suspended or abolished the ancient powers of the admiralty, that fact does not necessarily determine the limits of the jurisdiction under the jurisprudence of the United States. The signification of the phraseology employed in our constitution is not determined by the sense in which the same expressions were used in the English jurisprudence, except as to thos& terms which had a notorious common law meaning. Those terms which are derived from the civil law, or are expressive of the functions of courts acting under that system, are expounded upon the general principles which govern the interpretation of language, or by historical evidence of the mode in which the same terms were ordinarily employed in the administration of that system. In view of the American authorities on this subject, it cannot be an open question with this court, whether admiralty jurisdiction is to be ascertained by consulting the expositions given by the common law courts of Englánd, or by allowing fair force to the provisions of the constitution and laws of the United States, in connection with the doctrines and administration of the courts of other civil and maritime powers. The admiralty jurisdiction, in respect to contracts, depends upon their subject matter. De Lovio v. Boit [supra]; 2 Browne, Civ. & Adm. Law (Ed. 1709) 150, 169. A bill of lading clearly possesses the characteristics of a maritime contract. It concerns transportation by sea, and the whole service and consideration contemplated by the parties to it, relate to navigation and to maritime employment. The transaction covered by it is one of navigation and commerce on navigable waters — in this case, upon the high seas. The contract is, then, in its essence and nature, maritime, and is subject to the cognizance of this court, whether entered into on land or on water. The Rebecca [Case No. 11,619]. The exception to the jurisdiction is, therefore, overruled.
The questions which remain relate to the measure and mode of relief applicable to the facts, and to the competency of a court of admiralty to administer it. Two principles have an important bearing on the subject, one of which principles rests in the doctrine of the common law, and the other is drawn from the Commercial and Maritime Codes. The first is not open to contestation, and is, that the owner of a general ship is chargeable with the responsibility of a common carrier for goods transported at sea. 2 Kent, Comm. 608, 609; Story, Bailm. §§ 496, 501; Allen v. Sewall,
Satisfaction is sought, in this action, for the loss of cargo, occasioned by the plunder and consumption of some of the wines on the passage from Havre to Halifax, the port of distress, and also for the portion disposed of by the master at Halifax, to obtain funds for the necessary refitment of the ship. The necessity for the repairs is not questioned, nor is it contended that the master had any resources for their supply in that port, other than the cargo. Under such circumstances, the law justifies the master in appropriating •so much of the cargo as may be required for the necessities of the voyage. Cons, del Mare, cc. 105, 106; Laws of Oleron, art. 22; Laws of W'isbuy, arts. 35, 45; The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. Adm. 240. Our maritime courts hold that, in such case, the ship is responsible to the owner of the goods, and that a lien for their value arises, which can be enforced in rem, against the ship. The cases of Bulgin v. The Rainbow [supra] and of The Packet [supra] support this proposition. See, also, 3 Kent, Comm. 220. A distinction may be attempted to be drawn between an appropriation of the cargo, in aid of the ship, by the
The same principle covers equally the wines «old by the master in Halifax, and those consumed on the passage by the passengers and ■crew. Those depredations constitute no excuse to the owners, for the non-fulfilment of their contract of carriage. Abb. Shipp. 222; 2 Kent, Comm. 609; Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 190, 238; Schieffelin v. Harvey,
The goods having been deliverable here, and only a part of them having been brought to their port of destination, the libellant is entitled, in reimbursement of the deficiency, to recover the market value, at this port, of the goods lost, with interest. That seems to be the measure of damages for deficiency of cargo, except, perhaps, in cases of average adjustment. Watkinson v. Laughton,
An order must be entered, referring it to the clerk to ascertain the value of the goods, under these directions, and also to ascertain, the freight, primage and other necessary charges due from the libellant to the ship; and, if a balance is found due to the libellant, process for its recovery may be awarded at his instance.