128 U.S. 474 | SCOTUS | 1888
THE GAZELLE AND CARGO.
Supreme Court of United States.
*479 Mr. S.T. Wallis and Mr. Henry C. Kennard for appellants.
Mr. Archibald Stirling for appellee.
*484 MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
The jurisdiction and authority of this court, in passing upon this appeal, are defined by the act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, § 1, by which the Circuit Court, in deciding admiralty causes on the instance side, is required to state its findings of fact and its conclusions of law separately; and a review of its decrees by this court is "limited to a determination of the questions of law arising upon the record, and to such rulings of the Circuit Court, excepted to at the time, as may be presented by a bill of exceptions prepared as in actions at law." 18 Stat. 315. The limit thus prescribed has been steadfastly upheld by this court against repeated attempts to escape from it. The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440; The Benefactor, 102 U.S. 214; The Annie Lindsley, 104 U.S. 185; The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381; Sun Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U.S. 485; The Adriatic, 107 U.S. 512; The Connemara, 108 U.S. 352; Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Allen, 121 U.S. 67.
*485 The record in this case consists of the pleadings, the findings of fact, the conclusions of law and the final decree.
By the express terms of the charter-party, the charterers were bound to order the vessel "to a safe, direct, Norwegian or Danish port, or as near thereunto as she can safely get and always lay and discharge afloat." The clear meaning of this is that she must be ordered to a port which she can safely enter with her cargo, or which, at least, has a safe anchorage outside where she can lie and discharge afloat. Dahl v. Nelson, 6 App. Cas. 38; The Alhambra, 6 P.D. 68. The charterers insisted upon ordering her to the port of Aalborg. The Circuit Court has found that Aalborg is in a fiord or inlet having a bar across its mouth, which it was impossible for the Gazelle to pass, either in ballast or with cargo; and that the only anchorage outside the bar is not a reasonably safe anchorage, nor a place where it is reasonably safe for a vessel to lie and discharge.
These positive findings of essential facts are in no way controlled or overcome by the other statements (rather recitals of portions of the evidence than findings of fact) that large English steamers habitually, and thirty-one American vessels in the course of several years, had in fact discharged the whole or part of their cargoes at that anchorage, without accident or disaster. A dangerous place may often be stopped at or passed over in safety. The evidence on the other side is not stated in the findings; and if it were, this court, in an admiralty appeal, has no authority to pass upon the comparative weight of conflicting evidence.
The Circuit Court has found that "there existed, at the time of the making of the charter, a general custom in the Atlantic ports of the United States, with reference to charters similarly worded, that a ship may be ordered to any safe port within the range, where commerce is carried on, whether she can get into it or not, provided there is an anchorage near the port, customarily used in connection with it, and where it is reasonably safe for the ship to lay and discharge." But the only anchorage near the port of Aalborg not being a reasonably safe place to lie and discharge at, that custom has no bearing on this case.
*486 It has been strenuously maintained in behalf of the appellants that the Circuit Court erred in not making any finding upon the distinct issue, presented by the pleadings, whether by the uniform and established custom of trade between Baltimore and other Atlantic ports, and the ports of Norway and Denmark, Aalborg was recognized as being, and understood to be, a safe, direct port of Denmark, within the meaning of such a charter-party.
The answer to this position is twofold: 1st. It does not appear on this record that there was any proof of such a custom. If the appellants did offer such proof, and it was rejected or disregarded by the court, their remedy was by tendering a bill of exceptions, and thus making their offer, and the action of the court thereon, part of the record, which has not been done. The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 387. 2d. Evidence of a custom to consider as safe a particular port, which in fact is not reasonably safe, would directly contradict the charter-party, and would therefore be incompetent as matter of law. Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383; The Alhambra, 6 P.D. 68; Hayton v. Irwin, 5 C.P.D. 130.
The charterers, having refused to order the vessel to such a port as the charter-party called for, and having insisted on ordering her to a different one, were rightly held to be in default and answerable in damages; and the subject remaining to be considered is the amount of damages awarded against them, consisting of the whole amount of freight, and of the expense of taking out the cargo, and of wharfage and towing.
The material facts appearing upon the record, bearing upon this subject, are as follows:
The charterers having detained the vessel by their persistent refusal to order her to such a port as was described in the charter-party, the master, as he had a right to do, treating the charter-party as still existing, filed successive libels, claiming demurrage accruing under it, until the charterers filed a cross libel, contending that the master (who had only maintained the just rights of the owners) had committed a breach of the charter-party. It being then hopeless that the charterers *487 would perform the charter-party on their part, the master proceeded to take out the cargo, and the owners were entitled to freight. The Circuit Court has found simply that the time required to perform such a voyage as that stated in the charter would have been about the same time as elapsed before the vessel procured another charter; that another charter was procured as soon as could have been done; and that the expenses of the vessel in port were not less than on the voyage.
Nothing, therefore, is shown to take the case out of the general rule, that a ship-owner, who is prevented from performing the voyage by a wrongful act of the charterer, is prima facie entitled to the freight that he would have earned, less what it would have cost him to earn it. Kleine v. Catara, 2 Gallison, 61; Ashburner v. Balchen, 7 N.Y. 262; Smith v. McGuire, 3 H. & N. 554; S.C. 27 L.J. (N.S.) Exch. 465.
It is further contended that the court erred in awarding as damages the whole freight, amounting to $3285.60, under libels claiming only demurrage and expenses to the amount of $2470.20. But those libels set forth all the material facts ultimately found by the court, and each libel contained a prayer for general relief.
In the courts of admiralty of the United States, although the proofs of each party must substantially correspond to his allegations, so far as to prevent surprise, yet there are no technical rules of variance, or of departure in pleading, as at common law; and if a libellant propounds with distinctness the substantive facts upon which he relies, and prays, either specially or generally, for appropriate relief, (even if there is some inaccuracy in his statement of subordinate facts, or of the legal effect of the facts propounded,) the court may award any relief which the law applicable to the case warrants. Dupont v. Vance, 19 How. 162; The Syracuse, 12 Wall. 167; Dexter v. Munroe, 2 Sprague, 39; The Cambridge, 2 Lowell, 21.
Decree affirmed.
