79 Iowa 191 | Iowa | 1890
Appellants’ contention is that said several instruments were executed as parts of one transaction, and must therefore be construed together; that
II. It is a familiar rule that written contracts shall not be changed, varied or contradicted by contemporary or prior oral agreements. Lormer v. Allyn, 64 Iowa, 727; McClelland v. James, 33 Iowa, 578; De Long v. Lee, 73 Iowa; 54. In Day v. Lown, 51 Iowa, 366, it was held “that parol evidence is admissible to prove that the consideration is other and different from that stated in the deed.” College v. Bryan, 50 Iowa, 294, was an action upon a promissory note to the college for five hundred dollars, “for value received, with eight per cent, interest, payable at the office of the treasurer of said college on the first day of January and July of each year.” One of the defenses pleaded was that- the amount promised was a gift to the endowment fund, and promised in consideration of an agreement that all the funds donated for the endowment should be used exclusively for that purpose, and that the fund contributed had been diverted from that purpose. This court, after quoting from Atherton v. Dearmond, 33 Iowa, 353, say : “In the case before us the contemporaneous contract — namely, the agreement
III. Another familiar rule which it is proper to notice is that the circumstances under which a contract is made may be developed for the “purpose of arriving at the intention of the parties, when such intention does not clearly appear on the face of the instrument. But the intention of the parties cannot be enforced unless consistent with the language used, and the intention cannot be ascertained, except in case of latent ambiguity, by bringing forward proof of declarations or conversations which took place at the time the instrument was made, or before or after.” McClelland v. James, supra. Several cases are cited holding that it is competent to show by parol that there was in fact no consideration, but, as no such claim is made in this case, we need not notice these authorities. Our conclusion is that parol
Each party alleged and introduced testimony tending to show parol agreements made at the time of the execution of the instruments, to the effect claimed by them. It will be a sufficient answer to appellants’ objection to the testimony introduced by appellee, that they
IV. As to the consideration upon which the lease was executed, there is a direct conflict of testimony. Mr. Schuler, cashier, and Mr. Wolf, vice-president of the plaintiff bank, who alone negotiated for the bank, testified directly to an agreement that the payments on the lease were to be applied to the indebtedness, other than the twenty-seven hundred dollars evidenced by the two notes then executed. Mr. J. M. Snyder, who alone conducted the negotiations on behalf of Snyder Bros, and himself, testifies as positively that the payments on the lease were to go in satisfaction of the two-thousand-dollar notes executed at that time. The negotiations were not witnessed by any other person. Schuler and Wolf are corroborated by the fact that a much .larger indebtedness than twenty-seven hundred dollars was due, or about to become due, to the bank, and by their desire and J. M. Snyder’s willingness to secure the indebtedness. The value of the real estate was not more than sufficient security for the twenty-seven hundred dollars and five years’ interest. Snyder’s refusal to give a chattel mortgage is another corroboration of their testimony. Mr. Snyder is corroborated by the fact that in plaintiff’s original petition and answer to defendant’s cross-bill, and in the claim filed with the assignee, all verified by Schuler, the ■ lease was treated as such, and no recovery asked for rent; and by the further fact that the Snyders were charged with rent upon the books of the bank. These circumstances, however, are explained by the nature of the instrument upon which the original petition, answer and claim were predicated.
The decided weight of the testimony is in favor of the conclusion that the consideration for the deeds and title-bonds was the extension of time to the Snyders on twenty-seven hundred dollars of the indebtedness, for the purpose of securing the same, and that the consideration for the instrument called a “lease,” and the
Among the several complaints urged by the appellants against the decree is the one that it exacts full payment without securing to the assignee of Snyder Bros, the unexpired term of the lease. There is nothing in the decree to deprive them of the full term, if payments are made according to the agreement. We have examined the decree as to all the objections urged thereto, and are of the opinion that it should be affirmed in all respects. Affirmed.