THE FIRST CHURCH OF CHRIST, SCIENTIST VS. BARBARA ANN CHARDER
22-P-416
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
March 10, 2023
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel‘s decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The First Church of Christ, Scientist (Church) holds the remainder interest in a bungalow-style, two-story home on Fair Street in Nantucket (the property). The defendant has held a life estate in the property since 2003. Alleging waste, the Church commenced this action seeking (i) to terminate the defendant‘s life estate in the property pursuant to
Background. The Church commenced this action on September 11, 2019, and the defendant filed a timely answer. On April 7, 2020, the Church filed a motion to compel discovery. The defendant‘s attorney sought and was granted leave to withdraw; and the Church was ordered to serve the discovery on the defendant, personally. The Church did so. On August 3, 2020, having received no discovery, the Church filed a second motion to compel discovery. A judge ordered the defendant to comply on or before September 4, 2020. On January 12, 2021, the Church filed a motion for sanctions due to the defendant‘s failure to comply with the court order by September 4, 2020. On January 20, 2021, the judge found that sanctions were warranted but deferred “making any finding as to sanctions” at that time. The judge thereafter extended the deadline for the defendant to file a motion for summary judgment.
In the course of the summary judgment proceedings, the judge granted the Church‘s motion to strike evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion, noting that the defendant had failed to answer the Church‘s discovery requests concerning the condition of the property at various intervals, its maintenance over the years, and the basis for any facts supporting her position that (1) the property has not deteriorated substantially since she acquired title in 2003, and (2) she has not failed in her duty to preserve the property for the benefit of the Church. The judge ultimately denied summary judgment, however, on the basis that the Church‘s expert did not opine on the condition of the building‘s interior or estimate the costs of repair.
Following that decision, a different judge conducted a
Beginning the day before the scheduled inspection, the defendant made efforts to change the time of the inspection from 11 A.M. to between 9 A.M. and 9:30 A.M. Due to ferry schedules and other traveling challenges, the Church‘s counsel declined to change the time. The defendant also informed the Church that she refused to allow more than one person into the building and refused to allow the Church‘s attorney to enter the building. Counsel for the Church and three others (the original architect, the architect‘s co-worker, and a consultant on costs of repairs)
Counsel for the Church thereafter demanded immediate access and returned to the property around 2 P.M. The defendant did not appear; counsel for the Church traveled to her home and saw her tour van in the driveway and the defendant sitting in a lawn chair in the yard, using a smart phone. A few minutes later, the defendant‘s counsel called and told the Church‘s counsel that the defendant was busy providing a tour and would not allow the inspection until 4:30 P.M. After continuing conversations between counsel indicated that the defendant would not permit an inspection until 4:30 P.M., counsel for the Church and the Church‘s experts departed from the property and left the island.
The Church filed a renewed motion for summary judgment and a motion for sanctions. The Church detailed what it characterized as the defendant‘s willful and repeated defiance of court orders compelling discovery despite being warned by the judge that sanctions for not cooperating with the October 15,
The judge granted the motion for sanctions “for substantially the reasons set forth in the plaintiff‘s memorandum in support of its motion,” and entered judgment against the defendant pursuant to
Discussion. Entry of a default judgment is “committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,” and “[w]e do not consider that discretion abused unless its exercise has been characterized by arbitrary determination, capricious disposition, whimsical thinking, or idiosyncratic choice.” Greenleaf v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 429 (1986). “The consideration to be balanced in deciding a default question for failure to make discovery are, on one hand, a concern about giving parties their day in court, and, on
The defendant argues that the sanction of default was too severe and the judge should have considered lesser sanctions. The record shows, however, that the defendant repeatedly flouted discovery requests and related court orders. As for the inspection, she offered no legitimate excuse, and even if the
To the extent a finding of willfulness is required, but see Keene v. Brigham & Women‘s Hosp., Inc., 439 Mass. 223, 235-236 (2003) (such finding only “generally” required), the Church argued in its memorandum that the defendant‘s conduct was willful. The judge‘s decision adopting the memorandum implicitly made a finding of willfulness, which was more than justified by the evidence. See Gos v. Brownstein, 403 Mass. 252, 257 (1988) (finding of willfulness necessary unless “implicit and warranted“). In addition, absence of prejudice, which is not clearly shown here given the state of the property, “even if true, did not make the sanction imposed unreasonable.” Eagle Fund, Ltd., 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 86.7
“Waste has been defined as an unreasonable or improper use, abuse, mismanagement, or omission of duty touching real estate by one rightfully in possession, which results in its substantial injury” (quotation and citation omitted). Matteson v. Walsh, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 402, 405 (2011). Here, the complaint detailed the condition of the exterior of the property as set forth above, and alleged that “[a] substantial deterioration of the [p]roperty occurred as a result of [the defendant‘s] neglect of the [p]roperty, amounting to waste and injuring the remainder interest of the Church,” and that “[t]he waste committed or allowed by [the defendant] was an unreasonable or improper use, abuse, mismanagement, or omission
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Sacks, Singh & Brennan, JJ.9),
Joseph F. Stanton
Clerk
Entered: March 10, 2023.
