217 F. 300 | W.D. Wash. | 1914
On April 15, 1914, libel was filed by Heffernan Dry Dock Company, a corporation, monition issued, and steamship' Edith taken into custody by the United States marshal. Thereafter various intervening libels were filed for furnishing supplies, repairs, and other necessaries, also by the master and members of the crew for wages. The vessel was duly sold and the money paid into the registry of the court. The cause was referred to the United States commissioner, who took the testimony, reported his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the matter is now before the court on the exceptions to the report of the commissioner.
Intervening libelants, Carbon H ill Coal Company, Barton & Co., and Turner & Pease have filed exceptions. The exceptions of Turner & Pease are simply based upon the fact that the commissioner failed to report that the certificate of trade-name was filed, and that no proof was reported of the payment of the corporate license fee, as provided by the laws of Washington, but since the claims were allowed, and no exception filed, the omission is immaterial. Exception No. 2 of the Barton Company is in the same condition. Exception No. 1 of the Barton Company was allowed by consent of parties.
Various periods have been fixed by the courts in the various dis
The period of limitation fixed by the state statute is no guide in the fixing of any period of limitation under the admiralty rule on claims coming under the act of Congress, and it being impossible, consistent with the operation of vessels in the local harbor cases, to apply the general maritime rule, except as to the spirit and purpose, it would seem as though some rule should be adopted. The spirit and purpose of the general maritime rule is to give the vessel a credit of sufficient time to earn her charges for transportation, whatever they may be-, collect the same, and pay her bills. It seems to be an anomaly that the Alaska and San Francisco vessels and the steamships to the Orient, sailing from the port of Seattle, do, under the general admiralty rule, shift these priorities with every voyage (that is, about every month, and many of them several times a month), and the vessel which remains here, amenable to process at all times, should continue for three years. The long extension of time leads to evils and abuses which can well be avoided. An admiralty lien being a secret lien, no one except the parties directly interested having any knowledge, the abuses which may be occasioned become, upon the suggestion, apparent. In a place where the custom is that all settlements shall be made at least every 30 days, it seems that a period fixed beyond which the claims will lose their priority is a matter which fair dealing requires, and that a time sufficiently long to permit the owners „of vessels to make all reasonable arrangements and adjustments with relation to the earnings in their business, but which would also afford a reasonable safety to persons extending credit to the vessels, would be welcomed by all. I think that, as between claimants, to retain priority 90 days.should be the limit of time in these cases, where vessels are operating from the local harbors in the district, and from which they make daily or weekly trips, unless there is a special reason why the application of the arbitrary rule should not be made, which should be made to appear in the particular case.
I have conferred with Judge Cushman of the Southern Division, and am authorized to say that he agrees with this limitation of 90 days.
In view of the'rule heretofore followed in this court, the rule will not be applied in this case. The exceptions are therefore overruled, and an order may be presented confirming the report of the referee.