90 U.S. 69 | SCOTUS | 1875
THE DEXTER.
Supreme Court of United States.
*72 Mr. R.F. Brent, for the appellant, owner of the Julia, contended &mdash.
Messrs. S.T. Wallis and J.H. Thomas, contra.
*74 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Objection is made by the libellant that the lookout of the Dexter was insufficient, but it is unnecessary to decide the question, as it was a clear night, and as each vessel was seen by the other long before there was any necessity for precaution and in ample time before the collision to have done whatever the circumstances required to have prevented the disaster. Sufficient lookouts are required by the rules of navigation, but where it appears that the officer in charge of the deck saw the approaching vessel while she was yet so distant that no precautions to avoid a collision had become necessary, and that the want of a lookout did not and could not have contributed to the collision, the vessel omitting such a proper precaution will not be held responsible for the consequences of the disaster if in all other respects she is without fault.[]
It is insisted by the libellant that the wind was from the northwest and that his schooner was closehauled. On the other hand, it is contended by the claimant that the wind was west-by-north, and he denies that the course of the schooner was such as is alleged by the libellant.
Strong doubts arise whether the wind was as far north as the point assumed by the libellant, and the proofs fail to convince the court that it was as far to the west as is supposed by the claimant. Difficulties attend the inquiry, but the better opinion is that the course of the schooner of the libellant was not as close to the wind as she would lay, without impeding her headway. Nor is it very material whether *75 she was or not when the vessels were first seen by each other, as they were then two miles apart and were moving through the water, by estimation, at the rate of fourteen or fifteen miles an hour. Satisfactory proof is exhibited that the schooner of the claimant was heading south-southwest, and whatever may have been the course of the other schooner when they were two miles apart, the proof is equally satisfactory that her course when they were a half a mile apart was exactly opposite to that of the schooner of the claimant. Evidence is certainly exhibited in the record tending to show that the course of the schooner of the libellants was east-northeast when the vessels were first seen by each other, but it is convincing that when they were only a half-mile apart they were approaching from exactly opposite directions and that the case falls within the true intent and meaning of the eleventh sailing rule prescribed by Congress.
Sailing ships are meeting end on, within the meaning of that provision, when they are approaching each other from the opposite directions or on such parallel lines as involve risk of collision on account of their proximity, and when the vessels have advanced so near to each other that the necessity for precaution to prevent such a disaster begins, which cannot be definitely defined, as it must always depend, to a certain extent, upon the speed of the respective vessels and the circumstances of the occasion.[*]
Rules of navigation, such as the one mentioned, are obligatory upon vessels approaching each other from the time the necessity for precaution begins and continue to be applicable as the vessels advance so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain. They do not apply to a vessel required to keep her course after the approach is so near that the collision is inevitable, and are equally inapplicable to vessels of every description while they are yet so distant from each other that measures of precaution have not become necessary to avoid a collision.
Apply the eleventh sailing-rule to the case and it is clear *76 that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed, as the evidence shows that the two vessels when they were half a mile apart were approaching each other in opposite directions and that the schooner of the claimant ported her helm as required by that rule; and it is equally clear that the collision would have been prevented if the schooner of the libellant had performed her duty in that regard. Instead of that she held her course until the danger became imminent, and then, by the mistake of the man at the wheel, put her helm in the wrong direction, which rendered the collision inevitable.
Attempt is made in argument to exculpate the error of the helmsman upon the ground that the danger was imminent, but such an excuse cannot be admitted as a valid one where it appears that the imminence of the peril was occasioned by the negligence, carelessness, or unskillfulness of those in charge of the vessel setting up such an apology for a violation of a plain rule of navigation.
Serious conflict exists in the testimony as to what was done by the respective vessels when they were more distant from each other, but it is not deemed necessary to give that part of the evidence much examination, as it is clear that they had ample time and opportunity to adopt every needful precaution to avoid a collision after it must have been apparent to both that they were fast approaching each other from opposite directions.
Resort is had by the libellant to that part of the evidence to show that the case falls under the twelfth sailing-rule and not under the eleventh, as contended by the claimant. Even suppose that proposition could be maintained, which is denied, it is quite clear that it would not benefit the libellant, as it is conceded that his schooner changed her course by putting her helm to starboard and that it was that error which produced the collision.
Viewed in any light it is clear that the libellant is not entitled to recover.
DECREE AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[] Ib. 337.
[*] The Nichols, 7 Wallace, 664.
