*1 CONCLUSION judgment reasons, the trial court’s reverse we foregoing For and, upon complaint Lake’s I Hidden count of Trails on favor of Green Hidden in favor of judgment enter court to remand, direct the trial Green in favor of judgment court’s affirm the trial I. We Lake on count Trails’ third- On Green complaint. II Hidden Lake’s Trails on count the trial court’s affirm against Ryland, we complaint party remand. Trails and in favor of Green direc- cause remanded with part; part
Affirmed in and reversed tions. BURKE, JJ., concur.
McLAREN and CUSTER, ROCKFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, THE OF v. MATTHEW C. CITY Defendant-Appellant. 2 — 09—0743
Second District No. Opinion September filed ZENOFF, EJ., dissenting. Custer, Elmhurst, appellant pro se.
Matthew C. Hayes Weichel, Depart- Patrick W and David O. both of Rockford Law, Rockford, appellee, ment of *2 opinion JUSTICE delivered the of McLAREN the court: City (City) defendant, Custer, The of charged Rockford Matthew C. (see speeding in municipal violation of a ordinance Rockford (eff. 1971)). §16 of February Code Ordinances Following a —194 trial, bench guilty defendant was found the imposed and trial court and costs in pro se, fines the total amount of Defendant appeals, $400. arguing that permitting the trial court erred in the officer ticketed who him testify that he using measured defendant’s a radar device. We reverse. trial,
At Rockford officer Robert Woodford testified that on 26, 2008, August conducting he was enforcement State on East Avenue, Street. Woodford was situated on North Rockford which forms (which a “T” intersection with State Street. South Rockford Avenue Street) a “T” just also forms intersection with Stаte is located east of the intersection of and State Street North Rockford Avenue. Woodford facing was south and monitoring was the of westbound vehicles on State Street. testified he Woodford observed defendant’s traveling Using vehicle rate high device, a radar Wood- measured proceeded through ford the of defendant’s as it vehicle the intersection of State and Street South Rockford Avenue. Woodford traveling determined defendant’s vehicle was at 45 miles The hour. limit was 30 hour. Woodford testified that, experience, speed- based on his he believed that vehicle was ing speed electronically. even before he measured its testi- Defendant fied that he did not the 30-mile-per-hour exceed limit. that, initially prosecuted We note because defendant was under a municipal the alleged punishable only by ordinance and violation form, or a penalty,” proceeding “a fine “is civil the cause LaRocco, proceeding.” Village tried and reviewed as a civil v. of Kildeer App. Thus, Ill. 3d City required was not prove guilt beyond doubt, only by reasonable but LаRocco, App. the evidence. 3d at 211. (Code) (625 Illinois Vehicle Code ILCS 604(b) (West 2008)) grants municipality authority to raise 5/11— the speed or lower limit that would otherwise be under the 2008)) (West (see along any part or zone ILCS Code 5/11—601 corporate limits. municipality’s highway street or notice signs giving appropriate “when limit takes effect altered part or along proper proper place at the the limit are erected (West 2008). Of highway or street.” 625 zone of the 5/11— provides, here, further special significance be used within devices shall not “Electronic travel; in violation if so used sign in the direction of beyond any such any inadmissible in thereby shall be evidence obtained of this Section 2008). 604(b) (West speeding.” 625 ILCS prosecution attemрts to trial, objected to defendant’s City successfully At intersection of State between the introduce evidence of the distance sign reducing and a Street and South Rockford Avenue has appeal, On hour to 30 miles hour. from 35 showing that maps, diagrams appended photographs, to his brief sign in speed-limit is less than 500 feet the intersection (west). None of these matеrials were defendant’s direction of travel However, that docu although is axiomatic admitted into evidence. appeal may ments that are dehors the record not be considered (2009)), (see, Bulun, e.g., Knapp City objection indicated that it has no to defendant’s expressly has dispute that reliance on these materials. Instead, sign. speed-limit defendant’s vehicle was within 500 feet of the *3 oc City argues that the use of an electronic device points The State out that curs where the device itself is located. the radar maps, diagrams, photographs defendant’s show that question. in We unit located more than 500 feet from the legislative statute. The disagree interpretation with the State’s adjust give a driver time to underlying intent the 500-foot rule was “to subjecting People him to radar detection.” speed to the limit before Johannsen, 31, City’s interpreta Under the App. 126 Ill. 34 tion, range of 500 feet or more could speed-detection a device with a Asign. similar passed speed-limit a as soon as it be used on vehicle in Jo argued by the defendant reading literal of the statute was lаnguage that radar There, that the hannsen. contended that “any sign” such meant shall be used not sign, regardless of whether radar could not be used within 500 feet of for the same direction previously posted the same limit was stated, reasonably be construed The court “Statutes must travel. two constructions practical application. accordance with Whеre produces absurd the one which proposed, law are this court will avoid Johannsen, operation.” difficult of results and renders law argument based on 2d at 34. The court found the defendant’s App. literal of the statute to be Johannsen, unreasonable. 126 Ill. App. 2d at 34. The same unreasonable result would follow in our case upon based analysis. dissent’s A motorist facing speed reduction to 25 or 35 miles hour would have the benefit of a 500-foot buffer to reduce his or her speed, while a motorist who faces a reduc tion to 30 hour in an urban district would be required to slow his or her vehicle immediately. Such a result clearly legislative frustrate the intent. Accordingly, agree we with defendant the evidence obtained from the use of thе radar device was inadmissible.
Citing People v. Hampton, App. (1981), 3d 728 alternatively argues that defendant’s conviction may be sustained (1) based on Woodford’s testimony that defendant was driving at a “high speed,” rate of based experience, on his he believed that speeding defendant was before he measured the radar unit. In Hampton, an officer’s estimate оf a vehicle’s was considered prove beyond sufficient to a reasonable doubt that the defendant had violated the speed limit. City argues that Woodford’s testimony was sufficient satisfy the lower standard of proof by of the evidence—that applies here. — Hampton case, however, differs from this inasmuch as the officer in Hampton did merely offer opinion the defendant was speeding, but also offered an estimate of how fast the defendant was traveling. According to the officer in Hampton, the defendant “was traveling ‘around probably 45 or so’ a 30-mile limit zone.” Hampton, 96 Ill. App. Woodford, 3d at contrast, did not quantify defendant’s estimated
This important distinction is an Estes, one. In State v. 148 Idaho 2009), 223 R3d (App. surveyed the court сases from other jurisdictions addressing question of whether a officer’s estimate of a vehicle’s is sufficient to sustain a conviction. While some courts have categorically held that an estimate either is not sufficient conviction, to sustain a other courts consider question on a case-by-case basis, focusing on “the of training ficer’s and the amount which thе estimated exceeded limit, the posted or magnitude percentage variance as a added.) posted speed (Emphasis Estes, limit.” 148 Idaho at (Minn. 289; Ali, P.3d at see State v. 679 N.W.2d359 (uphold ing conviction where driving defendant was cited for *4 in a 30-mile-per-hour zone an officer who had been trained to visu ally estimate the of a per hour); vehicle within 5 miles City of (Mo. 1979) City Oxley, Kansas v. (reversing S.W.2d113 conviction where the officer traveling only estimated that the defendant was per miles 35-mile-per-hour speed limit); hour excess of the State v. (Mo. Kimes, (sustaining S.W.3d conviction based on 75% variance between officer’s estimate that defendant was traveling per at 35 miles hour and per limit of 20 miles hour); Olsen, People 22 N.Y.2d 239 N.E.2d 292 N.Y.S.2d (although police officer’s еstimate that defendant was traveling 50 to 55 hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone was suf ficient to sustain a conviction of speeding, testimony that the vehicle sufficed). proceeding might 35 to 40 miles hour not have Estes, the charged defendant was traveling 65 miles hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone. The court conviction, reversed the defendant’s noting, alia, inter that the difference between the estimated speed and great. was not
Recognizing that a ability to estimate moving vehicle subject error, these courts have sustained convic- only tions where the officers’ estimates were at least 10 over the speed limits. We note that although Hampton did not expressly employ this approach, the result in Hampton is Here, consistent with it. however, Woodford did supply an estimate of defendant’s actual speed, so it impossible say whether a convic- tion of speeding could be sustained under an appropriate margin of er- ror. Under circumstances, the evidence not only fails to establish guilt beyond a doubt, reasonable but is also insufficient to meet even City’s lower proof by burden of evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed.
Reversed.
BURKE, J., concurs.
PRESIDING ZENOFF, JUSTICE dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority agrees with defendant that the evidence obtained from Officer Woodford’s radar device was inadmis- (625 sible under section of the Code ILCS 5/11 — (West 2008)). A closer of the statute in question reveals that both defendant and majority focus on the wrong sign; thus, prohibition Code and its speed- detecting devices does not here. The trial properly court admitted the radar evidence. 601(c) (625 601(c) (West of the Code 5/11 —
2008)) provides that, in district, an urban maximum *5 hour, other restric- all vehicles is 30 miles unless some for maps, diagrams, photographs upon tion is established. The and which argument operating that he his vehicle defendant bases his show was district, territory contiguоus “[t]he is defined as to an urban which to including any up and street which is built with structures devoted business, dwelling at of less than industry or houses situated intervals quarter 100 feet for a distance of a of a mile or more.” 625 (West 2008). 604(b) provides, pertinent part, the Code as fol- Section 11— lows: *** *** determines, any city upon the basis of an “Whenever concerning highway
engineering investigation or or street traffic *** *** prescribed in 11—601 that a maximum limit Section respect to the greater or less than is reasonable or safe with any place along any part or or zone of conditions found to exist at street, by highway [city] or shall determine and declare such speed limit at ordinance a reasonable and safe absolute maximum zone, place along part such or such or which: (1) district, limit urban but not to Decreases the within an hour; or less than 20 miles district, limit but not to Increases the within an urban per hour[.] more than 55 miles A limit so determined and declared [*] * * *** becomes effective, prescribed limit in Section 11—601 suspends application limit appropriate signs giving notice of the Chapter, of this when place along proрer part or zone of proper are erected at the speed-detectingdevicesshall not highway or street. Electronic any sign in the direction within such be used travel; feet obtained in violation this Section evidence so used if speeding.” thereby any prosecution inadmissible in shall be (West2008). added.) 604(b) (Emphasis 625 ILCS 5/11— objection to defendant’s at City’s sustained the The trial court reducing tempt prove to that the at Dawson Avenue (set sign posted from 35 miles hour limit on State Street Avenue) than 500 feet from per hour was located less to 30 miles Vale measured. On his the location of his vehicle when vehicle’s diagrams that maps, and photographs, relies on appeal, defendant notes, majority at trial. As the not admitted intо evidence were the record that are dehors although it is axiomatic that documents Bulun, 392 Ill. (see, Knapp v. appeal e.g., may not be considered objec no (2009)), indicates that it has App. 3d event, if any on these materials. defendant’s reliance tion to materials, I represented by facts are as the nonrecord 604(b) that, by terms, would submit its here. unambiguous, givе
When a is clear and must statute court effect plain ordinary meaning language resort without Gallagher Square other tools of Union construction. Ass’n, Condominium Homeowner’s statutory 30-mile-per-
Section authorizes a to alter the city in an urban The district. altered takes ef signs fect “when appropriate giving notice of the limit are erected.” 604(b) (West 2008). 625 ILCS further 5/11 — prohibits the use added.) beyond “any sign.” such (Emphasis 625 ILCS 5/11 — (West 2008). use of adjective “such” indicates plainly that the *6 applies only sign 500-foot rule in modify the case erected to the statutory speed not, limit set forth in by section 11—601. It does its terms, apply signs limit posting by the standard set section 601, even the 11—601 where section limit is a reduction from the 11— 604(b) section modified An limit. examination of section 11—601 11— rеveals no language restricting use the of electronic speed-detecting devices. Under section the limit at the intersection of 11— East State Street and South Rockford Avenue —in urban an district— was 30 per miles by City. unless modified the 30-mile- per-hour sign at Dawson give Avenue did not a special speed notice of limit by the City 604(b); established merely gave under notice of prеscribed the standard by limit statute vehicles traveling in an urban 35-mile-per-hour speed-limit district. The sign at Vale Avenue was the 30-mile-per-hour one that modified the standard speed prescribed limit in section 11—601 for urban districts. brief, figure Defendant’s attached his makes it clear that he was measuring 30-mile-per-hour the distance from sign to the location of his car when his figure “B,” was clocked. He states 3 at “the [where intersection he was when his was clocked] (a therefore an well within area feet sign limit Street).” sign that reduces limit on State Apparently defendant, majority, and the think that prohibited section 11— the use of the speed-detection electronic device 500 feet of 30-mile-per-hour sign because it reduced limit from 35 to 30 However, milеs above, hour. as discussed a close statute clear makes it the restriction on respect referenced only speed-limit sign to a that modifies the sign, standard The word “such” refers back in to a described sentence, the preceding application “suspends 2008). 604(b) (West 11—601.” 625 prescribed limit, 30-mile-per-hour had been for a Accordingly, sign if the at Vale hour, by then virtue of 25 miles and the one at Dawson for 604(b), 500-foot statutory language section from the to and measured have been restriction would (35 sign actually posted at Vale Because the at Dawson. hour) speed, and the one at Daw- increase in the standard signaled an (30 hour), urban limit son, return to the section 11—601 a speed-detecting- not render the electronic the rеduction itself does intent of Certainly if that had been the applicable. device restriction differently. been drafted would have legislature, section 11— here and of section Clearly, protection admissible. the radar evidence was statute] is not interpretation [of literal “[a]
It is true that Assembly in the General spirit and intent of controlling where purposes are clearly expressed, objects its enacting a statute are clause forth, interpretation particular literal clearly set and a [citation]; literal enforcement where defeat the obvious intent contemplated great injustice that was of a statute will result [citation]; interpretation a literal Assembly or where the General Trustees Grеver v. Board [citation].” an absurd result would lead to Fund, Municipal Retirement the Illinois plain from the view, departing these criteria for my none of the limita argues that present are here. Defendant statutory language speed-detecting devices within the use of electronic tion on literal speed traps. Given a from speed-limit sign protects motorists by prеventing local purpose this interpretation, the statute serves they in areas where have setting up speed traps governments from than special speed lower authority to establish exercised their *7 could cases, conscientious motorists limit. In such statutory follow, necessarily change. It does not by the be taken unawares roads protection on entitled to the same however, that motorists are level established fixed at the standard where a reduc level constitutes the standard sign posting if the statute —even that motor argued limit. It can be a modified sign posting from a tion appropri to the their vehicles prepared to slow always ists should be leeway 500 feet of need not be afforded limit and аte 601(a) (West (stating that motor See 625 ILCS to do so. limit under speed from duty to decrease their ists have a curves, intersections, approaching such as when certain circumstances hills). use of electronic regulating the a rule produce applies special speed only where a investigate officer to Moreover, requiring absurd results. 30-mile-pеr-hour an sign in urban district one that whether represents preceding sign a return to the standard limit from a it be an undue enforcement modified would burden law safety. public Assembly inconsistent with enhancement of The General provide not an clearly expressed has intent to motorists with 500 feet leeway circumstances, their reduce all the General not, view, Assembly’s my great failure to do so does result injustice.
Because I conclude introduction radar evidence 604(b), prohibited by necessary is not to ad- parties’ dispute dress the either the regarding location the use of radar testimony device or the sufficiency of alone to sustain the speeding conviction.
I would affirm the trial court. HEIGHTS, THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE Plaintiff and Counterdefendant- Appellee, ENTERPRISES, INC., al., v. GLEN AYRE et Defendants and
Counterplaintiffs-Appellants. Second District No. 2 — 09—0791 Opinion August filed Rehearing denied October 2010.