274 F. 374 | E.D.N.Y | 1921
Ribelants, more than 30 in number, are in a strange land, apparently penniless, and practically friendless. There should be a prompt adjudication of their claim, so that they may have immediate relief. I shall therefore attempt little more than a statement of my conclusions.
The claimant asked that the libel again be dismissed, on the ground that the opinion of the court, which directed that the libel be dismissed, without costs, constituted a final decree, and that, inasmuch as the term at which it was rendered had expired, this court had no power to reopen the case. It is undoubtedly true, generally speaking, that with the expiration of the term within which a final decree is entered all power to set aside, vacate, modify, or annul the same is lost. Winslow v. Staab, 242 Fed. 427, 155 C. C. A. 202, is a recent authority for this well-settled rule.
I do not understand, however, that an opinion of a court is its decree, unless perhaps the opinion is so worded as to make it apparent that the court intended to make no further decree in the matter. That was not the case here. The -opinion was in a form very common and invariably followed by a decree. I have considered In re Barnes, Fed.
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