The Citta Di Messina, 169 F. 472

The Citta Di Messina

169 F. 472 | S.D.N.Y. | 1909

HOUGH, District Judge

(after stating facts as above). It is obviously advantageous, if not essential, to libelants’ case, to show that the facts found constitute deviation. That “deviation” is a term of art, belonging in the main to the law of marine insurance, and to be interpreted by that law, seems to me to have been overlooked in argument; and this belief on my part must excuse some review of the subject *475If an insured shipowner fails to pursue that course of navigation which experience and usage have prescribed as the safest and most expeditious mode of proceeding from one voyage terminus to the other, he violates a tacit but universally implied condition of the contract between himself and his underwriter, who is therefore freed from liability for loss subsequent to deviation because the assured has enhanced or varied the risks insured against. 2 Arnould, Mar. Ins. (8th Ed.) § 376; 1 Phil. Ins. § 977.

If the assured cargo owner have his cargo on a vessel which deviates, he for the same reason may lose (though by no fault of his own) all remedy for subsequent loss against his underwriter, but may proceed against the wrongdoing ship for his damagés. It is not, of course, necessary that a cargo owner, in order to recover against his carrier for losses subsequent to deviation, should have himself lost insurance protection by reason thereof. The voyage is the same, whether viewed from the standpoint of insurer or shipper, and any deviation therefrom will cast subsequent loss of or injury to either ship or cargo on the shipowner. The reason also is the same, viz., that the carrier by deviating from a voyage described alike in insurance policy and bill of lading, has broken the warranty not to deviate, thereby terminated his own insurance, and given the shipper a right either to rescind the contract of shipment and treat the goods as converted by the deviator, or to accept the goods, holding the ship responsible for damage subsequent to warranty broken, without any reference to the question whether the' deviation had any bearing on the particular loss complained of. Thorley v. Orchis S. S. Co., 1 K. B. (1907) 660; Thatcher v. McCulloh, Olcott, 365, Fed. Cas. No. 13,862.

In effect the deviator loses his own insurance, and becomes the insurer of his cargo from the date of deviation. If, therefore, the Messina was guilty of a deviation, it is wholly immaterial whether her stay at Almeria had or had not any causal connection with the rotten onions found on board in New York. If they were sound when the deviation occurred, the ship must answer for their subsequent damage. That delay, even upon the route prescribed by policy and or bill of lading, may. amount to deviation, has been often held (Company of African Merchants v. Ins. Co., L. R. 8 Exch. 154; Coles v. Marine Ins. Co., 3 Wash. C. C. 159, Fed. Cas. No. 2,988; Audenried v. Mer. Mut. Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. 482, 19 Am. Rep. 204), though the recent British marine insurance act (1906) has excluded delay from the definition of deviation (section 46), while giving the insurer (by section 48) the same release from liability “from the time when the delay becomes unreasonable.”

It being, however, still the law of the United States that a deviation (eo nomine) occurs the moment a delay even upon the prescribed route becomes unreasonable, the libelants here insist that the Messina’s reasonable stay in Almeria expired in at most four days, yet they have endeavored to show further that her actual stay in the then conditions of weather was injurious to their onions; a labor quite needless if the delay produced deviation.

*476It seems to me that in some cases where shippers have proved that the ship had injured their goods by reason of delay in ports of call, or calls in port unreasonable in respect of cargo already laden,_ the courts, while rightly awarding damages for breach of contract, i. e., for negligence, have spoken loosely of deviation as if that were the ground of decision. Glyn v. Margetson, A. C. (1893) 351, and cases cited. In Swift v. Furness (D. C.) 87 Fed. 345, the carrier of perishable cargo was authorized by his bill of lading to “make deviation,” and accordingly did so to the injury of his cargo, yet was held responsible. And see The Bordentown (D. C.) 40 Fed. 689, where the doctrine of deviation was invoked to fix liability on a tug which negligently took her tow beyond its destination, thereby exposing it to storm and causing loss. These were not cases of deviation in any proper sense; that word implies a voluntary departure from the usual course of the voyage “in reference to the terms of a policy of marine insurance” (Hostetter v. Park, 137 U. S. 40, 11 Sup. Ct. 1, 34 L. Ed. 568), and if (for example) the vessels concerned in the Glyn and Swift Cases (supra) had done what they did when insured under voyage policies describing the voyages, as in the bills of lading on which the cases were actually defended, it would have been impossible to contend that a deviation had occurred. So, in this case, the voyage described in the bills of lading is quite elastic enough to prevent even a longer delay than that in Almería harbor from producing deviation, “in reference to the terms of a policy of marine insurance” setting forth the same voyage in the same language, C. F. Phillips v. Irving, 7 M. & G. 325; Columbian Ins. Co. v. Catlett, 12 Wheat. 383, 6 L. Ed. 664, for striking instances of delay without deviation.

Eibelants cannot, therefore, recover on the ground just considered; and it remains to inquire whether claimants were guilty of negligence, and are therefore deprived of the protection of the exceptions in their bills of lading.

The question of the burden of proof in actions such as this has been set at rest by The Folmina, 212 U. S. 362, 29 Sup. Ct. 363, 53 L. Ed.-, the nature of the injury shows this damage to be prima facie within the exceptions of the bills, and the burden is on the shipper to establish that the goods are removed from their operation because of the carrier’s negligence. The only negligence assigned is delay in Almería, and what transforms delays permitted by bills of lading, such as those in suit, into negligence, will always depend upon what voyage was agreed upon in a business sense,—the agreement need not have been for the quickest or most direct mode of transportation. Evans v. Cunard S. S. Co., 18 T. L. R. 374, citing and explaining Glyn v. Margetson, supra. ’So, in this case, libelants did not agree for a quick or direct method of conveyance; they did agree that the Messina could do just what she did, provided she did not take unreasonable advantage of the bargain. But that bargain is to be interpreted according to the general usages of the trade, even though not known to any particular shipper. Hostetter v. Parks, supra; for the facts in which case, see fuller report in Hostetter v. Gray (D. C.) 11 Fed. 179.

*477It follows, in my judgment, that the libelants must show, in order to recover, that the ship’s stay in Almeria was a departure from general usage, that it was unreasonable in respect of the cargo already laden, and that it was the cause of the damage complained of. The evidence falls short of these requirements. These libelants have made no better case than those in The Hindoustan, 67 Fed. 794, 14 C. C. A. 650, and not nearly so good a one as in The St. Quentin (C. C. A.) 163 Fed. 883.

Libel dismissed, with costs.