400 U.S. 932 | SCOTUS | 1970
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The Court today affirms the District Court in a case involving the relationship of various factors in determining a “just and reasonable” charge under § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The appellants, various railroads operating in the southern United States, submitted to the ICC in 1967 a tariff proposing a $22-per-car transit charge for cotton and molasses.
A hearing was held in 1968, and after receiving testimony from appellants and the protesting shippers, the Examiner concluded that (a) the appellants had the burden of proving the charge was just and reasonable by “clear and convincing” evidence, (b) the. $22 charge was not shown to approximate the actual costs involved in transiting a freight car, (c) the existing line-haul rates returned more than out-of-pocket costs for all services performed, including transit, and made a contribution to overhead as well, (d) the likely effect of the charge would be to divert traffic to motor carriers and thus reduce the railroads’ overall revenue. “All things considered,” the Examiner concluded, appellants had failed to show that the charge was just and reasonable. The Commission adopted the findings and conclusions of the Examiner without change. Transit Charges, Southern Territory, 332 I. C. C. 664 (1969).
On review, the three-judge District Court
It has been settled law since the first Chenery case that “an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which.the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 95 (1943). Thus, when the reviewing court here determined that the agéricy applied an erroneous standard of proof in its determination, it was barred from going on to consider whether the agency’s action was supported by substantial evidence. The court compounded the error by upsetting two of the agency’s findings as to reasonableness and upholding the agency solely on the basis of the third finding. The Examiner’s report, adopted by the Commission, explicitly states that the conclusion was based on “[a] 11 things considered,” not merely the finding of diversion. Finally, the applicable statute provides:
“In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the Commission shall give due consideration, among other factors, to the effect of rates on the movement of traffic by the carrier or carriers for which the rates ¿re prescribed . ...”4
It is apparent from a reading of the statute that the likelihood of diversion cannot be an independent ground if the court determines, as it took upon itself to determine here, that the other factors involved do not support the Commission’s conclusion as to reasonableness. . Thus, the court was in error not only in reviewing the evidence after it determined the standard to be erroneous, but also
It may well be that, had the Commission acted in light of the District Court’s findings., as - to the standard of proof, it would have found that the proposed charge was just and reasonable. We cannot assume, any more than the District Court could properly assume, that the ' finding of an unreasonable charge would have the support of substantial evidence. As the Court said in Chenery, supra,
“The Commission’s action cannot be upheld merely because findings might have been made and considerations disclosed which would justify its order, as an appropriate safeguard for the interests protected by the Act. There must be such a responsible finding. There is no such finding here.” 318 U. S., at 94 (citation omitted).
By affirming the District Court, this Court gives its tacit approval to a procedure that is not in accord with accepted procedures of judicial review of agency actions. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the proceedings to the ICC.
“At any hearing involving a change in a . . . charge, . . . the burden of proof shall be upon the carrier to show that the proposed changed . . . charge ... is just and reasonable . . . .” 49 U. S. C. §15 (7).
“Transit” consists of stopping a freight car en route to its ultimate destination for proeessiiig of its contents. There is no, separate charge for transiting cotton at most points in the South, of for transiting molasses at Jacksonville, Florida, and in the instant proceedings the appellants sought to impose the separate charge on such commodities at these points. The original proposal included grain and grain products, but the appellants did not contest the Examiner’s decision regarding charges on those items before the full- Commission.
Convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1336.
49 U. S. C. § 15a (2) (emphasis added).
Lead Opinion
Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Ohio.
