86 F. 671 | 2d Cir. | 1898
(after stating the facts). The record is long and somewhat involved, and the commissioner’s report has not set forth his findings with sufficient detail to be of much assistance to the court in determining just what he did find and upon what proof. This appeal may be best disposed of by taking up the assignments of error seriatim.
1. It is assigned as error that the libelants in the original libel and in the amended libel were a combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign nations; that libelants were engaged in an attempt to monopolize such trade or commerce; and that all the work alleged to have been done by them collectively or individually was under a contract or combination in such form, and that such contract or combination was void, and the libelants cannot maintain this suit either collectively or individually. We do not find any satisfactory evidence that these boats were “engaged in trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations.” Most of them held coasting licenses, but there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that they ever did anything except to tow canal boats, barges, and such craft on the waters of the Hudson River above Poughkeepsie, and entirely within the limits of the state of New York. And it seems wholly unnecessary to inquire whether their owners had entered into any unlawful combination under the laws of the state. Finding that the rates of compensation for the services of themselves, their crews and their tugs, were becoming so low as to be unremunerative, uncertain, and irregular, they agreed with each other to charge for all services rendered by each vessel such sums as might be fixed by a tariff which they adopted. They called themselves the “Hudson River Tug-Boat Association,” had a so-called superintendent to allot work among them, adopted a system of fines, etc., but they never became a legal entity either as a corporation, a joint-stock association, or a partnership. They made collectively no contract with the claimant, nor were they capable of making such contract. Each piece of towage service rendered was a transaction between the boat towing and the boat towed, with which the other boat owners in the association had nothing to do. Indeed, the libel (original and amended) is obnoxious to the objection of an improper joinder of libelants. Each should have brought a separate libel;
“The man who imports goods for another, by means of a violation of the laws of his country, is disqualified from founding any action upon such illegal transaction for the value or freight of the goods. * * * But, after the act is accomplished, no new.contract ought to be affected by it. It ought not to vitiate the contract of' the retail merchant who buys these goods from the importer.”
The test, whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced at law, is whether the plaintiff requires the aid of the illegal transaction to establish his case. If he cannot open his case, without showing that he has- broken the law, a court will not assist him. But if he does not claim through the medium of the illegal transaction, but upon a new contract bottomed on independent consideration, he may recover. Swan v. Scott, 11 Serg. & R. 155; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; McBlair v. Gribbes, 17 How. 236. In the case at bar libelants clearly did not require the aid of the alleged illegal transaction to establish their case.
2. It is further assigned as error that “there was on the trial no sufficient proofs of the value of the services alleged to have been performed by the libelants or either of them, and no proof excepting of such value as was made and established by the libelants themselves while engaged in such combination,” etc. The record shows that as to each item of charge there was evidence that the, service rendered was worth the price charged, and, as much of the work done by the different scows was similar in character and quantity, many of the items of-.charge are supported by the evidence of several witnesses. The witnesses stated that, in testifying to the value of the services, they did' not give consideration to the schedule of prices adopted by the association. The mere fact that in some instances the sum testified tú as the fair and reasonable value of a particular service and the price for such service named in the schedule were identical is not controlling. It is not inconceivable that men may combine together to ask a perfectly fair price for their work. Co-operation does not necessarily imply extortion. We have not seen nor heard the witnesses, but the commissioner, who had that opportunity, reached the conclusion that their estimate of value was more nearly correct than that of the single witness called by claimant. As the record discloses evidence to support his finding upon this disputed question of fact, the decreé should not be reversed on the ground assigned. Appellant’s brief refers to an instance where the tug Andrews charged five dollars for towing the dredge from Troy to West Troy, when the regular charge was two dollars, the additional three dollars being charged for the reason that Wiswall (the owner of the dredge) had previously towed with a boat outside of the association. There
8. It is further assigned as error that judgment was rendered against the sureties for this claimant in the original libel wherein the Hudson River Tug-Boat Association was libelant, and that such sureties were discharged by the proceeding allowing the libel to be amended and the libelants to proceed therein individually. It appears, however, that the Hudson River Tug-Boat Association was not the libelant in the original libel. Twenty different persons were individually libel-ants, of whom eight have been removed by amendment, having no claims. In other words, the suit, began with twenty individual libel-ants, and ended with twelve of them, the obligation of the sureties being to answer the decree of the court. The assignment of error is unsound.
4. The last assignment of error (the sixth) is the general one that judgment should have been given for claimants instead of for libelants. It has been disposed of with the other assignments.
The decree of the district court is affirmed, with interest and costs.