5 F. Cas. 92 | D. Mass. | 1867
The decision in Taylor v. Carryl [supra], as explained in Freeman v. Howe [supra], and in Buck v. Colbath, 8 Wall. [70 U. S.] 334, does not operate to defeat the paramount maritime liens, but only to delay their enforcement, because the sheriff can sell only the right of the ship-owner, subject to those liens; the practical effect of which I find to be that the sheriff usually waives his possession when libels are filed for maritime liens, because his title becomes of little or no market value. So. that we have come back pretty much to the practice which prevailed before the leading case was decided. If that doctrine applies to an attachment of credits, its application in any given case may have the effect to destroy the maritime liens, because after the money has once been paid over by the freighter on due process of law, the remedy of the lien-holders will be very difficult of enforcement, to say the least. Judge Blatch-ford has refused to extend the rule to such a case as this; and has stated very forcibly the hardship which would follow such an application of it The Sailor Prince [Case No. 12,218].
I have come to a like conclusion upon a consideration of the nature and effect of our foreign attachment law. By that law it is, indeed, enacted that the credits shall be considered attached, and be held to respond to the final judgment in the same manner as goods or estate when attached by the ordinary process. But in point of fact there is no possession taken by the sheriff, but merely an order served on the trustee to show cause why the judgment, when recovered, should not be satisfied out of the credits of the judgment debtor in his hands. If he answers that the credits are not due to the principal defendant, but to some one else, he must be discharged. And if he pays over to the adverse holder in the mean time, he is not in contempt, but is merely paying at his own risk, and the sheriff has nothing whatever to do about it It follows that the fund is not really in the custody of the court, or of its officers, and that our trustee process is very different in this respect from the foreign attachment of the ship in the principal case, which was what we call in Massachusetts by the mere name of attachment. Our process does not undertake to-impair obligations already existing, and if it appears that there are such obligations sufficient to exhaust the whole fund, the trustee must be discharged. True, there is a provision for permitting claimants of the fund to appear, but this is only for the purpose of protecting the trustee; there is no power to adjust and liquidate the adverse claims, and no process for their payment, but merely a course of proceeding which may bar the adverse claimant thereafter in any suit by by him against the trustee, if his claim should be disallowed. It may be maintained with much plausibility that a credit which is incumbered is not liable to attachment. The general doctrine, in Massachusetts, is that incumbered goods cannot be attached. Badlam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. 399). This rule has been modified by statute, but in a mode which carefully preserves the rights of the holder of any mortgage pledge or lien, and requires payment to be made to him within ten days after notice. Gen. St. c. 123, § 62 et seq. There are no analogous provisions for credits that are pledged or incumbered; and it seems to me that it would be the duty of the court of common law, on proof that a fund was so incumbered, to discharge the trustee. In the case at bar, if the gas company answers to the trustee process, as it is bound to do on notice, that the fund in its possession is not due to the owners but to the master, who has a lien on it for wages and disbursements, the trustee must be discharged, for the master in such a case is like a factor who has made advances on the goods consigned to him, and has a right to collect the price of them. Lewis v. Hancock, 11 Mass. 72; Richardson v. Whiting, 18 Pick. 530; Manter v. Holmes, 10 Metc. [Mass.] 402. And it can make no difference that the master is passive and the persons applying to the court are the sailors themselves, and others through whom the master derives his lien. If it should appear that the amount of the liens on the fund were not sufficient to absorb it entirely, the court of common law would perhaps have the right, if the statute under which the process is brought can be construed to extend to such a case, to charge the trustees to the extent of the surplus, but even that could not be done until the only court that has original jurisdiction of these maritime liens can adjust and liquidate them, so as to ascertain whether any thing will remain liable to the attachment, and this cannot lawfully
Upon the question of a supposed conflict of .jurisdiction, an important case in England is very' much in point, where to a suit by ship-owner against freighter, for the freight money, it was held by three courts, including the highest, to be a good plea in bar, that, since action brought, the freighter had been required to pay the money into the court of admiralty, and had paid it accordingly. Place v. Potts, 8 Exch. 703, 10 Exch. 370, and 5 H. L. Cas. 383.
Ordered that the freight money be brought in
