155 F. 439 | D. Or. | 1907
(after stating the facts). What measure of damages should be applied for the ascertainment of the amount of libelants’ recovery? This is the principal question for determination. Proctor for libelants insists that the measure should be the difference between the invoice price libelants were to receive for the steel from Robertson-Manning Company and the amount paid therefor, in its damaged condition, by Honeyman. It is reasoned that the ship is liable in that measure because it is responsible for the damaged condition of the steel,-and it was that condition that prompted Robertson-Manning- Company to refuse to receive it. Upon the other hand, - it is urged that the true measure is the difference between the market value of the merchandise in Portland at the time of the ship’s arrival and the value thereof in its damaged condition.
In this- jurisdiction interest has been allowed on the measure from the time of delivery. The Nith (D. C.) 36 Fed 86- This as between the shipper and the carrier. But the ship’s liability is not to be affected by private contracts between the shipper and strangers for the purchase and sale of the goods. The Compta, 6 Fed. Cas . p. 233, No. 3,070. The reasoning of Judge Hoffman in that relation is cogent and pertinent.- He says:
“The shipowber by the bill of lading does not enter into any engagement with the owner of goods that may be damaged to go'into a joint speculative operation founded upon the anticipated state of the market at some indefinite future time, to be judged of by the shipper, who retains in his own hands the whole conduct of the adventure. Such a rule would ,impose on the shipowner obligations, and liabilities little suspected' by ■'persons engaged in that*441 business, and. of which his contract by bill of lading contains no hint. The only safe, rational, and equal rule is to hold, as before stated, the vessel liable for the difference between market value of the goods, if sound, and their value in their damaged condition at the time and place of delivery.”
These authorities leave nothing for me to add in the determination of this cause.' The damages sought to be recovered were occasioned, not by delay, but by the failure to carry in good condition, and the rule applicable in determining the measure thereof is plainly the one last stated. The amount recoverable, therefore, is $240, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from October 1 1903, the date of the arrival of the ship in port. To this should be added other items of expenditure occasioned by the damage, namely: Moving steel on Columbia dock, $3.50; wharfage, $22.25; storage, $22.60; (The Giulio, supra) ; and also, I think, commission on sale of the steel, $68.75 — making a total added of $117.10.
I disallow the item for telegrams and that for counsel fees, as being for the individual benefit of the libelants; also the items for premium occasioned by giving bond in court, $5.00, and court costs advanced, $18.20, because I assume they will be taxed, of course, following the decree in favor of the libelants.