1 Gall. 239 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts | 1812
It has been contended by the counsel for the claimants, the schooner and cargo are not forfeited, because the cargo was not taken on board with an intention to import the same into the United States, contrary to the act of 1st March, 1809; that their whole conduct shows that they never meant to violate the law, but intended the importation should be made into the United States, upon the contingency only that it should by subsequent events become lawful; and that within forty-eight hours after the arrival of the schooner at Boston, they gave an ulterior destination to the property, which was perfectly lawful. There is no evidence in the case, to show that a contingent destination for Boston, was in the original contemplation of the parties. The master voluntarily took on board his cargo for that port, and (for aught that appears in the case) came into port, with the intention to make it his port of discharge. The destination for St. Bartholo-mews appears to have been an after thought, and in the absence of all contrary evidence, I must take that to have been the real fact.
I cannot admit, that to constitute a forfeiture within the act, it is necessary that the party should have intended a clandestine importation or a fraudulent smuggling traffic. The 4th section of the act declares, that it shall not “be lawful to import into the United States, or the territories thereof, any goods, wares, or merchandise whatever, from any port or place situated in Great Britain or Ireland, or in any of the colonies or dependencies of Great Britain,” &c. “nor shall it be lawful to import into the United States, or the territories thereof, from any foreign port or place whatever, any goods, wares, or merchandise, being of the growth, produce, or manufacture, &e. of Great Britain or Ireland, or of any of the colonies or dependencies of Great Britain,” &c. “or of any
This leads me to consider another position, which has been assumed by the counsel for the claimants, viz. that the facts do not amount in point of law to an importation into the United States; and the 32d section of the collection act of 2d March, 1799 [1 Stat. 651], and the act of 22d February, 1805, c. 78 [2 Story’s Laws, 962; 2 Stat. 315, c. 18], § 2, have been relied on, to show the understanding of the legislature, as to the meaning of the term “importation.” And upon the footing of these acts it is argued, that an importation is not complete, until a vessel has actually arrived in port under such circumstances, as render her liable to the payment of duties. It is true, that the act of the 22d February, 1805, permits a vessel, arriving with a cargo from a foreign port, to depart with the same cargo for any foreign port without payment of duties, provided the destination be disclosed in a manifest presented to the collector of the port within forty-eight hours after her arrival. But this by no means implies that the cargo had not been imported into the United States. On the contrary, the legislature' use a language which evinces a contrary understanding, for the transaction is called a re-exportation. Independent of this provision of the statute, there can be no doubt that the cargo would have been liable to the payment of duties; and it is too much, to contend that an exception from the generality of a law disproves a construction, upon which alone the law can have its ordinary operation. The acts laying duties levy them upon goods, wares, and merchandise, “brought into the United States from a foreign port or place.” Act Aug. 10, 3790, c. 39 [1 Stat. 180]. And such a bringing in, if voluntary, is considered as an importation within the purview of those acts. See Act Aug. 10. 1790, c. 39; Act May 2, 1792, c. 27 [1 Stat. 259]; Act June 7, 1794, c. 54 [1 Stat. 390]; Act Jan. 29, 1795, & 82, etc. [1 Story’s Laws, 376; 1 Stat. 411, c. 17]. In the present case, the voluntary arrival with the cargo, would also be an importation within the true construction of the same acts. But whatever may be the true construction of the term “importation,” as applied to articles paying duties, I can have no doubt, that here was an actual importation within the true intent and meaning of the act of 1st March, 1809. I take it to be a well settled rule, that the mere coming into port, though without' breaking bulle, is prima facie evidence of an importation. But the presumption may be rebutted by showing that it was occasioned by unavoidable accident or over-ruling necessity. The Eleanor, Edw.