Lead Opinion
| lAppellant, The Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas (Board), filed this interlocutory appeal of an order of the Polk County Circuit Court denying a motion to dismiss an action brought by appel-lee Matthew Andrews for violations of the overtime provisions of the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act,'codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 11-4-201 to -222 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017). For reversal, the Board argues that the circuit court erred in denying Andrews’s motion to dismiss because the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies. Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule l-2(a)(l) (2017), we have jurisdiction of this appeаl because it involves our interpretation of the Arkansas Constitution. We reverse and dismiss.
I. Facts
Rich Mountain Community College (RMCC), a publicly-funded, nonprofit college in Mena,, employed Andrews as a bookstore manager from November 15, 2010, through | ¡May 9, 2013.
On November 14, 2013, Andrews filed a complaint against RMCC pursuant to the AMWA for failing to compensate him for working overtime. On January 29, 2014, Andrews filed a first amended and substituted complaint, alleging violations of the overtime provisions of the • AMWA and seeking overtime and liquidated damages. In his prayer for relief, he requested (1) the entry of a declaratory judgment that RMCC’s pay practices violated, the AMWA; (2) the entry of a judgment for damages for all unpaid regular rate and overtime compensation under the AMWA; (3) an award of liquidated damagеs pursuant to the AMWA; (4) the entry of a judgment for punitive damages owed to Andrews pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Justice Reform Act in an amount to be proven at trial; (5) the entry of a judgment for any and all civil penalties to which Andrew's may be entitled; and (6) an order directing RMCC to pay Andrews prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.
RMCC answered and pleaded sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, which the circuit court denied. Subsequently, on August 18, 2016, RMCC filed a motion to dismiss Andrews’s eom-plaint, | aarguing that Andrews’s claim under the AMWA was barred by sovereign immunity, pursuant to article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. RMCC asserted that the General Assembly did not have the authority to abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity in the AMWA.
On September 14, 2016, the circuit court conducted a hearing on RMCC’s motion to dismiss and heard arguments from both parties. The circuit court subsequently issued- a letter order denying RMCC’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court ruled that “RMCC has [not] met its burden of demonstrating that the provision of the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act as it applies to Andrews is unconstitutional” and that the State may be sued for violations of the AMWA. In an order entered October 24, 2016, the circuit court mеmorialized these findings, denied RMCC’s motion to dismiss, and found that RMCC was “not entitled to sovereign immunity as it relates to [Andrews’s]- claims ..under the AMWA.” RMCC filed a motion for reconsideration; the motion was deemed denied. RMCC appeals.,
II. Sovereign Immunity
For the sole point on appeal, RMCC argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. Specifically, RMCC claims that section ll-4-218(e), as it applies to Andrews, is unconstitutional because it violates article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. RMCC contends that the Arkansas Constitution does not authorize the General Assembly to waive the State’s soverеign immunity. RMCC argues that this court’s case law that recognizes, a legislative waiver as an exception to sovereign immunity is not consistent with our constitution.
| ^Andrews responds that the circuit court properly denied RMCC’s motion to dismiss because the. General Assembly’s abrogation of sovereign immunity in the AMWA is constitutional. Andrews claims that the sovereign-immunity exception applies because the plain language of section 11-4-218 demonstrates .that the intent of the General Assembly allows for a right of action against the State.
A. Interlocutory Appeal and Standard of Review
Rule 2(a)(10) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procеdure — Civil permits an appeal from an interlocutory “order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on the defense of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official.” The rationale behind this rule is that immunity from suit is effectively lost if the case is permitted to go to trial when an immunity argument can prevail. Ark. Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg.,
We generally review a circuit court’s decision on a motion to dismiss by treating the facts alleged in the complaint as true and by viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kennedy v. Ark. Parole Bd.,
B. Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
[BThe Board moved to dismiss Andrews’s action based on sovereign immunity. Article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution provides that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.” Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit, and jurisdiction must be determined entirely from the pleadings. See LandsnPulaski, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr.,
This court has held that the Board is an instrumentality of the State and is immune from suit. See Washington Cty. v. Bd. of Trs.,
This court has held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is rigid but that it may be waived in limited circumstances. Office of Child Support Enf't v. Mitchell,
C. Arkansas Constitution and Applicable Case Law
In determining whether the Board is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we provide a brief history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the Arkansas Constitution. Originally, in 1868, the Arkansas Constitution read, “The general assembly shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought by and against the state.” Ark. Const, of 1868, art. 5, § 45. However, in 1874, the people passed what was the fifth and current version of the Arkansas Constitution. It altered the previous language and stated that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts.” Ark. Const, art. 5, § 20.
Subsequently, in 1935, this court considered the issue of whether the legislаture could waive the State’s sovereign immunity. See Ark. Hwy. Comm’n v. Nelson Bros.,
This court adhered to this principle for over sixty years until 1996. in Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration v. Staton,
Our constitution generally prohibits suits against the state. Ark. Const, art. 5, § 20. However, Ark. Code Ann. § 26-18-507(e)(2)(A) (Repl. 1992) permits a taxpayer to sue the state for an improperly collected sales tax only after a refund has been sought and refused or the Commissioner has not acted upon the taxpayer’s request. Since Mr. Tedder is the only taxpayer who had requested a refund and had his application denied, the Department claims that the chancery court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining members of the proposed class. In State v. Staton,325 Ark. 341 ,934 S.W.2d 478 (1996) (substituted opinion granting rehearing), we resolved this issue in the Department’s favor. Recognizing strong fiscal public policy concerns, we held that full compliance with the statute is necessary before sovereign immunity is waived.
Tedder,
D. Applicable Statutes and Statutory Construction
| sIn 2006, the General Assembly enacted a provision allowing employees to file suit against the State in AMWA actions. Acts of 2006 (1st Ex. Sess.), Act 15, § 5, eff. Oct. 1, 2006; Acts of 2006 (1st Ex. Sess.), Act 16, § 5, eff. Oct. 1, 2006. Subsequently, in 2014, Andrews filed his amended complaint alleging violations of the AMWA, which provides in relevant part,
(e)(1) An employee may bring an action for equitable and monetary relief against an employer, including the State of Arkansas or a political subdivision of the state, if the employer pays the employee less than the minimum wages, including overtime wages, to which the employee is entitled under or by virtue of this subchapter.
(2) If the employee brings an action under this subsection, then any complaint before the director by the employee on the same matter shall be dismissed with respect to that employee.
(3)(A) The employee shall not be required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action.
(B) There shall be no procedural, pleading, or burden of proof requirements beyond those that apply generally to civil suits in order to maintain the action.
Ark. Code Ann. § ll-4-218(e) (emphasis added). “Employer” is defined as “the Stаte of Arkansas” or “any political subdivision of the state[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § ll-4-203(4)(A).
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to determine the meaning of a statute. Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v. Shults,
If we apply our pоst-1996 caselaw, the plain language of section ll-4-218(e) would qualify as an exception to sovereign immunity because it contains an express waiver created |9by the legislature. Subsection (e)(1) allows for “an action for equitable and monetary relief’ against the State of Arkansas “or a political subdivision of the State” for violations of the AMWA, and this court has held that the Board is an instrumentality of the State. State Comm’r of Labor v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs.,
This court begins with the axiom that eveiy act carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v. Bailey,
E, Analysis
The key question on appeal is whether there is a clear incompatibility between section 11-4-218 and ■ article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. We conclude that there is a clear incompatibility between section ll-4-218(e) and our state constitution.
In the case at bar, the circuit court relied in it's letter order oh Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education,
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Alden v. Maine,
We reverse the circuit court’s ruling for the following reasons. First, this appeal involves a question of state constitutional law. In- Jacoby, this court applied federal constitutional law to a federal statute. Ja-coby does not apply to the case at bar. The present case concerns our interpretation of the validity of section ll-4-218(e) vis-á-vis article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. Thus, the circuit court’s reliance on Jacoby was in error,
Second, we acknowledge that the General Assembly enacted the AMWA and allowed “an action for equitable and monetary relief against [the State].” Ark. Code Ann. § ll-4-218(e). Nevertheless, we conclude that the legislative waiver of sovereign immunity in section ll-4-218(e) is repugnant to article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, we interpret the constitutional provision, “The State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts,” precisely as it reads. The drafters of I n our current constitution removed language from the-1868 constitution-that provided the General Assembly with statutory authority to waive sovereign immunity and instead used the word “never.” See Ark. Const, of 1868, art. 5, § .45; Ark. Const, art. 5, § 20. The people of the state of Arkansas approved this change when ratifying the current constitution. The General Assembly does not have the power to override a constitutional provision. To the. extent section ll-4-218(e) directly contradicts the constitution, it must fail.
Third, under the doctrine of stare deci-sis, we cannot ignore six decades of this court’s precedent prior to Staton. In Nelson Brothers, we stated,'
The human element in legislatures and courts, following a natural impulse, abhors an injustice perpetrated without a forum in which the right, denied or the wrong suffered may be asserted or redressed. Therefore, we find legislatures devising means for the assertion of rights or the redress of wrongs even when the state is involved and the courts are as sensitive to such impulse as the legislatures. On that account laws are often enacted, and decisions rendered to ■effectuate abstract justice, but which on no just grounds can be sustained except by unsound or specious reason. An apt illustration оf this is found in the cases which we have reviewed. It is with reluctance that we have undertaken this review, but we are impelled by the conviction that these decisions are wrong. We realize that the overruling of a decision has a tendency to render the laws of the state less certain. In this case, however, to adhere to our former decisions would be, as we conceive it, nothing short of judicial usurpation. It is our settled conviction that the state cannot give its consent to the maintenance of an action against it and the court below was without' jurisdictiоn. No one has a vested right to sue the state even when that privilege may be, and has been, given; it may be withdrawn even where a suit has been commenced without disturbing any vested right. Beers, Use of Platenius v. State of Arkansas,20 How. 527 ,15 L.Ed. 991 . “The plaintiff cannot complain because the-court overrules its former decision, even though that decision permitted the ■ plaintiff to maintain its suit similar to the one now before us.” Pitcock v. State, [91 Ark. 527 ,121 S.W. 742 (1909) ].
Nelson Bros.,
Further, this court has held that suits subjecting the State to financial liability are barred by sovereign immunity and that plaintiffs like Andrews with these causes of actions have a “proper avenue for redress. against State action, which is to file a claim with the Arkansas Claims Commission.” Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis. v. Adams,
III. Additional Arguments
Andrews raises additional arguments that (1) article 2 trumps article 5, and thus the State must be answerable in court to claims at law for violations of the AMWA, and (2) any application of sovereign immunity has been waived.
We do not address these arguments. Here, the circuit court did not specifically rule on these issues in either its letter order or its Anal order. This court has been clear that it will not presume a ruling from the circuit court’s silence, and we have held that we will not review a matter on which the circuit court has not ruled. Alpha Mktg.,
IV. Conclusion
For‘the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in denying the Board’s motion to dismiss because it lacked jurisdiction over Andrews’s AMWA claim pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we revérse and dismiss. See, e.g., Burcham,
Reversed and dismissed. ■
Notes
. On February 1, 2017, RMCC became a part of the University of Arkansas System. The circuit court took judicial notice of the merger and ordered that the Board be substituted as the-defendant.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s decision to hold that the legislative waiver of sovereign immunity found in the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act is unconstitutional. The majority’s opinion is patently flawed for several reasons.
First, the majority’s holding yields the untenable position that while private employers are required to pay their employees minimum wage, the State may forgo paying its employees the required minimum wage. By way of example, when an act is passed by the legislature or more specifically, when the citizens of Arkansas pass an act to increase the minimum wage, pursuant to the act, private employers are required tо compensate their employees in compliance with the act. However, as a result of the majority’s holding, the Minimum Wage Act is no longer applicable to the State. Thus, if the State pays its employees below the required minimum wage threshold, State employees will have no available recourse because there is no longer a right to enforce the Act against the State.
Second, the majority opinion appears to attempt to limit its holding to only legislative waivers of sovereign immunity; however, its holding is much more far-reaching. Article 5, section 20 states that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.” Ark. Const, art. 5, § 20. (emphasis added). The word “made” is the past participle | 14of the word “make.” MerriarrWWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed.) (1991). Webster’s lists twenty-five definitions for the word “make.” One of these definitions is to “to cause to be or cause to become.” Another definition is “to cause to act in a certain way: compel.” I submit that the drafters of the constitution intended for -“made” to mean the latter, to “compel.” Any other interpretation of “made” would render any waiver of sovereign immunity — by the executive, legislative or judicial branch — impossible. Thus, we could not hold that the State waives sovereign immunity: by the executive branch, through the attorney general seeking relief or by bringing suit; by a legislative act; or by the judicial branch through postconviction rules. However, if the word “made” means to compel, then the State can allow itself to be sued in those situations. Further, the majority’s attempt to limit its holding to money judgments is disingenuous to the literal text of article 5, section 20. If the majority is holding that “made” means to “cause to become,” then thе text of article 5, section 20 should be read-to mean that the State cannot be caused to be a defendant in any of her courts. Absent from our constitution is any language limiting sovereign immunity to money judgments. The majority’s holding that the legislature may no longer waive sovereign immunity, necessarily means that the executive and judicial branches likewise may not waive sovereign immunity because any other interpretation would result in treating the legislature differently from the executive and judicial branches. For each branch to operate as envisioned by the constitution, one branch must not be subordinated to either or both of the other branches, and one branch must not take control of one or both of the other branches. City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc.,
|ifiThird, the majority declines to address Andrews’s arguments regarding article 2 because the circuit court failed to specifically rule on this issue. However, the Arkansas Constitution must be considered as whole, and' every provision must be read in light of other provisions relating to the same subject matter. Gatzke v. Weiss,
Fourth, after citing the 1874 constitution, the majority states, “Subsequently, in 1935, this court considered the issue of whether the legislature could waive the State’s sovеreign immunity. See Ark. Hwy. Comm’n v. Nelson Bros.,
It will be seen that out of the conflicting views of a majority of the several members of the court a very definite result has been reached; ie., that in a proper case the highway commission may be sued when authority for the bringing of the suit may be found in the statute ... we now hold that, in all cases where the statute authorizes a'suit, it may be maintained against the highway commission whether it be thought to be . a juristic person or whether section 20, art. 5, be merely declaratory of the general doctrine that the state mаy not be sued in her courts unless she has consented thereto.
117Fifth, the majority states that “under the doctrine of stare decisis, we cannot ignore six decades of this court’s precedent prior to Staton.” However, the same can be said with regard to our over twenty-years of precedent set forth in Staton and Tedder. In Chamberlin v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company,
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we are bound to follow prior case law. The policy of stare decisis is designed to lend predictability and stability to the law. It is well-settled that “[precedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable.” Our test is whether adherence to the rule would result in “great injury or injustice.”
(Internal citations omitted.) Pursuant to Chamberlain, the majority has failed to demonstrate that our precedent set forth in Staton is “patently wrong” or “manifestly unjust.” Instead, the mаjority’s decision, in a perfunctory fashion, overhauls over twenty years of our well-established law on sovereign immunity and has effectively revived the antiquated doctrine that “the king can do no wrong.”
• Arkansas Minimum Wage Act-
• Arkansas Whistle Blower’s Act
• Post-conviction cases
• Land-condemnation cases
• Illegal-exaction cases
• Suits against State owned hospitals
• Freedom of Information Act
• Suits filed against DHS, including dependency-neglect cases
As discussed above, the majority’s opinion transforms the State to king-like status and makes “the king can do no wrong” theory absolute. However, even under that theory, the |19law has always recognized the sovereign’s right to submit to suit. This court, for over twenty years, has recognized that the sovereign' may waive its immunity and submit to suit. I would .follow our precedent and I would hold that the General Assembly’s abrogation of sovereign immunity found in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-4-218 is- constitutional.
. Hart, J., joins.
. Since Staton and Tedder, we have consistently recognized an exception to. the doctrine of sovereign immunity where an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of immunity. See Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers,