234 F. 959 | W.D. Wash. | 1916
This action is prosecuted under Seaman’s Act March. 4, 1915 (U. S. Stat. at E. vol. 38, p. 1164, .§ 9 at page 1167). It is contended by the claimant that, under admiralty. rule 16 of the Supreme Court of the United States (29 Sup. Ct. xl):
“In all suits for an assault or beating on thé high seas or elsewhere within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, the suit shall be in personam only.”
, This rule was promulgated prior to the adoption of the Seaman’s Act, supra, and hence has no application. The provision of the act upon which 'reliance is placed (section 9 of the act, supra, page 1167) provides:
“ * * * Any failure on the part of such master to use due diligence to comply herewith, which failure shall result in the escape of such officer, shall render the master or vessel or the owner of the vessel liable in damages. * * * if
The act was passed “to promote the welfare of American Seamen in the merchant marine of the United States. * * * ” The intent of the act was to give the assaulted seaman a right of recovery for the injury. That separate, recovery cannot be had against each, but one recovery against one or all, I think clearly expresses the intent of the lawmakers. I do not think that force can be given to the sug-
“The word ‘or’ is frequently construed to mean ‘and,’ and vice versa, in order to carrv out the evident intent of the parties.” Dumont v. U. S., 98 U. S. 143, 25 L. Ed. 65.
When necessary to carry out the provisions of an act the word “or” may be read as “and.” North Springs Water Co. v. City of Tacoma, 21 Wash. 517, 58 Pac. 773, 47 L. R. A. 214. In the instant case the purpose of the statute was to promote the welfare of American seamen, and against certain abuses gave them a right of recovery, and since this recovery can be obtained from the vessel, the master, or
the owner, each being liable and their liability being created by the act, giving the benefit to the seamen, I think the word “or” must be held to mean “and.” Rooney v. Brogan Construction Co., 107 App. Div. 258, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1. Since all are liable, there certainly could not have been any purpose or intention on the part of Congress to compel the seaman to elect as to which to pursue, and thereby exempt the others from liability. The purpose was to give him a right of recovery for the damages sustained, and this may be obtained from all of the parties.
The exceptions are overruled.