91 F. 540 | D. Wash. | 1899
By a contract in writing between libelant and the Seattle-Dawson City Transportation & Merchandise' Company (which, for convenience, will be hereafter referred to as the "Transportation Company”), said Transportation Company agreed to carry a number of passengers and about 100 tons of freight, by a vessel not named, from Seattle to the mouth of the Yukon river, at
Levin filed an intervening libel for the amount of his wages during the time he was engaged as purser and freight clerk, and, by an order of court, he "was permitted to prosecute his suit as an intervener in forma pauperis. After his libel liad been answered by the claimants,
It is clear that the libelant has no claim against the Bella, nor against her owners, by virtue of any contract made with them, or any agent authorized to represent them, or with the master. The charterer could not bind the schooner by any contract, without satisfying the conditions of the charter party essential to acquire the right to have possession of'the vessel and to control her employment. Having failed to comply with the conditions, the Transportation Company did not become owner of the vessel for the voyage, nor a representative of the owner. Although the Transportation Company was permitted to have a new cabin constructed on the vessel, which was necessary to equip her for the intended voyage, its possession and control of the ship were not so complete that representatives of the libelant were deceived by being led to believe that it had authority to make a contract creating a lien upon the vessel. The contract upon which the suit is founded makes no reference to the schooner Bella, and no lien for freight or passage money ever attached to the goods or baggage of the people represented by the libelant. Neither the owner nor charterer could lawfully assert a claim to such a lien by reason of the handling of their goods, without their consent, while the vessel was in the marshal’s custody. As between the respective owners of a ship and cargo, their rights are reciprocal. The right to a lien for freight gives a right to a lien upon the ship for due performance of the contract for safe carriage and delivery, and no such lien upon the ship attaches until the lien for freight has attached upon the cargo. I hold, also, that until a passenger has rendered himself on board, for the purpose of being carried as a passenger, performance of the contract has not been commenced, so as to subject the vessel to a lien. The Eugene, 83 Fed. 222; Id., 31 C. C. A. 345, 87 Fed. 1001. Merely going on board to inspect the vessel, or to select and reserve a sleeping berth, is not any part of a journey, nor the beginning of the relation of carrier and passenger.
By the uncontradicted evidence, it appears that the intervener, Levin, was received and recognized by the master of the Bella as purser and freight clerk, and he remained on board in that capacity 26 days. His services were of no value to the ship, but his time was reasonably worth to him $100 per month, and I must conclude that he did have a valid claim against the ship and the master for his wages at that rate for 26 days. I do not consider that it is a commendable practice to settle a litigated claim without the knowledge of the attorneys whose appearance for the party appears of record. Nevertheless, attorneys who have not taken the steps necessary to acquire a lien upon the money due .to their client cannot assert any right in their own