255 F. 171 | E.D.N.Y | 1918
Two libels for wharfage have been filed, and tbe cases tried together by consent. Tbe contract in each case was made with the libelants by one Novelly, and a question at once arises as to whether claimant is bound by his acts as its agent.
*172 “Sec. 859. It shall be lawful to charge and receive, within the city of New York, wharfage and dockage at the following rates, namely: From every vessel that uses or makes fast to any pier, wharf, or bulkhead, within said city, or makes fast to any vessel lying at such pier, wharf, or bulkhead, or to any other vessel lying outside of such vessel, for every day or part of a day except as hereinafter provided, as follows: * * * For every vessel over 200 tons burden, two cents per ton for each of the first two hundred tons ■burden, and one-half of one cent per ton for every additional ton. * * * ”
And again:
“Sec. 863. * * * Any person owning or having charge of any pier, wharf, bulkhead, or slip as aforesaid, who shall receive for wharfage any rates in excess of those now authorized by law, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved treble the amount so charged as damages, to he sued for and recovered by the party aggrieved.”
The rate under the statute would be only $4.97 per day.
The court has not been referred to, nor has it found, any decided case which is directly in point; but, unless constrained by authority, it is not disposed to allow a boat under these circumstances to avail itself of wharfage which is worth at least $75 per day for $4.97 per day. The court holds rather that the claimant by its express contracts waived the statute. As Judge Thomas remarks in The Antonio Zambrana (C. C.) 88 Fed. 546:
“The statute is supreme, and confers a right; and unless the person upon whom the right is conferred waives it, by contract or otherwise, a court is technically barred from declaring that the exercise of the right is unlawful.”
Decree for libelant in each case.