104 F. 904 | D.S.C. | 1900
The amended libel, filed December 5, 1899, in behalf of the owners and crew of sundry licensed wrecking schooners and sloops therein named, and of sundry wrecking sloop boats, and of the owners and crew of the steamtug Dauntless, claims salvage for services rendered to the Danish steamship Alexandra. The answer of A. G-. Blom, master and claimant of the steamship Alexandra, filed January 2, 1900, admits the services, alleges un-skillfulness and negligence in the performance of the same, and prays that the court should make a moderate award of salvage, and that the costs of the respondent be decreed against the libelants, for the reason that no settlement could be reached with libelants, because of their exorbitant and excessive demands, although efforts were made to come to an agreement with them. On February 1, 1900, Det Forenede Dampskibs Selskab, of Copenhagen, filed its petition and bond, and, in pursuance of an order of court granting leave to inter
Before disposing of the case, certain questions of pleading and practice which have arisen in its progress demand attention. It will be observed that the issue made by the libel and answer is simply the amount of salvage. The intervention of Det Forenede Dampskibs Selskab, of Copenhagen, owner of the steamship, makes a new and entirely different issue. It claims that the salvage was forfeited
“Any wreckers wlio give or agree to give the master any part of the salvage or other sum of money or make him any unlawful present or help him in any manner to make any money out of the wreck of his vessel, shall forfeit their salvage.”
This intervention makes a new issue, which goes to the very root of the case. If supported by sufficient proof, the libel would be dismissed. It is an altogether different defense to that made in the answer, which went merely to the quantum of the award. No notice was given of the filing of such intervention, and no copy was served upon the proctors for libelants, who say that until the opening of a certain deposition, to be hereafter adverted to, they had no notice that such defense was interposed. Proctors for the intervener claim that notice was not necessary; that the libelants, being parties to the cause, were bound to take notice of the intervening petition and of the proceedings thereunder. There has been no motion to vacate the order allowing the- intervention, which I think would have been the proper practice; but the question arises upon a motion to strike out certain questions and answers in the deposition of Blom, as being irrelevant to the issues made in the pleading. On the day of the filing of the intervention, notice was given that the “intervener herein” would take the testimony of A. H. Blom, at Copenhagen, in Denmark, before J. C. Ingersol, Esq., consul for the United States, in accordance with the provisions of sections 863 and 1750 of the Revised Statutes. The deposition of Blom was taken by said consul in the form of questions and answers, and returned by him to the clerk of this court; being received by mail March 28, 1900. On April 12, 1900, while the court was proceeding to hear the testimony in behalf of the libelants, a large number of witnesses from the south coast of Florida being in attendance, a motion was made to suppress the deposition on the ground that depositions de bene esse could not be taken in a foreign country. Proctors for intervener cited and relied on the opinion of Judge Blatchford in Bischhoffsheim v. Baltzer (C. C.) 10 Fed. 4, in which it was held that “depositions de bene esse in civil causes may be taken in a foreign country by any secretary of legation or consular officer.” Upon the conclusion of the argument the court expressed its doubt that depositions could be so taken, and that it would take further time to examine and consider the question, whereupon proctors for libelants stated that their witnesses were poor, and had come from a considerable distance and at great expense, and it would be great inconvenience and might work great hardship if they had to return to testify as to any matter brought out in such deposition, in the event that the court should hold the deposition admissible, and moved that the deposition be opened. The court thereupon ruled that the deposition be opened, and that, if libelants examined witnesses in respect to matters contained therein, it would be held that they were estopped from raising hereafter any formal objection as to the manner of taking the deposition, but that they would not be thus estopped from objecting to any questions there
Objection is made to nearly all of the questions propounded in this deposition because they are irrelevant to the issue. It is elementary that no evidence is properly admissible but what applies to matters in issue between the parties, and nothing is in issue but what is. averred on one side and denied on the other. While in admiralty the formalities required in pleading at common law or in equity are not demanded, if the respondent wished to avail himself of any particular matter of defense he should present it with proper averments in his answer or plea, and should set out clearly and explicitly the facts relied on; and proofs should correspond substantially with the allegations, so as to prevent surprise. The pleadings here made but one issue, and that was the amount to be awarded. If respondents desired to set up another defease, it should have been made either by amendment to the answer or by proper plea. Certainly the libelants were entitled to some notice that a new defense was to be set up. In effect, the steamship company has attempted to make itself a parly in the place of its legal agent, who, under the admiralty practice, was defending in its name, and has set up a new and altogether different defense. This cannot he done ex parte. The questions put to the witness are in flagrant violation of the rule which forbids leading questions. The story of the alleged offer of a gratuity is simply the story told by the counsel examining the witness, which receives his verbal assent. There is nothing to indicate that the witness was hostile or unwilling to testify, and none of those circumstances which frequently justify courts in allowing leading questions. Inasmuch, however, as the deposition was admitted under the circumstances above detailed, and the testimony of libelants has been taken, I have given to the testimony as to the alleged offer of gratuity such weight as it would be entitled to if free from the objections stated, and my conclusion is that it is insufficient to sustain the contention that the salvage lias been forfeited by such alleged offer of gratuity. Roberts and Albury, who were examined before me, deny positively making any such offer. Their licenses from the district court of Florida are official certificates of good character. “In cases of misconduct set up, there must be a special allegation of facts, with due certainty of
It remains, therefore, to determine the amount of salvage which should be awarded. Among the ingredients of the salvage service are: First, the degree of danger to human life and to property, and the value of the property saved. It is not pretended that there was any danger to'human life. The value of, the steamship, as proved, is that the ship was built in 1894 at a cost of $180,000. The experts who have testified to her value fix it at about $100,000. The value of the cargo as shown by the manifest was about $67,000, and the freight about $13,000. A small part — the least valuable — of her cargo was jettisoned. The sum of $200,000 to $225,000 would be an approximate estimate of the value of the ship and cargo. As to the danger to the property, the testimony shows that the ship ran aground upon, a coral reef about 90 miles from Key West, upon a lonely and desolate coast, at a time of the year when storms might naturally be expected; but during the time that she was aground there was but a slight wind, and an examination of the ship’s bottom made by a diver after her arrival in Charleston showed that she was not injured. After she was floated and had been hauled into deep water oh the afternoon of September 14th, there was not sufficient wind to enable the small boats upon which the cargo had been placed to go alongside in order to reload, but on the next day there was some wind and a rough sea. The extreme velocity of the wind during the 15th was 23 miles an hour, and the reloading required some care and was attended with some little risk. Second, as regards the salvors. The ingredients to be considered are the danger to human life, the danger to the property employed in the salvage service, and the value of such property, and the time, labor, and skill employed in the service. The testimony shows that 18 or 19 wrecking sloops and schooners assembled at. the scene of the wreck. A few of them did not arrive until the steamship was hauled off, but 15 were used as lighters, upon which the cargo was placed. There were also some small boats, not licensed, which belonged to the man engaged in the service. There were 120 or 130 men gathered about the scene of the wreck, who unloaded the cargo that was placed in their boats. They also carried out the heavy anchor about. 90 fathoms from the ship, upon which the ship heaved with her own engines, and thus the steamship got afloat. Thei service was unattended with any risk to human life, and the risk to the property engaged was that which might have followed if a storm had arisen while these boats were laden with so much of
The libel states “that at midnight on said 13th day of September, Anno Domini 1899, the said steamship was floated, but, owing to the heavy swell and strong current, she again went ashore." The answer charges “that by The unskillfulness and negligence of the libel-ants she was allowed to get ashore again.” There has been a good deal of i estimonv as to the causes of the second grounding. Some of the libelants’ witnesses say that it was owing to the fault of the master of the steamship in taking up an anchor which the master wrecker told him to leave down. It is the duty of the master wrecker to make a careful survey and soundings of the neighborhood where the wreck lies, and to devise flie best means to save the property speedily. By rule 14 of the wrecking rules it is made the duty of the master of the wrecked vessel to remain by the wreck and superintend the operation of the salvors, in connection with the master wrecker. There was undoubtedly fault somewhere in allowing the vessel to get aground the second time. If it was entirely clear that this was the fault of the master wrecker, the award should
The amount to be awarded for salvage service is always a question of- delicacy and difficulty. • Full and fair compensation for the work and labor actually done, and for skill and diligence, is always allowed, and consideration must be had of the dangers and difficulties of the'service. This much the salvors are entitled to as of right, and to this amount should be added so much as, in the discretion of the court, is reasonable and proper, in the interests of commerce, to encourage others to like exertions to save life and property in peril. In view of the dangerous character of the south coast of Florida, and of the want of any extensive or expensive appliances for the aid of vessels in distress, the district court grants its license to certain people living on the Keys along the coast, and requires that they provide themselves with certain equipment and conform to certain regulations. This equipment is often inadequate to> all the service demanded, but, such as it is, it is frequently the only means of relief immediately available; there being no large, seaports near, nor means of telegraphic communication. Under these circumstances, the highest degree of skill and the best equipment are not to be expected. Promptness in repairing to the scene of peril, readiness to assist, and the faithful doing of all that limited powers enable to accomplish,
The claimants ask that costs be not allowed, because of the exorbitant bond demanded for the release of the ship. It appears that libelants demanded a bond for $40,000, but the clerk, in the absence of the judge, very properly fixed the amount of the bond at $20,000, which was given; and it does not appear that the claimants have suffered loss from the demand of what, under the circumstances, was an exorbitant requirement. A decree will be entered in favor of the libelants for $11,500 and costs.