143 N.C. 33 | N.C. | 1906
Lead Opinion
At the close of the testimony the Court instructed the jury that if they believed the evidence, they would answer the first -issue “Yes”; the second issue “No,” and the third issue “$2,000,” the amount stipulated in the policy.
The defendant objected to this charge of the Court, and the brief for defendant filed in the cause stated that all other exceptions are abandoned.
We are of opinion that the objection to the charge cannot be sustained. ’ a
On the trial, the plaintiff introduced the policy insuring the life of the deceased for plaintiff’s benefit for the sum of $2,000, proved the payment of premiums, which, by the terms of the policy kept same alive, till June 18, 1905; and then introduced a clause of the defendant’s answer which admitted that deceased died on the 25th of April, 1905.
According to the authorities, this testimony makes out a prima facie .case for plaintiff, and nothing else appearing, would justify the charge of the Court as given. Spruill v. Ins. Co., 120 N. C., pp. 141-150; James v. Ins. Co., at the present term.
Defendant’s first objection rests upon the allegation that no satisfactory proof of the death of the insured has been made; that the requirements of the policy as to the form and quantum of proof have not been fully complied with.
We fail to discover any essential defect in the matter referred to; but if such defect existed, we do not think the objection is now open to defendant.
So far as the quantum of proof is concerned, it is admitted in the answer that the insured is now dead, and was at the beginning of the suit.
Here, proof of death was made on blanks supplied by the company in July, 1905. So far as the testimony shows, no objection or suggestion of any defect was made as to the proof until answer filed November following, denying liability on the policy; and then in such general terms that plaintiff could hardly discover what change or correction was desired. Under such circumstances, the objection as to the form of proof is properly held to be waived.
Again, the charge of the Court is urged for error in connection with the second issue, the issue being in form as follows :
“Did the insured die by his own act or hand with intent to commit suicide ?”
The policy, bearing date June 18, 1904, contains a condition that if the insured, within one year from the issue of f the policy, die by his own act or hand, whether sane or insane, the company shall not be liable for any greater sum than the premiums, etc. A condition of this kind is held to be a valid stipulation. Spruill v. Ins. Co., 120 N. C., p. 140; Vance on Insurance, p. 532.
And it is generally held also that such a provision, in its terms, refers to suicide and does not include a killing by accident, even although the act of the insured may have been the unintended means of causing death. Vance on Insurance, supra.
It is also accepted doctrine that on such an issue addressed to this question, the presumption is against an act of suicide,- and the burden is on the party who seeks to establish it. Am. and Eng. Ency., vol. I, p. 331; Vance on Insurance, p. 523; Lawson’s Law of Presumptive Evidence, p. 241; Spruill v. Ins. Co., supra; Mallory v. Ins. Co., 47 N. Y., p. 52.
In Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, supra, the case is thus put: “H. is found dead. An examination reveals that his death was caused by taking arsenic. Plis life is insured, and the question arises whether his death was caused by suicide or accident. The presumption is that it was caused by the latter.”
This being the presumption, and defendants having offered no evidence, the question arises whether, on the testimony introduced by the plaintiff, there is, in law, sufficient evidence for the consideration of a jury tending to rebut the presumption. The testimony we find in the record pertinent to this question will be found in the statement of plaintiff and of the coroner, on file pursuant to a requirement of the policy, as a part of the proof of death. That of plaintiff is as follows:
“Q-ive cause of death (full particulars). Ans.: Was caused by gunshot wound in left side. Everything pointed to an accident in handling the gun, which was supposed-to have been empty.”
That of the coroner:
“Was death the result of the deceased’s own hand or act? Ans.: Yes; or by some unknown hand, accidentally or otherwise.”
The statement of the coroner is colorless and without probative force of any kind. It amounts, in fact, to his saying
The testimony then discloses that the deceased was found dead with a gunshot wound in his left side. There is no testimony as to the temperament, condition, or domestic, social, or business life of the deceased which would tend to indicate suicide, or as to any declaration, written or oral, of like tendency. There is nothing offered as to the position of the body, the placing of the gun, or the character and course of the wound which would support such a theory.
The testimony before us leaves the matter as stated, with the objective fact, “Found dead with a gunshot wound in his left side,” with the additional and only explanatory statement of the applicant, “Everything pointed to an accident in handling the gun, which was supposed to be empty,” and this supports the presumption raised by the law that the killing under such circumstances is presumed not to be with suicidal intent.
We think it clear, therefore, that his Honor was correct in charging the jury that if the testimony was believed, they should find according to this presumption and answer the second issue “No.”
There, is nothing in Spruill's case, supra, pp. 150-151, relied on by defendant, which militates in any way against our present decision. In that case the plaintiff had stated, in his proof of loss, that the insured “had died by his own hand”; and the Judge writing the opinion had held that this statement, standing unexplained, was an admission of suicide,' and at once shifted the burden of proof. The decision proceeded upon the idea that by fair intendment, and by uniform construction of the courts, these words, unexplained, amounted to an allegation or admission of suicide; and the opinion, on this point, says: “The plaintiff, though she went on the stand herself, in nowise contradicted the import of these words; nor did she testify to any facts tending to show she
But there is no such admission in the proof offered here. Even if the statement of the applicant permits the interpretation that the deceased had hold of the gun when the death wound was inflicted; not only is there no admission of suicide, but such an inference is repelled .by positive averment. “Everything pointed to an accident in handling a gun supposed to be empty.”
There is no error in the charge of the Court, and the judgment is affirmed.
No Error.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting: It may be conceded that where nothing else appears but the fact that the death of the insured was caused by his own act, the law will presume it to have been accidental rather thap, suicidal, for it will not generally presume a wrong; and it may also be conceded that under the terms of the contract the death must have been caused by the voluntary and intentional act of the insured in order to avoid the policy. But with these concessions made, it seems to me that there is sufficient evidence here of deliberate self-destruction to carry the case to the jury. The provision against liability in the event of suicide is not only a valid one, but a policy which insures against such a risk as suicide has been held to be void as being against public policy. Ritter v. Ins. Co., 169 U. S., 139. Such a clause -of exemption from liability should therefore be favorably considered, as it is in harmony with the policy of the law.
No one can read the testimony of the beneficiary without being impressed with the belief that in her answer to the question as to the cause of death she intended to convey the meaning that the insured died of a gunshot wound in his left side which was inflicted by himself. If there was any
Again, we turn to the coroner’s testimony, and find that to the question, “Was death the result of the deceased’s own hand or not?” he gives this answer: “Yes; or by some unknown hand — accidentally or otherwise.” Here again we have precisely the answer that was given in the Spruill case; and there is added, as was done by the beneficiary when replying to a similar question, what is nothing more nor less than rank conjecture. He first says, “Yes,” that is, “he did die by his own hand or act,” and then proceeds to express his opinion in regard to something he evidently knew nothing about. The very terms of his further answer to the question, after he had said positively that he had died by his own hand or act, shows clearly that he did not intend to speak of his own knowledge, but was only making a guess as to what other circumstances may have caused his death.
I do not think it was incumbent on the defendant to show that which was peculiarly within the knowledge of the other 'side, or of which they at least had the better opportunity of acquiring knowledge; and especially is this true when the coroner had admitted, and the plaintiff virtually so, that the insured died by his own hand, thereby casting upon the plaintiff the burden of explaining the occurrence.
It is also to be noted that the coroner testified that he held no inquest, and made no post-mortem examination, because no foul play was alleged. What did he mean by this statement ? Simply that he died by his own hand and not by the hand of any one else; that a suicide and not a felonious homicide had been committed. These were all matters for the jury.
It is further to be said that the policy provides expressly that “the proofs shall be evidence of the facts therein stated in behalf of, but not against, the company.’* That which makes for the company shall be considered, but not that which may tend to make for the beneficiary. The sufficiency of the evi-
It is to be noted that the plaintiff did not go on the stand, nor did she offer the other witnesses who joined her in the proofs. This is significant and was a proper subject of comment in discussing the evidence before the jury, and was a circumstance proper for their consideration. Goodman v. Sapp, 102 N. C., 477; Yarborough v. Hughes, 139 N. C., 199.
The right of trial by jury is one that should be jealously guarded and accorded to the citizen in all cases, where there are any disputed matters of fact which raise issues between the parties. It is one of the fundamental guaranties of our system of government, and should never be denied to any