305 Mass. 341 | Mass. | 1940
This is a suit in equity in which Marion J. Thaxter, one of the executrices of and the residuary legatee
The evidence is not reported, and the record does not disclose that any request for a report of material facts was made by either of the parties under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 215, § 11. The judge, however, did make a report of facts entitled “Report of Material Facts." It is not stated in the report by the judge, nor is it indicated therein other than by its title, that the report contains all the facts that entered into his decree. The parties, however, have argued the case as if the report was of all the facts that entered into the decree, and, since the result will be the same as if this were not so, we deal with it on the basis upon which the parties have proceeded. So treated “there is no room for any implication of further findings." Birnbaum v. Pamoukis, 301 Mass. 559, 562, and cases cited.
The material facts found by the judge are substantially as follows: The securities involved are bearer bonds aggregating in par value $11,000. Included among them are two $1,000 bonds of the Utah Power & Light Company. In 1934 the deceased sold certain real estate in Marblehead for $12,000. He told the respondent that he desired her to have the sum realized from this sale for her needs and that he would invest it so as to give her a monthly income. Bonds of the par value of $4,000 were purchased by the deceased on March 5, 1936, bonds of the par value of $2,000 (those of the Utah Power & Light Company) on March 13, 1936, bonds of the par value of $2,000, on April 6, 1936, bonds of the par value of $2,000, on April 13, 1936, and a bond of the par value of $1,000 on December 9, 1936. • The aggregate
On October 27 (whether in the year 1936 or the year 1937 does not appear) the deceased, with the knowledge and consent of the respondent, pledged the bonds of the Utah Power & Light Company for a loan of $750, negotiated for the purpose of paying his taxes to the town of Milton. After the death of the deceased, this loan was paid from funds of his estate. During his lifetime the deceased collected the interest on all the bonds and placed it to his own account. This was done in accordance with an arrangement between the deceased and the respondent “whereby the” deceased “paid the expenses over and above the income” on certain real estate owned by the respondent. The deceased accounted for the income received from the bonds in his State and Federal income tax returns.
After the death of the deceased the bonds in question, except those of the Utah Power & Light Company, were found in an envelope in the joint safe deposit box. The envelope was indorsed “Property of Eva A. Traiser” (the respondent). A brief description of all the bonds in question
The petitioner contends that the facts found do not warrant a conclusion that there was a delivery of the bonds by the deceased to the respondent, and hence that any attempted gift failed; and, further, that the retention of the income from the bonds by the deceased, the pledge by him for a personal loan of the bonds of the Utah Power & Light Company, the inclusion in his State and Federal income tax returns of the income from all the bonds, and the circumstance that the respondent did not in fact make any attempt to touch the bonds or use them in any way during the' life of the deceased, “clearly prove that . . . [the deceased] did not for one instant yield control of the bonds to the respondent.”
It is true that no actual manual delivery of the bonds is shown, but the acts and declarations of the deceased and the respondent, including the hiring of the safe deposit box jointly, the placing of the bonds involved therein in one envelope containing the notations of the deceased thereon, and the free access which the respondent had to this place of joint depository, all serve to show an intention of the deceased and the respondent to treat the bonds as delivered. This is further evidenced by the finding of the judge that, in collecting the income from the bonds and placing it to his own account, the deceased was acting in accordance with an agreement with the respondent which was to her advantage; and by the further finding that the pledge of the bonds of the Utah Power & Light Company by the deceased for a personal loan was with her knowledge and consent. Upon these facts the judge was right in finding sufficient delivery. See Sullivan v. Hudgins, 303 Mass. 442, 447-448, and cases cited.
Even if the facts found would require the conclusion that the deceased reserved to himself a life interest in the
Decree affirmed.