Plaintiffs’ liquor license was revoked by a county board of license commissioners after Plaintiffs violated the terms under which the license had been granted. After Plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed the decision revoking their license to state court, they filed this action in federal district court alleging that the condition that they violated was an unconstitutional restriction on their freedom of speech and seeking preliminary injunctive relief. Because there were significant questions regarding this Court’s jurisdiction, the parties were asked to brief that issue prior to consideration of preliminary relief. Defendants seek to dismiss this case on the grounds that it seeks review of a state-court order and therefore is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine does not apply because they seek relief that was not available from the state court. Because I find that all of Plaintiffs’ claims either were directly addressed by the state court or are inextricably intertwined with that court’s decision, I dismiss this case under the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
For purposes of considering Defendants’ Motion, I accept the facts that Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint as true. See Aziz v. Alcolac,
The history of Plaintiffs’ liquor license dates back at least to 2009, when Plaintiffs first sought a license from the board. Id. ¶ 11. Following a hearing, the parties arrived at a consent order (the “First Consent Order”) on November 12, 2009, id., which allowed the sale of “beér, wine, and whiskey,” ¡provided that Thai “will be operated as a family restaurant” between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., and that “there shall be no entertainment other than dinner music from either a radio аnd/or tv.” without prior approval of the Board, First Consent Order, Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-3. It appears that Plaintiffs operated within the parameters of the First Consent Order through 2011, when they requested that the First Consent Order be rescinded to allow Plaintiffs to provide entertainment at Thai. See Compl. ¶ 12.
Following a hearing on December 8, 2011, the parties arrived at a further consent order (the “Second Consent Order”) issued on January 12, 2012 that “approve® a modification of the [First] Consent Order,” allowing Thai to remain open until 2:00 a.m. on Thursday through Saturday nights and “to offer additional entertainment ... to include instrumental and acoustical music; Karaoke; [and] DJ music and dancing.” Id. ¶ 12; Second Consent Order, Compl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-4. As a condition of the grant of a liquor license, the Second Consent Order provided, intpr alia, that “the licensees shall not allow an outside promoter to maintain control of any entertainment and shall not offer any ‘teenager only’ events or ‘go-go’
Notwithstanding the terms of the Second Consent Order, Plaintiffs “contracted with various ‘go-go’ bands to perform at Thai” and Thana “authorized the managers of the bands to market, jointly with her, the events through the use of flyers, posters and internet marketing.” Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs allege that “Thana personally approved each piece of marketing material” and “Plaintiffs were joint participants in the marketing of the events.” Id. However, many of the posters for events at Thai advertised those events as presented by outside promoters. See Event Advertisements 4 (advertisements including the text “through Rock Promotions,” “brought to you by [] On Fire Productions/J & J Productions/Kenya White Productions/Smitty Productions/R.E.D. Productions/Swagg Entertаinment,” and “Swagg Entertainment, Ezzy Does It Promotions & On Fire Productions presents”), 5 (“No Questions Band Ent Presents”), 9 (“Corporate Affairs presents”), Compl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 1-5.
Upon learning of these events, the Board issued a show cause order on June 20, 2013, requiring Plaintiffs to appear, before the Board and show cause as to why the Second Consent Order should not be revoked. Compl. ¶ 14; Show Cause Order, Compl. Ex. 4, ECF No. 1-6. A hearing was held before the Board on December 12, 2013. Compl. ¶ 15. Following the hearing, the Board found that Plaintiffs “allowed numerous outside promoters to maintain control of the entertainment at Thai” and “hosted numerous events, that included ‘go go’ entertainment,” in -violation of the Second Consent Order. Board Decision and Order 3-4, Compl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 1-7. Accordingly, the Board revoked both the First and Second Consent Orders as well as the liquor license it had issued to Plaintiffs. Id. at 4.
Plaintiffs sought'review of the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Charles County. Compl. ¶ 16. On October 15, 2014, in a thorough and thoughtful opinion, the circuit court affirmed the findings of the Board and the revocation of the Second Consent Order,
Plaintiffs filed their .Complaint in this Court on November 5, 2014, before the time to appeal the circuit court’s ruling to the Court of Special Appeals had expired. See Md. Rule 8-202(a). Plaintiffs’ Complaint set forth a single count alleging, that the restriction on go-go entertainment in the Second Consent Order violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to free speech and seeking, in essence, a declaratory judgment finding that the condition— and the revocation of the Second Consent Order based upon its violation — ran afoul of the First Amendment; an injunction preventing the Board from enforcing the restriction or revoking the Second Consent Order or Plaintiffs’ liquor license; and an award of monetary damages. Compl.
At the same time, Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [“TRO”], Preliminary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction, ECF No. 2, asking me to. enjoin the Board from revoking the Second Consent Order on the grounds that the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ right to host go-go entertainment was, itself, an irreparable harm and Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The next day, November 6, 2014, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO in a Letter Order finding, inter alia, that it was, far from clear that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and noting that this Court might lack jurisdiction altogether under the Booker-Feldman doctrine. Letter Order, ECF No. 5. Because Plaintiffs’ m.otion for a preliminary injunction remained pending, I also ordered the parties to schedule a conference call with the Court to determine
Following a telephone conference call on November 21, 2014 and several letters from the parties, I found that there was a serious question regarding this Court’s jurisdiction that would need to be resolved before proceeding to discovery and briefing on the preliminary injunction motion, and I permitted Defendants to file a preliminary motion addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Letter Order, ECF No. 15. Defendants filed their motion, ECF No. 17, and supporting Memorandum, ECF No. 17-1, on January 30, 2015. Plaintiffs have filed their opposition, ECF No. 20, and Defendants have replied, ECF No. 21. Having reviewed the filings, I find a hearing is not required. Loe. R. 105.6.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party may move to dismiss a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), which provides that a party may assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction by motion as' a' defense to a claim for relief. When a defendant moves to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that “a complaint simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based[,] ... the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true and the plaintiff, in effect, is afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under а 12(b)(6) consideration.” Adams v. Bain,
III. DISCUSSION
“[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned that federal courts are bound by a ‘virtually unflagging obligation .... to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’ ” Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gross,
“Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that ‘the pen-dency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction Colo. River,
However, in recent years both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have clarified that the doctrine is quite narrow and applies only to
cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review arid rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow' federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-c.ourt actions.
Exxon,
In the wake of Exxon and its progeny, it .is apparent that Rooker-Feldman remains alive, if narrow, but its contоurs have become difficult to trace as the doctrine has become more closely circumscribed. The principal post-Exxon case in this circuit is Davani v. Virginia Department of Transportation, in which the plaintiff, after being fired from a government job, administratively grieved his termination and, after the termination was upheld, unsuccessfully appealed the ruling to a Virginia state
In several other cases, the Fourth Circuit has shed light on the contours of the doctrine. In Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank, a party who had been subject to a debt collection judgment in state court filed a federal lawsuit against the collecting bank alleging that the bank violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by seeking, in its initial pleading in state court, attorneys’ fees that had not yet been earned.
' And yet, the Fourth Circuit also has made clear that, even in its narrowed form, Rooker-Feldman retains its vitality. In Smalley v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP, after a law firm that had handled several foreclosures was' discovered to have engaged in improper practices and relied upon fraudulent documents, several individuals whose homes had been foreclosed upon brought a federal case raising, inter alia, claims under the FDCPA and challenges to the fees awarded in the foreclosures.
Through careful reading of the Rooker-Feldman case law, it is possible to synthesize some key principles. First, as the. Fourth Circuit expressly has stated, a claim only will fall within the scоpe of the doctrine if it alleges a harm actually worked by a state-court judgment. If the harm existed prior to the state-court action, a federal district court may exercise jurisdiction even if a contrary ruling by a. federal court could create inconsistent state and federal rulings — this danger is avoided by traditional preclusion doctrines. And a case that merely touches on a state-court judgment, such as by attacking the means of enforcing it, as in Switzer, or the underlying statute, as in Adkins, ■ does not fall within the doctrine if it does not seek review of the judgment itself or the state-court’s application of the allegedly invalid statute. Nonetheless, Rooker-Feldman appears to apply even to administrative proceedings "that áre amenable to judicial review, see Rousseau,
As a threshold matter, it readily is apparent that Plaintiffs are “state-court losеrs” subject to an unfavorable ruling jn state court. See In re Thana, No. 08-C-14-000298. The only question truly before me is whether they seek to redress “an injury caused by the state-court decision itself.” Davani,
The substantive relief sought by Plaintiffs falls into three broad categories: First, Plaintiffs seek what, in essence, is an invalidation of the revocation of their liquor license. See Compl. ¶¶ B (seeking declaratory judgment that revocation of Second Consent Order violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Rights), C (seeking injunction against enforcing provisions of Second Consent Order), D (seeking injunction against revocation of Second Consent Order), E (seeking injunction against revocation of liquor license). Given the fact that the circuit court’s opinion and order specifically addressed the substance of the very constitutional challenge that Plaintiffs seek to raise before mе and concluded, citing authority from the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that Plaintiffs had waived the rights they now seek to enforce by voluntarily agreeing to the terms of the Second Consent Order, it is difficult not to conclude that — even under the narrowest application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — this case falls neatly within the bounds of the doctrine insofar as it plainly seeks to attribute error to the core of the Board’s order and the circuit court ruling affirming it (and thereby, to overturn them). See Board Decision & Order 3 (revoking Second Consent Order and liquor license); In re Thana, No. 08-C-14-000298, at 25. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction whether Plaintiffs complaint is construed as a challenge to the decision of the circuit court or of the Board itself. Rousseau v. Howard Cnty., Md.,
Second, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the restriction against “go-
And in fact, a challenge to the terms of the Second Consent Order is an appeal of a decision of an administrative agency in any event, which expressly is foreclosed by Rousseau,
.Finally, Plaintiffs seek $500,000 in unspecified monetary damages, id. ¶ G, which they argue — without citing case law in their favor — allows them to escape Rooker-Feldman because “[cjompensatory damages cannot be awarded in the other case.” Pis.’ Opp’n 8. Though far from clear in their Complaint, Plaintiffs’ Opposition asserts that they do not seek damages arising out of the revocation of their liquor license, but rather for the very imposition of the restriction on “go-go” entertainment in the first place. Id. at 2. No doubt, this is because Rooker-Feldman clearly pre
It also is far from clear that Plaintiffs suffered any harm at all from the entry of the Second Consent Order in 2012. The complaint clearly reflects that Plaintiffs held “go-go” events notwithstanding the restrictions in the Second Consent Order, see Event Advertisements, and Plaintiffs do not allege any way in which they altered their conduct as a result of the Second Consent Order. See Compl. To the contrary, Plaintiffs expressly allege that even after the Second Consent Order, they “exercised their First Amendment right of free speech by promoting and/or offering ‘go-go’ music and/or entertainment in their establishment.” Id. ¶ 1. Although government action that chills speech may effect a cognizable harm, see, e.g., Laird v. Tatum,
But even if the very existence of the Second Consent Order harmed Plaintiffs in ways that they have failed to allege, they cannot bring a federal claim for monetary damages for the same reason that they cannot seek declaratory judgment: Both claims seek to undermine the revocation of Plaintiffs’ liquor license. And though I am aware of at least one instance in which this Court has allowed plaintiffs to proceed with (though not to prevail on) constitutional claims arising out of the alleged improper suspension of a liquor license, see Orgain v. City of Salisbury,
Because I find that this Court lacks jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, I need not consider Defendants’ arguments for abstention.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED, and this case will be DISMISSED.
A separate order will issue.
Notes
. According to the Complaint:
"Go-go” music is a subgenre associated with funk music that originated in Washington, D.C. in the midl960's to late 1970's. It remains primarily popular in the area as a uniquely regional music style. The man considerеd to be the "Godfather of Go-Go," Chuck Brown, was a- resident of Charles County, Maryland, and resided in Waldorf, Maryland until his death in 2012.
Compl. ¶ 9.
. Because the circuit court found that "the Board made no findings as to whether [Plain- . tiffs] violated the terms of [the First] Consent Order," it remanded to the Board for consideration as to whether it was appropriate to revoke Plaintiffs’ liquor license in toto or whether the First Consent Order should remain in effect. In re Thana, No. 08-C-14-000298, at 24 (Md.Cir.Ct.P.G.Cnty. Oct. 15, 2014). The record before me does not reflect whether Thai currently is operating under the terms of the First Consent Order, but for the sake of clarity — and because it is аpparent that Thai contests the revocation of the Second Consent Order notwithstanding whether the First Consent Order remains in effect — I will refer simply to the "revocation" of Plaintiffs’ liquor license even though that revocation was not complete.
. Though couched as a due process challenge, this was not significantly different from Plaintiffs’ current contention that a restriction on “go-go” entertainment is an unconstitutional condition, see Compl. ¶ 19-20, and in any event, a First Amendment challenge to action by a state or municipal аctor technically arises under the Due Process Clause, see Gitlow v. New York,
. There was no question that Plaintiffs entered into the Second Consent Order voluntarily and, in fact, they testified before the circuit court' that "they understood and agreed to each condition of Consent Order # 2.” In re Thana, No. 08-C-14-000298, at 16 n. 4. It is well-settled that "procedural rights under § 1983, like other federal constitutional and statutory rights, are subject to voluntary waiver.” Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford,
. Accordingly, even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply and Plaintiffs’ claims were not governed by traditional preclusion doctrines, as both parties acknowledge they may be, see Defs.’ Mem. 19, the statute of limitations would remain a significant barrier to Plaintiffs' claims arising out of the Board's actions in 2012. See Wormwood v. Batching Sys., Inc.,