Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found Jimmy Thammasack guilty of possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Thammasack contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the methamphetamine found in his vehicle. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment, and the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility of the witnesses are adopted unless they are clearly erroneous. Further, because the trial court is the trier of fact, its findings are analogous to a jury verdict and will not be disturbed if any evidence supports them. However, when evidence is uncontroverted and no question of witness credibility is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Campbell v. State,
Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record shows that on the night of January 23,2012, an officer with the Henry County Police Department was on patrol when he observed Thammasack driving a white Honda Civic in the opposite direction with red headlights engaged. Based on his training, the officer believed that headlights were legally required to emit a white-colored
The officer activated his blue lights and initiated a traffic stop. Upon approaching the stopped vehicle, the officer explained to Thammasack the basis for the traffic stop, asked him to produce his driver’s license, and inquired why the vehicle had a different color than what was reflected in the license tag check. Thammasack produced a Florida driver’s license and told the officer that he had painted the vehicle. The officer checked Thammasack’s license and discovered that it had been suspended. He arrested Thammasack for driving with a suspended license, and during a subsequent inventory search of the vehicle, discovered half a gram of methamphetamine.
After he was indicted for possession of methamphetamine, Thammasack filed a motion to suppress in which his sole contention was that there was no reasonable basis for the officer to have initiated the traffic stop. He argued that OCGA § 40-8-34, the traffic code section governing the color of headlights,
The State conceded that OCGA § 40-8-34 was void for vagueness for purposes of Thammasack’s motion to suppress but argued that the stop nevertheless was proper under the Fourth Amendment because the officer had an honest belief that a traffic violation had been committed in his presence. The State further argued that the
After conducting an evidentiary hearing in which the officer and Thammasack testified, the trial court found that even if OCGA § 40-8-34 was void for vagueness, the officer had an honest belief that a traffic violation had been committed in his presence when he observed Thammasack driving a vehicle with red headlights. The trial court determined that, in light of the testimony at the hearing, the officer’s stop of the vehicle had been reasonable and not arbitrary or harassing. Accordingly, the trial court denied Thammasack’s motion to suppress.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts, and the trial court found Thammasack guilty of possession of methamphetamine. This appeal followed in which Thammasack’s sole enumeration of error is that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress.
We conclude that the trial court committed no error in denying Thammasack’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine. “It is well settled law that before stopping a car, an officer must have specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Christy v. State,
The State can meet its burden of proving the lawfulness of the traffic stop even if the statute upon which the stop was based is later declared unconstitutional. As our Supreme Court has explained, the fact that the statute creating the traffic offense is subsequently declared unconstitutional “does not, of itself, require suppression of the evidence seized during the traffic stop.” Ciak v. State,
[pjolice are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality — with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to*718 determine which laws are and which laws are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.
Ciak,
Furthermore, we have repeatedly held that
[ajlthough an officer’s honest belief that a traffic violation has actually been committed in his presence may ultimately prove to be incorrect, such a mistaken-but-honest belief may nevertheless demonstrate the existence of at least an articulable suspicion and reasonable grounds for the stop.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Webb,
Applying these principles to the case-at-hand, we conclude that the trial court was authorized to find that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion for stopping Thammasack’s vehicle. Even if OCGA § 40-8-34 were deemed void for vagueness and thus unconstitutional,
In any event, the record also reflects that, separate and apart from the issue of the red headlights, the officer stopped Thammasack’s vehicle after discovering a discrepancy in the color of the vehicle when he ran a check on the license tag plate number. In Andrews v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA § 40-8-34 provides: “The color in all lighting equipment covered in this title shall be in accordance with Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Standard J578, April, 1965, as thereafter revised or amended.”
The Supreme Court of Georgia has exclusive jurisdiction over “all cases in which the constitutionality of a law... has been drawn in question.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VT, Par. II (1). See Lewis v. State,