THAI PLASTIC BAGS INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee, Hilex Poly Co., LLC, and Superbag Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
Consol. Court No. 11-00086
United States Court of International Trade
June 18, 2012
Slip Op. 12-86
POGUE, Chief Judge
1267
This Court next notes that Max Fortune‘s counsel had access to all of the substantive proprietary documents pertaining to Max Fortune and also that “Max Fortune was provided with sufficient public information to have notice of, and to respond to, the allegations made against it.” Def.‘s Opp. at 32. Commerce determined that the public summaries were sufficient to provide a meaningful opportunity for Max Fortune to respond. Id. Max Fortune contends that it has the right to examine the Chinese Informant‘s documents and to determine their authenticity, but that is actually the role of Commerce in an antidumping administrative proceeding. Throughout the administrative review, Max Fortune had abundant notice of the Petitioner‘s allegations that Max Fortune did not report all of the factors of production. Def.‘s Opp. at 32. Max Fortune‘s awareness of the Petitioner‘s allegations is evidenced by its own submissions denying these allegations. Max Fortune Response to Seaman‘s Sept. 15, 2009 Submission, dated Oct. 19, 2009 (C.R. 22). Accordingly, Max Fortune‘s contention that it did not receive a fair proceeding is not supported by evidence on the record. Upon a thorough review of the record, this Court finds that Max Fortune was afforded a complete and fair proceeding.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that Commerce‘s decision to treat certain information as proprietary is supported by substantial evidence on the record and otherwise in accordance with law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record pursuant to
Irene H. Chen, Cen Law Group LLC, of Rockville, MD, and Mark B. Lehnardt, Lehnardt & Lehnardt LLC, of Liberty, MO, for Plaintiff.
Joseph W. Dorn, Stephen A. Jones, and Daniel L. Schneiderman, King & Spalding, of Washington, DC, for Consolidated Plaintiffs.
Vincent D. Phillips, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for Defendant. With him on brief were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Scott D. McBride, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.
POGUE, Chief Judge:
In this action, Plaintiff Thai Plastic Bags Industries Co., Ltd. (“TPBI“), a producer of polyethylene retail carrier bags (“PRCBs“) from Thailand, the subject merchandise, and Plaintiffs Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee, Hilex Poly Co., LLC, and Superbag Corporation (collectively “PRCBC“), producers of a domestic like product, each challenge determinations made by the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or “the Department“) in the fifth administrative review of the antidumping (“AD“) order on PRCBs.2
Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge: 1) Commerce‘s adjustments to TPBI‘s reported cost allocation methodology; 2) Commerce‘s use of zeroing; 3) Commerce‘s cost adjustment, under the transactions disregarded rule, for linear low density resin (“LLD“) obtained by TPBI; and 4) Commerce‘s determination that TPBI‘s 2009 inventory valuation losses were attributable to finished goods inventory and were therefore excluded from the calculation of TPBI‘s general and administrative expenses for producing its goods.
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to
For the reasons discussed below, issues two and three are remanded to Commerce for reconsideration and further explanation; Commerce‘s determinations on issues one and four are affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under its familiar standard of review, the court will sustain Commerce‘s determinations if they are “supported by substantial evidence on the record,” and “otherwise . . . in accordance with law.” See
DISCUSSION
I. TPBI Issue 1: Reallocation of TPBI‘s Reported Costs
Commerce, during an administrative review, determines whether subject merchandise has been sold at less than fair value, or “dumped,” in the United States. To do so, the Department endeavors to make a fair comparison between the export price or constructed export price of a
This determination requires that Commerce compare products sold in the United States to matching “like” products sold in the home market. See
To the extent that not all products have an identical match, Commerce, in accordance with the statute, may calculate a constructed value (“CV“) of the merchandise. Commerce uses the same method to calculate “costs” for both COP and CV. Compare
In addition, in calculating the normal value, Commerce may make reasonable allowances for differences in physical characteristics of the merchandise (its “DIFMER” adjustment).6
As Commerce must calculate the COP and CV with as much accuracy as possible, if the company‘s reported cost allocation methodology shifts costs away from the subject merchandise or the foreign like product, Commerce has the authority to adjust costs to ensure that they are not artificially reduced. Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co. v. United States, 34 CIT __, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1324 (2010) (“Thai Plastic
Specifically, in the fifth administrative review of this order, just as in the fourth administrative review, Commerce concluded that TPBI‘s reported cost allocation “resulted in product-specific cost differences which were unrelated to differences in physical characteristics.” Thai Plastic Bags I, 34 CIT __, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1329; Resp. Br. of PRCBC in Opp‘n to TPBI‘s Mot. for J. on Agency R. at 7, ECF No. 74 (“PRCBC‘s Resp. Br.“). These differences were the result of TPBI‘s adjustment of its reported “conversion costs.” TPBI alleges that these adjustments were to reflect the additional time needed to process different products. Pl.‘s Rule 56.2 Mem. of Law in Supp. Of Mot. for J. on Agency R., ECF No. 50-1, at 15 (“TPBI‘s Br.“). But Commerce determined that TPBI‘s submitted evidence showed that TPBI‘s reported cost allocation methodology did not reasonably reflect the actual costs for producing the merchandise, Def.‘s Resp. in Opp. to Pls.’ Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. upon the Agency R., ECF No. 67, at 14 (“Def.‘s Br.“), and that TPBI‘s reporting methodology unreasonably distorted the cost of manufacture (“COM“).8 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags From Thailand, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,953, 53,955 (Dep‘t Commerce Sept. 2, 2010) (preliminary results of antidumping duty administrative review) (“Prelim. Results“).
In particular, Commerce found that TPBI‘s reporting methodology was inconsistent with its normal cost-accounting practice and the reported cost differences were unrelated to physical differences. Id. Commerce found that TPBI did not actually use its reported cost allocation methodologies in its normal books and records, but rather created a methodology outside of its normal business practices to report labor and overhead costs to Commerce. Def.‘s Br. at 14-15; I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 10. Accordingly, Commerce reallocated TPBI‘s reported conversion costs.9
TPBI argued that its cost allocation method reflected cost differences attributable to physical characteristics; but Commerce found that TPBI‘s method resulted in “great variability” in costs for similar items having nothing to do with physical characteristics. Def.‘s Br. at 15; Prelim. Results 75 Fed. Reg. at 53,955. Specifically, Commerce looked at nine pairs of CONNUMs10 that were very similar physically and found that under TPBI‘s allocations, these items had very different costs. I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 8.
Even though TPBI explained that many variables other than physical characteris
TPBI now challenges Commerce‘s decision to replace TPBI‘s reported costs with Commerce‘s average cost calculation. TPBI‘s Br. at 13. TPBI states that Commerce should have accepted TPBI‘s reported costs as in accordance with GAAP principles, that Commerce incorrectly relied on the DIFMER standard in reallocating TPBI‘s costs and that Commerce should have used TPBI‘s cost information in its calculations. See id. at 14. However, as explained below, Commerce reasonably decided A) not to use TPBI‘s cost methodology; B) to utilize the DIFMER standard; and C) to reject TPBI‘s alternate cost methodologies.
A. Costs
TPBI first argues that Commerce‘s decision to replace TPBI‘s reported costs with averaged costs is not supported by substantial evidence. TPBI‘s Br. at 13. But in its normal accounting system, TPBI calculates a single monthly per-kilogram average conversion cost for all products based on the costs and quantities from the previous three months. See TPBI‘s Section D Resp., A-549-821, ARP 08-09 (Dec. 16, 2009), Admin. R. Con. Doc. 7 [Pub. Doc. 40] at D-14. Contrary to this normal practice, in reporting its costs for this administrative review, TPBI used a different reporting methodology. See id. at D-15. TPBI allocated conversion costs to individual models based on production hours. Id. at D-26 to D-28. Commerce rejected TPBI‘s allocation as distortive because it shifted costs away from the subject merchandise. Def.‘s Br. at 16. See I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 9.
Disputing Commerce‘s conclusion, TPBI maintains that its cost allocation is a reasonable reflection of production and sale costs of the subject merchandise. TPBI‘s Br. at 15. TPBI claims that although its costs were based on actual costs, that other variables besides physical characteristics affected the costs. Def.‘s Br. Ex. G at S5D-20 to S5D-22; Def.‘s Br. at 15; TPBI‘s Br. at 7; TPBI Case Br., A-549-821, ARP 08-09 (Dec. 10, 2010), Admin. R. Con. Doc. 42 [Pub. Doc. 128] at 13. TPBI states that Commerce should have reviewed those cost driving factors (such as material inputs, order sizes, complexity of bags) instead of relying on a sampling of nine CONNUM pairs to conclude that there are factors other than physical characteristics that drove cost differences. See TPBI‘s Br. at 18.
But it was not unreasonable for Commerce to conclude that TPBI‘s methodology produces “great variability” in the costs of similar items having nothing to do with the physical aspects of the specific product. Def.‘s Br. at 15; Prelim. Results, 75 Fed. Reg. at 53,955. Specifically, in considering the nine pairs of CONNUMs that were very similar physically, Commerce found that under TPBI‘s reported cost allocations these items had very different costs. I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 8; Def.‘s Br. at 15.
Commerce correctly notes that most of the CONNUM pairs were made at the same facility and that the evidence illustrated that slight physical differences could not account for actual cost differ
As TPBI‘s reporting methodology deviated from its normal accounting practice, Commerce adjusted the reported costs to ensure that they were not artificially reduced and distortive of true costs. I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 9; Def.‘s Br. at 16. See also SAA at 835; Thai Pineapple Pub. Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff‘s reported per-unit costs shifted costs away from the subject merchandise, and thus Commerce reasonably recalculated Plaintiff‘s costs by averaging them in order to prevent large discrepancies in costs between merchandise that was physically similar. Def.‘s Br. at 17; I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 12.
B. DIFMER
In calculating normal value, Commerce utilizes a DIFMER standard—i.e., a “difference in physical characteristics” or “difference-in-merchandise” adjustment—in its review of what constitutes a reasonable allowance for differences in the physical characteristics of products sold in the U.S. and in foreign markets. See
In the Final Results Commerce stated that it considered physical differences in its cost analysis because these differences ultimately affect price. Def.‘s Br. at 20. Commerce argues that it analyzes subject merchandise costs by using physical characteristics because this is a dependable way to compare the different products, and that cost comparisons utilizing physical characteristics are “key” to Commerce‘s analysis. Def.‘s Br. at 18; Prelim. Cost Mem. For TPBI, A-549-821, ARP 08-09 (Aug. 26, 2010), Admin. R. Con. Doc. 36 [Pub. Doc. 105] at 2 (“Prelim. Cost Mem.“); Def.‘s Br. Ex. I at 2.
TPBI challenges Commerce‘s reliance on its physical differences, or DIFMER, analysis. TPBI‘s Br. at 23-24. TPBI argues that the DIFMER standard is not appropriate here, as it was intended for use in the context of price adjustments to normal value when there are variable cost differences between non-identical foreign like products and the subject merchandise. TPBI‘s Br. at 24.
TPBI argues that Commerce misapplied the DIFMER standard both in improperly weight-averaging conversion cost differences across all products and by calculating the DIFMER adjustment to normal value based solely on cost differences in materials (because the DIFMER standard is not to be used for cost differences unrelated to physical differences). TPBI‘s Br. at 26-27.
However TPBI did not offer any meaningful evidence to explain why physical differences in the CONNUM pairs resulted in such large differences in conversion costs. As cost allocation based on physical characteristics is a primary factor in Commerce‘s analysis, Commerce may adjust a company‘s allocation method to more reasonably reflect costs. I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 10; Def.‘s Br. at 19; See also
PRCBC adds that it would be distortive to use different costs for the COP, CV and DIFMER contexts; PRCBC‘s Resp. Br. at
To the contrary, as Thai Plastic Bags I explained:
In its determination, Commerce decided to revise TPBG‘s cost allocations (regarding direct labor, variable overhead and fixed overhead costs) to eliminate a “distortion” based on factors not attributable to physical characteristics. 74 Fed. Reg. 39, 931. . . . Commerce reallocated TPBG‘s costs for the sales-below-cost test, the constructed-value calculations and the difference-in-merchandise adjustment. Id. The governments’ [sic] legal determination to apply its adjustment for all three purposes was reasonable because the calculation of costs “reasonably reflect[ed]” the associated costs of production and sales. See
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) . As the SAA explains, Commerce must use a methodology that reasonably captures all of the costs incurred in manufacturing and selling the product at issue. SAA at 835. Further, “if Commerce determines that costs, including financing costs, have been shifted away from the production of the subject merchandise, or the foreign like product, it will adjust costs appropriately, to ensure they are not artificially reduced“. Id. See NTN Bearing Corp. of America v. U.S., 368 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Commerce noted that it ‘does not rely on a respondent‘s reported costs solely for the calculation of COP and CV,’ Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 2574, and concluded that it would be distortive to adjust those costs only for those calculations, but not for others in which they were used. Id. (‘[I]f we determine a component of a respondent‘s COP and CV is distortive for one aspect of our analysis, it is reasonable to make the same determination with respect to those other aspects of our margin calculations where we relied on the identical cost data.‘). We concur with Commerce‘s analysis and hold that it did not err in interpreting these provisions to permit it to employ affiliated supplier cost data to calculate cost deviations to limit the definition of similar merchandise, the difmer adjustment, and inventory carrying costs.“).
Thai Plastic Bags I, 34 CIT __, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1328 n. 28.
TPBI also asserts that Commerce‘s determination was arbitrary because Commerce failed to cite a benchmark and did not address all of the factors that might influence cost differences between similar products. TPBI‘s Br. at 18-20. In addition, TPBI contends that Commerce‘s regulations did not require that cost differences unrelated to physical characteristics must be reallocated or that the DIFMER standard be applied. Id. at 27-28.
However, Commerce correctly notes that it may, but is not under an obligation to cite benchmarks or address all potential cost factors, and Plaintiff did not provide the record evidence necessary to do so. Def.‘s Br. at 20-21; See
Commerce also counters TPBI‘s argument that Commerce‘s costs reallocation was inappropriate because there was no evidence of under-reporting. See TPBI‘s Br. at 22. Commerce notes that it is not required to wait for under-reporting before determining that those costs did not reasonably reflect actual costs. Def.‘s Br. at 24. Commerce found a distortion in that the reported conversion costs were understated for some models and overstated for others; resulting in the need to adjust the costs. I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 13; Def.‘s Br. at 25.
Thus, Commerce‘s cost analysis in this fifth administrative review is consistent with Commerce‘s determination in the fourth review, in which Commerce reasonably adjusted reported costs to reasonably reflect actual costs. Thai Plastic Bags I, 34 CIT at __, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1328 n. 28; Def.‘s Br. at 26.
C. Alternate Cost Methodology
In responding to Commerce‘s request for cost data, TPBI submitted two alternate sets of costs for its margin calculation, both of which Commerce rejected, finding that they distorted TPBI‘s actual conversion costs. TPBI Pl.‘s Br. at 15-16; Def.‘s Br. at 29. While Commerce may consider alternative methods, Commerce should only choose such a method if it minimizes distortions. Def.‘s Br. at 29-30; See also U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 24 CIT 757, 2000 WL 1180250 (2000);
TPBI argues that Commerce should have used one of TPBI‘s two proposed cost allocation methodologies, as they were both reasonable alternatives. TPBI‘s Br. at 15-16. TPBI also claims—without proof—that by using weight-averaging for all of its labor and fixed and variable overhead costs, Commerce added more distortions, not fewer. TPBI‘s Br. at 31.
TPBI further argues that Commerce should have accorded it a chance to correct any deficiency in its cost allocations and that Commerce should not have applied “facts otherwise available.” TPBI‘s Br. at 32-33. See also
Commerce‘s conclusion, however—“that it was more important to use a cost allocation methodology that diminished the possibility of extreme undervaluation or overvaluation, even if that meant that a DIFMER adjustment could not be made[,]” Def.‘s Br. at 31; I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 12—was not unreasonable. Commerce correctly states that after finding TPBI‘s methodologies to be distortive, Commerce was under no obligation to utilize them. Def.‘s Br. at 29; I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 13-14. In addition, Commerce reasonably found that there was an undue difficulty as well as a distortion in Plaintiff‘s cost allocations. I & D Mem. at 14.
Moreover, despite TPBI‘s contention that it was not notified, TPBI‘s Br. at 33, Commerce did notify Plaintiff when it rejected its method in the fourth review and issued supplemental questionnaires. Def.‘s Br. at 6-7, 32; Id. Ex. E at S1D-2.
Based on the record here, Commerce reasonably found Plaintiff‘s methodologies to be distortive. Commerce‘s determination on this issue is therefore affirmed.
II. TPBI Issue 2: Zeroing
Where imported goods are being sold in the United States at less than fair value and to the detriment of domestic industry, the statute directs Commerce to impose an antidumping duty on those imported goods “equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price) for the merchandise.”
Here Commerce applied its “zeroing” methodology in arriving at Plaintiff‘s weighted-average dumping margins.15 In
Before the court, TPBI contends, based on current law, that “Commerce failed to explain why its inconsistent statutory interpretation [i.e., differing in administrative reviews from the interpretation applied in investigations] with regard to zeroing is reasonable., TPBI Pl.‘s Br. at 36, and that the court should remand because Commerce must either explain its inconsistent interpretation of
Commerce argues that denying offsets and applying zeroing serves the policy rationale of combating masked dumping. I & D Mem. Cmt. 4 at 22. In addition, Commerce contends that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because Plaintiff did not rely in its briefing on Commerce‘s differing interpretations of
Despite arguing that Plaintiff has not exhausted its administrative remedies here, that the Federal Circuit has already rejected TPBI‘s argument regarding WTO related activities, and that exhausting remedies would not have been futile, in the alternative, Commerce requests a remand. Def.‘s Br. at 34, 37.16 The court will grant this request.17 Here, the briefing in the administrative review occurred before the parties had sufficient time to consider the Federal Circuit‘s decision in Dongbu. Commerce will now have the opportunity to fully explain its reasoning regarding the zeroing issue.18 See also Union Steel v. United States, 35 CIT __, 804 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1367-68 (2011) (“The court concludes, upon reconsidering its decision in Union [Steel v. United States] II, [753 F.Supp.2d 1317 (C.I.T.2011) ] that it is appropriate to set aside its affirmance of the use of zeroing and to direct Commerce to provide the explanation contemplated by the Court of Appeals in Dongbu and JTEKT Corp.“).
III. PRCBC Issue 3: Transactions-Disregarded Rule
During the POR, TPBI purchased three types of resin19 from suppliers (both affili
More specifically, in adjusting the COM, Commerce compared the transfer price of LLD resin with the arm‘s-length transaction price of LLD resin. See Prelim. Cost Mem. at 4. Commerce thus compared purchases separately for a specific resin type. Id.; Br. of PRCBC in Support of Mot. for J. on Agency R. at 11-12, ECF No. 49 (“PRCBC‘s Br.“).
However, in the Final Results, Commerce changed its methodology and used the transactions-disregarded rule,21 comparing average transfer and market prices across all types of resin; even though the parties did not argue for revising the level of specificity at which to apply the transactions disregarded rule. PRCBC‘s Br. at 11-12; I & D Mem. at 19.22
TPBI, as a respondent, argued that Commerce should not have applied the major input rule because the affiliated supplier was not a resin manufacturer. See TPBI‘s Case Br. at 50-51, 59.
PRCBC argues that the court should remand this issue, stating that Commerce changed its analysis for the Final Results without providing an avenue for comments by the interested parties or a chance for Commerce to consider those comments. PRCBC‘s Br. at 11-15. Commerce now agrees. Def.‘s Br. at 41.
As an agency may request a remand to reconsider its position, SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the court will remand this issue so that Commerce can give the parties the proper opportunity to comment.23
IV. PRCBC Issue 4: Inventory-Valuation Losses
Under the statute, the calculation of COP includes an amount for general and administrative (“G & A“) expenses.24 Commerce‘s practice is to include inventory valuation losses in G & A expenses except for those losses relating to finished good‘s inventories. Def.‘s Br. at 38; Stainless Steel Wire Rod from the Republic of Korea, 69 Fed. Reg. 19,153, 19,161 (Dep‘t Commerce Apr. 12, 2004) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review) and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum, A-580-829, ARP 01-02 (Apr. 5, 2004) Cmt. 7; PRCBC‘s Br. at 15.
Here, Commerce did not include inventory-valuation losses in TPBI‘s G & A expenses. See Pet‘rs’ Case Br., A-549-821, ARP 08-09 (Dec. 10, 2010), Admin. R. Con. Doc. 41 [Pub. Doc. 126] at 4. PRCBC contends that Commerce‘s finding that TPBI‘s inventory valuation losses were attributable to finished goods inventory, and thus excluded from G & A expenses, was unreasonable. PRCBC‘s Br. at 16. PRCBC argues that instead these losses should have been part of the cost of production. PRCBC‘s Br. at 18.
However, because Commerce may exercise its authority to draw reasonable inferences from the record, Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. Int‘l Union of Electronic Elec., Technical, Salaried and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO, 6 F.3d 1511, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Grobest, 36 CIT at __, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (2012), Commerce‘s determination that Plaintiff‘s inventory-valuation losses should be excluded from the cost calculations was supported by the record.
In its determination, Commerce concluded that TPBI‘s 2009 inventory losses should be excluded because the evidence suggested that these reported losses were related to finished goods. Def.‘s Br. at 38; I & D Mem. Cmt. 6 at 26. PRCBC claims that Commerce relied upon evidence that cannot support its determination. PRCBC‘s Br. at 16-17.25 Specifically, PRCBC argues that, as no amount for inventory valuation losses was explicitly listed in the statement of administrative expenses, Commerce‘s determination was not reasonable. PRCBC‘s Br. at 18-19.
However, in the Final Results, Commerce reasonably articulated its basis for excluding TPBI‘s inventory-valuation loss
Commerce cites to record evidence to bolster its claim that TPBI‘s reported inventory valuation losses were related to finished goods. In particular, in its responses to Commerce, TPBI stated that during the POR it had raw materials, work-in-progress and finished goods in inventory and that raw materials and work-in-progress were valued at actual cost, whereas finished goods were valued at actual cost or net realizable value at year‘s end, depending on which was lower. Def.‘s Br. Ex. B at D-11; Def.‘s Br. Ex. F at S4D-2 to S4D-3; Def.‘s Br. at 39-40.
TPBI provided documentation showing that an inventory valuation loss from 200827 was attributable to finished goods. Supp. Resp. 1 at Ex. S1D-10; PRCBC‘s Br. at 16. This same loss appears in the comparative schedule in the 2009 financial statements. TPBI‘s Supp. Section D Resp., A-549-821, ARP 08-09 (July 26, 2010), Admin. R. Con. Doc. 27 [Pub. Doc. 90] Ex. S4D2-1, at 17 (“Supp. Resp. 2“); PRCBC‘s Br. at 16. PRCBC argues that this is not evidence that TPBI‘s 2009 inventory valuation losses28 are also related to finished goods, as they may also be attributable to raw materials and works-in-progress. PRCBC‘s Br. at 16-17; Supp. Resp. 2 Ex. S4D2-1 at 11 n. 3.
PRCBC also states that even though the 2008 to 2009 change in inventory valuation losses was identified,29 and that this same amount appears in the cost reconciliation,30 that this does not provide enough information to conclude whether the loss is attributable to finished goods, WIP or RM. PRCBC‘s Br. at 17; Supp. Resp. 2 Ex. S4D2-1 at 17; TPBI‘s Supp. Section D Resp., A-549-821, ARP 08-09 (Aug. 18, 2010), Admin. R. Con. Doc. 32 [Pub. Doc. 99] Ex. S5D1 worksheet D at 2. PRCBC claims that it is Commerce‘s obligation to deny the adjustment instead of assuming that the 2009 losses should be excluded from normal value. PRCBC‘s Br. at 18;
Commerce counters that in analyzing the inventory valuation loss for 2009, it looked to the statement of administrative expenses, which showed TPBI‘s report of a loss from a cost higher than net realizable value for finished goods as a 2008 administrative expense, but that no amount for 2009 was reported. Def.‘s Br. at 40; Def.‘s Br. Ex. F; I & D Mem. at 26.
In addition, in responding to a questionnaire on the issue, TPBI explained that
As Commerce may make reasonable inferences based on the record, “[t]he specific determination [the court] make[s] is ‘whether the evidence and reasonable inferences from the record support the [Commerce‘s] finding.‘. The question is whether the record adequately supports the decision of the [Department), not whether some other inference could reasonably have been drawn.” Daewoo Elecs., 6 F.3d at 1520 (citation omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
Even if PRCBC posits evidence that may detract from Commerce‘s determination, PRCBC‘s Br. at 18, just because there are alternative inferences that could be drawn does not mean that Commerce was unreasonable. Goldlink Indus. Co. v. United States, 30 CIT 616, 619, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (2006) (“The Court‘s role in the case at bar is not to evaluate whether the information Commerce used was the best available, but rather whether a reasonable mind could conclude that Commerce chose the best available information.“)
Based on the foregoing record evidence, including TPBI‘s past treatment of such losses and its responses to Commerce, it is reasonable for Commerce, to infer that the 2009 inventory-valuation losses related to finished goods. Commerce‘s decision to exclude inventory-valuation losses is therefore supported by substantial evidence and will be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court grants Plaintiffs’ motions regarding issues two and three. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects.
Commerce shall have until August 17, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Both Plaintiffs shall have until August 31, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until September 14, 2012 to file any reply. Plaintiffs, also by September 14, 2012, may each reply to the other‘s comments.
It is SO ORDERED.
OTR WHEEL ENGINEERING, INC., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, Bridgestone Americas, Inc., and Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, Intervenor Defendants.
Slip Op. 12-89. Court No. 11-00166.
United States Court of International Trade. June 27, 2012.