59 W. Va. 253 | W. Va. | 1906
The Thacker Coal and Coke Company filed a declaration in trespass on the. case in the circuit court of Mingo county against Charles Burke and five others for damage for enticing servants from the plaintiff’s service, which declaration upon demurrer was dismissed, and the company sued out a writ of error.
Certain legal principles control the case. In Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, we find it stated, .on authority there given, that “If one wantonly and maliciously, whether for his own benefit or not, induces a person to violate his contract with a third person to the injury of that third person, it is actionable.”
We find that holding confirmed in Angle v. Chicago Railway, 161 U. S. 1, in the language following: . “If one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties, and induces one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other, the party injured can sustain an action against the wrongdoer. When a man does an act which in law and fact is a wrongful act, and injury to another results from it as a natural and probable consequence, an action on the case will lie.” If additional authority were needed for such a proposition of common sense and justice see the case decided by the highest English tribunal in 1901, Quinn v. Leathem,
The first count of the declaration alleges that the company is owner and operator of a coal mine, and was engaged on the 8th day of August, 1901, in the business of mining coal from the mine; that in order to carry on the business it was necessary for the plaintiff to employ, and it did employ, a large number of men to work in the mine, who were engaged in the company’s service 'in working the mine and loading coal on railroad cars for shipment to parties with whom the plaintiff had contracts to furnish coal; that the defendants well knowing these facts, but contriving and kvi'qkedly and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff in its business, unlawfully, wrongfully, maliciously, without justifiable cause,
The first count does not, in words, state an .express contract for service between employer and employee. By the language used in the books a contract must exist. This count says the miners were “employed” by the plaintiff and in actual service. Now, if the law gives action for enticement of a servant, it is not conceivable that a third person can maliciously entice away a lot of employes, simply because there was no contract fixing term of service. The relation of master and servant exists. In such case there is a contract recognized by law, m implied contract by which the employee can recover for his service. By entering such service the employee agrees, contracts to work. It is no difference that he can quit when he pleases. In Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, was such a count and the court held it good. Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, meets this objection. It says: “To make out the relation of master and servant, it is not necessary that there be any written, or even verbal, contract between the parties to work for any particular length of time, but' the relation exists where one person is willing to work for another from day to day, and that other desires the labor and makes his business arrangements accordingly. Employers, where third parties interfere with their employes against the latter’s consent, and endeavor by unlawful means to induce them to quit work, have a right to sue for relief.” In Chipley v. Atkinson, 28 Fla. 206, 11 Am. St. R. 367, it was
The second count alleges that the plaintiff to secure miners from other states made special written contracts with certain miners, to-wit: “William Linder and eight others, residents of North Carolina, whereby these miners agree to come to plaintiff and enter into service and engage in digging and shipping coal from its mine at a certain fixed rate per ton,” specifying the rate, and that the company paid their fares of $11.50 each from North Carolina to the mine under contract with the miners that the fares were to be repaid the plaintiff out of the wages earned by the miners in mining for the plaintiff; that on the arrival near the mine the defendants, knowing of such contract, wrongfully, maliciously and with unlawful purpose to injure the business of the plaintiff and against the consent of the plaintiff, induced and enticed said miners to break their several contracts of service and refuse to enter the service of the plaintiff according to the written contract, and persuaded and induced and enticed them to depart, and that by reason of said persuasion and enticement said miners, engaged under said written contract, wholly failed and refused to perform their contracts and enter the service of the plaintiff, and immediately departed from the place where they were employed to work without having entered the service of the plaintiff and without having paid the plaintiff the money advanced for said railroad fare, and that none of the miners have returned to work in the said mine. Under the principles stated above this count shows a good cause of action.
A third count alleges that the plaintiff being such operator of a coal mine made a written contract with SamuelBowean where
A fourth count says that the plaintiff, being owner and operator of such coal mine, made special written contracts with Alvin Hunter and other persons named, whereby each one of them obligated himself to mine for the plaintiff a certain fixed amount of coal at a specified rate per ton; that said Hunter and others had actually started upon the performance of their contracts, that the defendants well knowing thereof, contriving and falsely and maliciously intending to injure, vex, harass, oppress, impoverish and wholly ruin the plaintiff in its business, unlawfully and maliciously did agree, confederate, combine and form themselves into a conspiracy to persuade, entice and procure Hunter and others named to violate, break and wholly disregard their contracts with the plaintiff; that the defendants having so conspired and confederated under the name of the “United Mine Workers of America,” contriving and intending as aforesaid, in pursuance and execution of their conspiracy, on a day named, unlawfully, wantonly, wrongfully and maliciously, without justifiable cause, and against the will of the plaintiff, molested, obstructed and hindered the plaintiff in its business of mining and shipping coal by wilfully, wantonly, wrongfully and maliciously persuading, enticing and procuring Hunter and the others named to break, violate and disregard their contracts, and that on pretext and because of such persuasion, Hunter and others, against the will, and without the consent of the plaintiff, without cause, violated their contracts by refusing to continue their work of mining coal as required by their contracts, and have not performed their contracts. Under principles above stated this Count shows a good cause of action. Employing Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 50 S. E. 353.
The defendants rely on Code of 1899, p. 1053, section 14,
We, therefore, reverse the judgment, overrule the demurrer, except as to the first count, and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings, with leave to amend the first count of the declaration.
Reversed.