410 S.W.2d 173 | Tenn. | 1966
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In' this case the Commissioner of Employment Security has appealed from a decree of the Chancery Court of Hamilton ■ County, Tennessee, awarding unemployment Compensation benefits. The Board of Review of the Department had denied benefits,, finding the applicant disqualified under T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A, but on cer-tiorari the chancellor reversed.
Following this decision the claimant sought a rehearing and requested permission to introduce medical proof.
Upon certiorari, the chancellor found that the claimant did not voluntarily quit his most recent employment, but “was forced to do so due to physical disability.” The chancellor disagreed with the construction placed by the Board upon T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A. He held that section had no application to permanent disability, but that it referred only to a situation where an employee was temporarily disabled and thereafter recovered and re-offered himself for employment with his former employer. The chancellor held that the disqualification referred to in the statute had no application in case of a permanent disability which rendered it impossible for the employee to continue the work which he was doing, but left him capable of performing other work which he was ready, willing and able to do.
The statute in question, T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A, is as follows:
A. If the commissioner finds that he has left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause connected*394 ■with Ms work, such disqualification, shall be for the duration of the ensuing period of unemployment and until he had secured subsequent employment covered by an unemployment compensation law of this state, or another state, or of the United States, and earned thereby five (5) times his weekly benefit amount. No disqualification shall be made hereunder, however, if such individual presents evidence supported by competent medical proof that he was forced to leave his most recent work because he was sick or disabled and notified his employer of that fact as soon as it was reasonably practical to do so, and returned to that employer and offered himself for work as soon as he was again able to work, and to perform his former duties. Neither shall this disqualification apply to an individual who left his work in good faith to join the armed forces of the United States.
There is no question in the record in the present case but that the applicant felt that he was physically unable at the time to perform the work assigned to him and that accordingly his employment was terminated for that reason. It is not claimed that his disability was in any way attributable to his employment or connected with his Avork. His doctor wrote a letter stating that the claimant had had a curvature of his spine since his high school days, and the doctor found that at the time of his last examination of the claimant on February 15, 1965, claimant had a permanent partial disability of 15% to 20% of the body as a whole secondary to his back pathology.
The claimant, as stated, had worked for his employer, Ayers Motor Company, for about eleven years. The record shows that he Avas employed as a mechanic, and he
It is the insistence of the Commissioner on this appeal that the- chancellor was in error in his construction of T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A. It is the insistence of the Commissioner that the employee voluntarily quit without good cause connected with his work. Further, it is the insistence of the Commissioner that there has been no •compliance by the claimant with the provisions of T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A that the employee, if forced to leave •work, because of illness or disability, must, as soon, as reasonably practical, return to the - employer and offer himself for work as soon as he is again able to work, and ..to perform his former duties.
The construction of T.C.Á. sec. 50-1324, subd. A in connection with cases of permanent partial disability was before this Court very recently, in the case of Cawthron v. Scott, 217 Tenn. 668, 400 S.W.2d 240 (1966). In that case, the claimant had worked for her employer for some eléven months, prior to undergoing an operation. .Prior to-her operation she had worked on the night shift. •Following her operation she was off from work for about eight' weeks. Thereafter she returned to .work and r,e-
At the same time the Court decided the Ccmthron case, it also decided a companion case involving a claimant who had fallen while walking on a street and injured her light wrist. She was off from work some four months following the injury and thereafter she returned to her work and worked for about three months. She quit work finally on February 18, 1964, because the performance of her work caused her to suffer severe pain in her injured wrist. Her work required constant movement of her wrist. Her doctor stated that her injury was such as to necessitate that she quit her usual work, but she could do other work.
In both of these cases, the Department denied benefits under T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A, and the chancellor, on certiorari, sustained the action of the Department. This Court affirmed the action of the chancellor in each case and held that where there was a permanent disability which was not caused by the employment, the termination of the employment by reason of such dis
We are of tbe opinion that tbe present cáse is controlled by tbe decision in the Cawthron case, and its companion case (West v. Scott), decided at tbe sanie time and discussed in tbe same opinion. In tbe Cawthron case tbe Court recognized that in tbe various states the unemployment compensation statutes differ in their provisions and recognized that there is authority to tbe .effect that illness or disability may be deemed to be so impelling as to cause tbe leaving to be involuntary. Tbe Court recognized that the problem is primarily one of statutory construction. Unemployment compensation is not necessarily health insurance. In several states “good cause” for quitting must be attributable to the employer or arise in connection with tbe work before tbe employee is said to be taken out of tbe category of having voluntarily quit. Tbe Tennessee statute contains such a limitation, and tbe individual is disqualified if be leaves voluntarily without good cause connected with bis work under tbe express terms of T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A. In tbe Cawthron case tbe Court held that there must be a showing of a causal connection between tbe disability or illness and tbe work in order for tbe termination to be deemed involuntary.
It is argued on behalf of tbe appellee that tbe Caw-thron case is distinguishable on tbe ground that the claim
In another case, Guffey v. Scott, 217 Tenn. 707, 400 S.W.2d 705 (1966), this Court sustained an interpretation of T.C.A. sec. 50-1324, subd. A consistent with that made by the Department in the present case. There the claimant had been employed for nearly nine years prior to termination of her employment by reason of pregnancy. Her work terminated on March 23, 1964, and she was released to return to work by her doctor on May 1, 1964. She did not, however, make application for re-employment until June 23,1964. At that time there was no opening available for her, and accordingly she filed her claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The claim was denied upon the ground that she had left work voluntarily without good cause connected with her work within the meaning of the statute. The Appeals Referee sustained the action of the Agency in rejecting the claim, the Board of Review affirmed, and upon certiorari the chancellor affirmed. This Court also affirmed on appeal. The chancellor found that the Board of Review was justified in holding that the claimant had voluntarily left her employment without good cause connected-with her work, by reason of her pregnancy. The chancellor further
Of course, the Guffey case did not involve permanent disability, but only a temporary disability. The present case does involve a permanent disability, as did the Cawthron case.
We are of the opinion that the chancellor was in error in reversing the action of the Board of Review. The assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment of the chancellor is reversed. The cause is dismissed at the cost of appellant.