23 F. Cas. 869 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Texas | 1874
Lead Opinion
I will consider the last motion first; The first section of the civil rights act (14 Stat. 27) declares, that citizens of every race and color shall have the same right, in every state, to make contracts, sue, give evidence, inherit, purchase and hold property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments and none other, any law, statute or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. The second section makes criminal and imposes penalties on any attempt to deprive any citizen of these rights, or to different punishments on account of his having at any time been held in a condition of slavery. The third section gives to the district courts of the United States cognizance of all crimes and offenses under the act; and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, cognizance of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the state or locality where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been commenced in any state court against any such person for any cause whatsoever, such defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to the proper district or circuit court, in the manner prescribed by the “Act relating to habeas corpus,” etc., approved March 3, 1863, and its amendments. The act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 755), to which reference is made, authorizes the removal to the courts of the United States of suits and prosecutions commenced in a state court, against officers or others acting under authority of the United States, and, to effect such a removal, authorizes the party sued “to file a petition, stating the facts, and verified by affidavit, for the removal of the cause for trial at the next circuit court of the United States, to be holden in the district where the suit is pending,” etc. Thus, the statement on oath by the party himself is all the verification of the facts which the law required for effecting the removal. The question is, whether local prejudice against a colored person, by reason of his race and color, alleged to be so great that he cannot have a fair trial in the state courts, is good ground, under the civil rights act, for removing a criminal action against him from the state court into the district court of the United States. Is it a cause for removal within the act?
It is clear that in order to entitle to a removal of the cause the case must show the deprivation of a right guarantied by the first section of the act. The defendant says that he is deprived of such a right, and that the right of which he is thus deprived is, “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as enjoyed by white citizens.” But how does he say he is deprived of that right? Not by the laws themselves, but by the prejudice and enmity of the people. Is that sufficient? What says the third section? How does it describe and define those who are within the meaning of the act? It defines them as “persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the state or locality where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act.” Here are two classes: (1) Persons who are denied any of the rights secured to them by the first section of the act. (2) Persons who cannot enforce in the courts any of said rights.
Does the denial of rights or the inability to enforce them in the courts refer to a denial by the laws, usages and customs of the state, and to an inability to enforce rights in the courts in consequence of inadequate remedies to that end; or does it refer as well to other obstructions of right, such as personal or class prejudice, or political feeling and the like? It must be remembered that the privilege of removal is thus guarantied to every citizen of the United States, as well white as black. And if every citizen who is prosecuted in a state court can, on his own allegation, remove his case to the United States courts, it will present a powerful temptation to litigants, especially of the criminal class,
The ease must be remanded to the state court.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). The purpose and object of the civil rights bill was a most laudable one. It was to secure to the newly enfranchised black race the same rights and privileges, civil and political, as were enjoyed by the whites. The first section of that act enumerates those rights. It provides that the colored race shall have the right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey, real and personal property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.”
From a careful consideration of the act in question, my opinion is that no cause, civil or criminal, to which a black man is a party pending in a state court, can be properly removed into a court of the United States unless it affects the exercise and enjoyment of some one of the rights specified in the above section. I cannot think it was the intention of congress, by any provision in said act contained, to discriminate in favor of the black race as against the white, but simply to secure them in the same rights, civil and political, that the white race enjoyed. Both were to be left subject “to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none other,” for violation of the criminal laws of the state. In other words, their rights and responsibilities, civil and criminal, were to be identically the same.
In this ease, the defendant has been indicted under the laws of the state of Texas, for the crime of bigamy and convicted thereof. The case has been transferred to this court by order of the supreme court of the state, simply upon the sworn statement of the defendant that, owing to a hostile public sentiment and prejudice against him, he cannot obtain justice. In my judgment, the civil rights bill does not authorize the transfer. It is not such a case as the act contemplates and is not embraced in its provisions.