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Texas Title Guaranty Co. v. Shepherd
89 P.2d 337
Okla.
1939
Check Treatment
GIBSON, J.

This is an action in foreclosure by the alleged assignee of a note and the real estate mortgage security, and to quiet title to the mortgaged premises.

Plaintiff in error, the Texas Title Guaranty Company, by verified answer pleaded ownership and lawful possession of the premises in itself, denied thе execution of the note and mortgage by the former owners and alleged mortgagors, denied thаt the instruments were assigned by the mortgagee, pleaded the five-year statute of limitations. and deniеd that an alleged payment Indorsed on the note within said statutory period was made.

The defendant mortgagors did not answer, and the cause proceeded to trial to the court, after jury waivеd, upon the issues as presented ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍by the petition and the foregoing answer and the reply theretо. The parties will be referred to herein as they appeared at the trial.

Defendant stoоd upon its demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence when the same was overruled, declined to introduce its own evidence, and moved for judgment, whereupon the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff.

Defendant asserts that the plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof placed upon him to establish the execution of the note and mortgage, the assignment thereof, and the partial x>ayment indorsed uрon the note. It is here contended that 'the denial of these allegations ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍by the verified answer рlaced the aforesaid burden upon plaintiff.

Plaintiff says the verification of the answer was irregulаr and insufficient, under the' provisions of the statute, to place the above allegations in issue. Thе statute, section 220, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. Stat. Ann. sec. 286, provides, among other things, that allegations of the execution of a written instrument and indorsements thereon shall be taken as true unless the denial of the same be vеrified by the affidavit of the party, his agent or attorney. But the plaintiff proceeded to trial of thе issues without objection to the answer, and without challenging the sufficiency of the verification. He thereby waived any defects appearing in the verification, and the answer will stand as if properly verified. In Fort Worth Lead & Zinc Co. v. Robinson, 89 Okla. 221, 215 P. 205, we stated the rule as follows:

“Where the sufficiency of a verification to an answer denying the exeсution of a" note and mortgage is not challenged in the trial *600 court by motion to strike, the defects in said ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍verification will be treated as waived.”

See, also, Ward v. Coleman, 170 Okla. 201, 39 P.2d 113.

The answer was therefore sufficient to place in issuе all the allegations of the petition, and the burden fell upon the plaintiff to establish the same.

Where, as here, the note is payable to the order of the payee (sec. 11348, O. S. 1931, 48 Okla. Stat. Ann. sec. 100), production of the note by a subsequent holder constitutes prima facie evidence of his ownership thereof. Jones v. Wheeler, 23 Okla. 771, 101 P. 1112; Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 140 Okla. 212, 282 P. 279; Miller v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 180 Okla. 555, 71 P.2d 452.

But the mere production of the note in such case bearing thereon an indorsement of partial payment is insufficient to establish payment as a toll of the statute of limitations. ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍As stated in, 37 C. J. 1151, sec. 630, “It is the payment and not the indorsement on the evidence of debt that operates to toll the statute.” See, also, Hastie v. Burrage (Kan.) 77 P. 268. And as further said in the text abоve: “There is no presumption that the date of the indorsement is correct.” The date in such case is no more important than the fact of actual payment. Therefore, the mere indorsement produces no presumption that payment was actually made where such payment is rеlied upon to save the action from the bar of the statute. Though an indorsement of payment has been held to raise a iwesumption of payment in favor of the debtor claiming the credit (8 C. J. 1015, seс. 1321), the rule is otherwise where the indorsement is relied upon to toll the Statute. The correct rule in suсh case as gathered from the decisions in the vast majority of jurisdictions is that where an in-dorsement on a promissory note, made before the bar of the statute of limitations attaches, is relied on to save the cause of action upon the note from the operation of such statutе, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the payment was actually made at the timе alleged, or that it was made by or with the consent of the payor.

In the instant case the plaintiff сlaims’ to have received the note and security from the i>ayee on April 28, 1919. The in-dorsement in questiоn reads as follows: “$100.00 Principal paid — September 28th, 1933, all interest paid to 9-1-1933. S. K. Heilman.” Action was instituted July 3, 1936. No evidence was offered to show that the payment was actually made by anyone ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‍or that such payment, if made, was received within five years before commencing the suit. Payment was denied аnd the issue properly raised under the defense of the statute of limitations, and iffaintiff failed entirely tо establish a prima facie case in this respect.

The court erred in overruling defendant’s demurrer and rendering judgment for plaintiff. The cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the views herein expressed.

It is so ordered.

BAYLESS, O. J., and RILEY, OSBORN, and DAVISON, JJ., concur.

Case Details

Case Name: Texas Title Guaranty Co. v. Shepherd
Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Date Published: Mar 21, 1939
Citation: 89 P.2d 337
Docket Number: No. 28674.
Court Abbreviation: Okla.
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