93 S.W. 489 | Tex. App. | 1906
This suit was brought by W. W. Warner against the Texas Pacific Railway Company and the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company for the recovery of $1,800 as damages for loss and damage, itemized at $1,473.50, sustained en route by a printing press outfit shipped by the plaintiff from Wills Point, Texas, to Springfield, Missouri, over the lines of said defendant. The plaintiff alleged negligence in handling, and especially in transferring and reloading said shipment into a new car, en route, after the goods had been carefully packed for shipment by plaintiff before delivery to the railway companies at Wills Point, Texas.
The Texas Pacific Railway Company answered by general exception and general denial, and by special plea, that its duties in respect to the transportation of said shipment and its liability was, by a written contract, limited to its own line of road, and that it properly handled the shipment and delivered the same in good condition and without injury to the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company at Sherman, Texas, its connecting point with its co-defendant. Said defendant asked for judgment over against the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company.
The St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company answered by general exception, and general denial, and by special plea that it first received the shipment from the Texas Pacific Railway Company at Sherman, at which time the same was in a sealed car, covered by the Texas Pacific Railway Company seals, which were not broken while in its possession, it not being customary to open sealed carload shipments received from connecting carriers. That the car was carefully and properly handled and not damaged on its road by any negligence on its part, but that the injury to said shipment, if any, occurred before its possession or control of the shipment began at Sherman, and that if any damage occurred on its road, the same was on account of improper packing in the car when delivered to it. Said defendant asked for judgment, and in case any recovery was had against it, that it have judgment over against the Texas Pacific Railway Company.
The case came on for trial on the 19th day of April, 1905, and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff against the Texas Pacific Railway Company in the sum of $1,313.60, together with six percent interest from date; that plaintiff take nothing against the defendant, the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company, and that neither of the defendants recover anything on their pleas against each other. The Texas Pacific Railway Company has appealed.
The evidence is sufficient to warrant the following conclusions of fact: On or about the 29th day of August, 1903, plaintiff Warner delivered to appellant at Wills Point, Texas, in good condition for transportation, a printing outfit, consisting of the various articles of property mentioned in his petition. The goods were carefully packed in a Texas Pacific car at Wills Point, Texas. Some of the goods *284 were packed in paper and excelsior boxes, some in barrels and bundles and other parts, not liable to breakage, were shipped without packing. The type cases were placed one above the other with paper carefully placed between, then strongly cleated together and at both ends. The machinery was so distributed about the car and securely blocked or fastened that it could not be made to touch any other piece or overturned, without some violent handling and motion of the car. When the car in which the goods were packed at Wills Point reached Sherman, they were by the appellant, the Texas Pacific Railway Company, transferred to and reloaded in another car, after which said car was sealed and the same, together with the goods, as they were placed therein by appellant, delivered to the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company to be conveyed by the latter company to Springfield, Missouri. When the car in which the goods had been placed by appellant at Sherman, Texas, arrived at Springfield, some of the goods were missing, various articles were found scattered in different parts of the car, the heaviest pieces piled up in the middle section thereof and broken and otherwise injured in such manner that appellee Warner sustained damages by reason thereof in the sum found by the jury. The car was properly handled by the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company en route from Sherman, Texas, to Springfield, Missouri, and none of the damage or injury to the property in question was occasioned by any act of negligence on its part, but was the result of the negligence of appellant, consisting either of the improper or rough handling of the car, in which the goods were shipped from Wills Point, Texas, to Sherman, Texas, or a failure to properly load, pack and make secure said property in the car in which it was reloaded at Sherman, which negligence was the proximate cause of the goods being damaged.
Appellant's first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error are grouped and complain of the admission of certain testimony of the witnesses Warner, Harding and Clements. These witnesses were permitted to testify over the objection of appellant, in substance, that when they first examined the contents of the car at Springfield, upon its arrival there, they discovered that the goods had not been properly and securely packed; that from the general appearance of the goods on the delivery at Springfield it was their judgment that the damaged condition of the shipment was due to careless and improper packing of the goods in said car; that from the evident condition of the packing of said car it must necessarily have resulted in injury to the goods and machinery in the usual and customary carriage of a freight car; and that the injury was caused by the goods being insecurely packed in that car. The gist of appellant's objection to this testimony, in the court below, was that the same was merely an opinion of the witnesses, not based upon actual knowledge of the facts necessary to be known in order to make such an opinion of any value and constitute a sufficient basis for its introduction, and hence such testimony was inadmissible.
No specific objection was urged to the introduction of the evidence, either on the ground that the witnesses were not qualified to testify as experts, or that the matter to which it related was not the subject of expert testimony. The objection made, that it was an opinion, and the matter one upon which the opinion of the witnesses was inadmissible, *285
raised merely a question as to the character of the evidence, and did not raise a question as to the qualification and competency of said witnesses. (Little Rock Ry. Co. v. Shoecraft, 20 S.W. Rep., 272.) Appellant, however, seeks, as we understand it, to raise these questions for the first time in this court. This, we think, it can not do. No objection having been made in the trial court, to the effect that neither of the witnesses, whose testimony is claimed to have been improperly admitted, had qualified as an expert to express an opinion, and that the fact sought to be established thereby was of such a character as did not admit of proof by expert or opinion evidence, such objections can not, properly, be made in this court or considered by it. Especially is this true since, whether expert or opinion evidence is admissible upon any subject undergoing investigation by the court, is a question which rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. But if it should be conceded that appellant's bill of exceptions and assignments of error are sufficient to raise and present the questions as to whether the witnesses Warner, Harding and Clements, or either of them, qualified as experts, still the evidence upon which the trial court acted in admitting the opinion of said witnesses as to whether the goods shipped were properly loaded and the cause of the damage thereto, is not saved and placed before this court, either in said bill of exceptions or otherwise. Without such evidence this court can not intelligently review the action of the lower court and will not assume to do so. Whether the witness has qualified himself to testify as an expert upon any subject of inquiry, is a question for the determination of the trial court and its action will not be reviewed by an Appellate Court unless a gross abuse of its discretion is made to appear. Such an abuse of discretion can not be made to appear on appeal unless, practically all the evidence upon which the trial court's action was based, is shown by the record, "either in the bill of exceptions or in some other proper manner." In the case of Hardin v. Sparks,
The court charged the jury to the effect that "if appellant in reloading the shipment of goods at Sherman, upon the Frisco car, did not exercise ordinary care to properly reload and pack said goods, and such failure was the direct and proximate cause of the goods being damaged while in transit from Sherman to Springfield, Mo., to find in *287 favor of the defendant, St. Louis San Francisco Railway Company, over against appellant such damages as occurred between said points."
It is contended in effect that this charge is erroneous in that (1) it made appellant liable for all the damage occurring between Sherman, Texas, and Springfield, Missouri, if the jury believed appellant was guilty of negligence in reloading the goods at Sherman, whereas the jury may have believed appellant guilty of such negligence and yet may not have believed the same caused all of the damage; (2) that the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad was the final carrier and the one on whose road the damage to the goods was first discovered, and the evidence was insufficient to remove the presumption of law that the entire damage occurred while said goods were in its possession and through its negligence. To this contention we do not agree. In addition to the paragraph complained of by appellant, the court instructed the jury as follows: "If you believe from the evidence that defendant Texas Pacific Railway Company did exercise ordinary care to properly reload and pack the goods on the car at Sherman, Texas, then you will not find against said defendant anything for damages to said goods, if any, occurring between Sherman and Springfield, Mo., and if you believe from the evidence that the alleged lost goods were not lost between Wills Point and Sherman you will not find anything for lost goods over against the Texas Pacific Railway Company. If you find for the plaintiff and also find from the evidence that a part of the damage occurred on each of the defendant company railroads, you will find for the plaintiff against each defendant the damages that occurred on its line, without the fault of the other, if any. If you find all the damages occurred upon one line or the other you will find for plaintiff against such defendant."
When considered as a whole, as must be done, the court's charge fairly and correctly presented the law applicable to the facts. The evidence was sufficient to rebut any presumption of liability on the part of the St. Louis San Francisco Railroad Company, and justified the jury's conclusion as manifested by their verdict, that the damage to appellee's property was the proximate result of the negligence of appellant while the same was in transit from Wills Point to Sherman, or, the failure on its part to exercise that degree of care and caution that a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same circumstances in transferring and reloading said property at Sherman, Texas.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Writ of error refused. *288