*2 WALKER, C.J., Before BURGESS GAULTNEY, JJ.

OPINION WALKER, L. Chief Justice.

RONALD per- A. made a claim for Jeff (“PIP”) protection injury benefits he his for an incurred as exited litigation truck. This ensued pick-up insurer, Farm Bureau Texas Mutual the claim. Company, Insurance denied inju- The trial court found Sturrock’s a “motor vehicle acci- ries resulted from insurance within severing After Sturrock’s bad suit, separate into faith cause of action for the trial court entered $2,555 attorney fees on Sturrock’s plus Texas Farm of contract claim. breach issues in its following Bureau raises the appeal: one: insurance

Issue Sturrock’s personal protec- him entitles resulting coverage only injuries tion for “motor accident.” Stur- from a injured his foot became rock was when of his got pickup. he entangled when object was person, No other stopped and pickup was involved. His off, portion of Sturrock’s turned pickup. body impacted any meaning of plain, ordinary Using the accident,” was Sturrock “motor vehicle accident? in motor vehicle involved insurance Issue two: Sturrock’s injury protec- him entitles resulting for only tion Does from a “motor vehicle accident.” Insurance Code Article 5.06-3 neverthe- Maddux, Buthod, require coverage less Amy Douthitt Tynan Botts, L.L.P., Houston, does not result from a appel- Baker accident”? lant. body issues any portion pickup.”

These concern the Insurance of his of his requiring personal injury pro- Code article the inci- Texas Farm Bureau contends that (“PIP”) coverage tection lia- automobile agreed dent in the described statement bility policies: “No automobile not an facts is accident for which benefits *3 liability ... lia- covering be payable policy’s per- would under the bility arising out ownership, mainte- injury protection it coverage because nance, any or use of be motor vehicle shall did not involve a collision or near collision ... pro- delivered unless personal injury motor and between the covered vehicle ” coverage provided.... tection Tex Ins. vehicle, object. person (Vernon 1981). Code Ann. art. 5.06-8 Berry Dairyland County Mut. Ins. “ injury protection’ ‘Personal of consists Tex., (Tex.Civ. 428, Co. 534 S.W.2d of provisions of a motor liability policy vehicle 1976, writ), App. no held in Worth — Fort which provide payment to named plea an appeal granting from the of a of up $2,500 insured ... to an amount of ... injury by that an privilege received for payment of all expenses reasonable alighting insured while from his vehicle arising from the accident....” Id. Stur- was an “accident” within the of rock’s policy requires Texas Farm Bureau Al Article 5.06-3 of the Insurance Code. pay personal injury protection benefits though by endorsement form utilized bodily injury: because of resulting “1. company policies the insurance on like that accident; from a motor vehicle and sus- to Berry issued required tained aby covered person.” “Covered occur in a person” defined any to include appellate language court reasoned that occupying covered auto. The “ the coverage would narrow afforded states, in, ‘Occupying’ upon, get- means by repugnant Article 5.06-3 would be in, on, ting out or off.” Berry, the statute. at 431. agreed The statement of facts submitted The court reasoned that a con reasonable 1) to the trial court stipulated, part: phrase struction would include “an PIP obligated Texas Bu- Farm in a accident sustained motor vehicle while reau pay bodily benefits because of a process alighting the insured was injury “resulting from motor vehicle acci- using therefrom after same.” Id. 2) by sustained person; a covered “occupying” Since the insured was a motor 3) person; Sturrock awas covered hurt, when he was driving pick-up, his parked and Dorsey Id. The court relied on covered. 4) ignition off; turned the “Sturrock then Co., Fidelity Casualty Union 52 S.W.2d door, opened turned and and as he was (Tex.Civ.App. Waco, writ — vehicle, exiting the left foot his somehow dism’d), payments coverage where medical entangled, became he slipped almost injured by was found when someone was himself, caught and fell and and that discharge gun being the accidental when burning he felt his neck and Surety loaded into a and Southern exiting shoulder area. The the vehicle Davidson, (Tex.Civ. Co. v. 280 S.W. 336 5) that.”; caused him do “He his hung Worth, 1926, writ), no App. — Fort foot on the raised of the door sprained his he insured ankle when 6) truck.”; facing on his “Sturrock some- on a brick he exited vehicle. stepped as his neck, shoulder, injured how his upper more on the getting light back as he was Later caselaw sheds pick-up.” 7) April Court of dis- “Sturrock’s 10 was not issue. Eastland impact any portion tinguished Berry on its facts in a PIP case Le case involved a door to the court followed in a

where the insured closed the Farm steps falling. car-jacking. fatal Schulz v. State vehicle and took four before Co., Auto. Dairyland Mut Ins. Co. Mut. Ins. County Flores v. (Tex.Civ. Tex., (Tex.App . —Houston n.r.e.). writ).

App. writ ref'd — Eastland interpret require “We Article 5.06-3 “courts in almost all cases Recognizing, exist necessity relationship of some causal an accident need not have determined that ing between the vehicle and accident collision,” be the Texarkana Court in an recovery sustained before analysis Appeals rejected employed in be under the accident could made “superfluous unsupported dicta.” Le as *4 coverage Id. injury protection provided.” Lindsey, Ins. Tex. v. Century Mid Co. of at 895. ( Tex.App.—Texarkana 942 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.1999). Peck, 1997), affirmed, 997 S.W.2d State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. review, Supreme the Court petition no On for (Tex.App S.W.2d 910 . —Amarillo conflict be writ), liability apparent did not discuss the a claim on an auto involved cases, fresh dog employed the a by by a a tween policy passenger bitten considering how the issue analysis to The during trip a the veterinarian. jurisdictions. in other of held term had addressed Appeals Amarillo Court the been Lindsey, unambiguous Mid-Century to an Ins. Co. Tex. “auto be accident” of (Tex.1999). Lindsey in where one or 997 S.W.2d 153 referring term “situations coverage type in some of volved the underinsured motorist more vehicles are involved in rear climbing a the boy or with ve a case where collision near collision another hicle, dislodged a object, parked pickup at The person.” or Id. 913. window buckshot, discharge it causing shotgun, court accidents where the distinguished person sitting another from which struck a vehicle is in some manner involved as Id. 154. The court parked in or near car. at merely place accidents that take required that the term “accident” an Id. sumed automobile. found an “auto but nevertheless drive-by holding In victim of a that the an accident by the were benefits, shooting not entitled to PIP was Id. at policy. of the within the disagreed of with the First Court 155-56. Mut. County Le v. Farmers Texas Berry. Court dis- Co., Supreme (Tex.App. Lindsey, In the Ins. denied). Tex- in Farmers decision writ cussed its earlier —Houston Griffin, stated, County as Ins. Co. the context Mut. The court “Within (Tex.1997), that held a insurance, liability legisla automobile acci- an “auto shooting was not coverage, drive-by includ types ture intended all under duty to defend per giving rise a liability, uninsured motorist and ing at 155. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d limited injury protection, to be the term acknowledged that There The court situations. motor vehicle accident 3(b) to situations fore, to ‘the accident” refers refers “auto when article 5.06— with are “involved” accident,’ one vehicles vehicle or more it means the motor acci vehicle, Id. object, person. or au legislature dent which the created 83, and at Griffin, 955 S.W.2d (quoting Id. at 324. liability insurance.” tomobile 913). rea- Peck, The court at that the instrumentali court reasoned soned, holding or language in the “Nothing plaintiff’s injuries a ty that caused suggests Peck] and of either case The same gun, not the car. Id. [Griffin requires rupted that an the causal chain between the use of ‘auto accident’ collision or in this excludes occurrences like the one as a the vehicle vehicle case.” Id. at 156. The court reasoned resulting from that use. liability

that out of’ the use of “arise Bureau argues Texas Farm “a or motor causal connection or near requires “auto accident” a collision relation must exist the accident objects. collision between We note injury and the use of the motor vehicle.” property dam “collision” defined adopted Id. at The court follow- liability age portion of the policy, ing test: is not “colli policy limited to For an within “use” to fall whole, Viewing sion.” as a (1) of an automobile term “motor vehicle accident” does not accident must arisen have out of any impact, physical provided necessitate automobile, inherent nature as the facts demonstrate causation between (2) such, the accident must arisen the use the accidental within natural territorial limits person. incurred covered automobile, and not the actual use must *5 moving, Had the vehicle been and had (3) terminated, the automobile dragged along ground Sturrock been merely must not contribute to cause door, hung up because his foot was on the which produces injury, condition but impact there would be no produce injury. must itself clearly and the but Id. (citing at 157 Couch InsuRance “produced” by would have been (1997) 119.37, § at 119-56 and 6B A. John Here, stationary, the pickup vehicle. was ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE actively was still in engaged ed.) (1979)). § (Buckley at 367-69 of using the act the truck as a means of The cases here cited address several transportation place from one to another. liability provisions different of motor vehi- policies. cle Ultimately, pri- Accepting Farm premise Texas Bureau’s mary distinction is between those cases that the term “motor acci- only where the vehicle incidentally is in- may require dent” be construed to more provides volved and the “mere situs” “accident,” that, than we hold consistent an incident that any- could have occurred Supreme with the interpretation Court’s where, and those injury- cases where the accidents, auto the event that resulted act producing involved the use of a vehicle ac- Sturrock’s was Lindsey, as a vehicle. In boy’s pur- cident” within the of his automo- pose gain was to entry to truck and his bile Issues over- one two are gun entirely contact with the inadver- ruled. The is affirmed. boy’s tent. Id. at 158. The efforts AFFIRMED. gun enter the vehicle dis- charge. Id. GAULTNEY, Justice, B. DAVID The inherent nature of a pickup dissenting. of conveyance,

truck is an instrument use mounting respectfully of which necessitates both I In Tex. dissent. Farmers dismounting. engaged County Griffin, Sturrock was Mut. Ins. Co. v. exiting (Tex.1997), process the truck Su- when S.W.2d Texas got caught part preme foot on a of the truck Court held that “auto term intervening instrumentality unambiguous itself. No dis- approved accident” definition following used the Amar- Appeals: illo Court of

“The term ‘auto accident’ refers situa or are tions where one more vehicles vehicle, object, involved with another or Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. person.” State Peck, (Tex.App.— writ). Amarillo Similarly, the term “motor vehicle acci- and, unambiguous like the term “auto refers to situations or more are involved with one vehicles vehicle, object, person. or Tripping getting while a vehicle one not what comes to mind when hears the term “motor vehicle accident” “auto accident.” Sturrock admitted as much admis- response appellant’s request I sion when he stated: “Admit was not accident’, involved in an ‘motor vehicle [sic] involving I in an accident but was involved *6 a motor vehicle.” is governed I believe this case Grif- I reverse and render would fin. here did not from result motor vehicle accident. HARRELL,

Douglas Appellant, Chad Texas, Appellee. STATE 14-00-01100-CR, 14-00-01101-CR. Nos. Texas,

Court (14th Dist.). Houston 6, 2001. Dec. Rehearing Jan. Overruled